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No. 71-864 
FCC v. Business E~ecutivest Move for Vietnam Peace 
No. 71-865 
Post-Newsweek Stations v. Business ~tives' Move for Vietnam Peace 
No. 71-866 
ABC v. Democratic National Committee 
Cert to CA DC: Nright, Robinson; dissenting: ~1cGo~ 
This case was before the Court a little while ago an a 
stay pending appeal. The Court denied that stay. 
~.a 
At issue is the rule of the DC CA that flat bans on ~litieaL-
advertisements are prohibited by the ~ 1st Amemdment. That 
court remanded these cases to the FCC to devise regulations 
as to how some access to politicaJ advertisement could be 
achieved given the ~x~Exme problems of limited broadcast time 
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and fairness to ~pposition . The court did not rule that 
-~ 
the radio and t . v. stations had to sell advertising time to 
the two complaining parties, the Democrats and the Businessman. 
It did not rule that the media had to be available to all who 
wanted to purchase time. It prohibited only a fxxx flat ban - -
on editorial advert isements and it remanded to the FCC to 
work out equitable rules for ~NxiXiEx editorial advertisements . 
Since the FCC had initiated such a review before the opinion 
couft 
in the ~XENNK below, it did not even disrupt the FCC's procedures . 
Before this opinion, the situation was that some , probably 
most, radio and t . v . stations would sell editorial advertisementso 
But local station \ITOP refused to sell the Businessmen a minute 
to talk againstx the war. Moreover, the Democfy/ts , anticipating 
the necessity of heavy use of the media to xix raise money for 
the upcoming campaign, sought a ruling fNm from the FCC on 
the legality of flat bans . After the FCC upheld that x~&gxxxif~x 
legality, this appeal to the DC CA resulted . 
Before I get into to the arguments advanced x by pets 
seeking cert , I want to indicate my bias in favor of what the 
DC CA did . It is standard 1st Amen}ent doctrine that a govt 
(and there is no question of state action here) cannot close 
a XNXN!RX forum to a would-be S::JO!RXE speaker , arbitrarilY. . 
Radio and t . v . permit commercial advertisers to pay money and 
utilize the fxNm forum . But they arbitrarily , at least in 
some cases , say that persons presenting what they call :JONN 
political views may not have access to that XNN forum . The 
!R r~ason they give fNxx to justify this !R!Rm seemingly arbitrary ,, '" 
action is that Xk!R¥ they are compelled by the fairness doctrine , 
which has been upheld by this Court , to air both sides of 
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political questions. But the obvious fallacy in that postition 
is that the media, and not the interested parties, control 
the initation and content of such presentations. Moreover, 
the line between commercial advertisement and ~Mxixi~x editorial 
advertisement is certainly not a bright one. Witness for 
example the oil companies ads on t.v. trying to counteract 
the bad publicityx they have received from gxx environmentalists. 
Or, the railroads ad, featuring some xxxxNXMg~xx astronaut, 
in which they actually request the viewerg to oppose a bill 
pending before Congress. What CA DC has sai~s that this 
arbitrary line between editorial and commercial advertising 
cannot stand and that some editorial advertising must be sold ..... 
KN if any advertising is sold. It left the FCC free to develop 
regulations of editorial advertising, which presumably could 
aNx include a ban on spot advertising or even short, one 
minute ads, if it were determined that political issue cannot 
be responsibly sold like soap. In short, I think the opinion 
below is both xxx very narrow in scope and is consistent with 
1st amendment doctrine. 
Petrs argue xk that when the Court upheld the fairness 
doctrine in Red I.ion ~XHNN~HXXXNN Broadcasting Co. v. fCC , 
395 U.S. 367, that ix it x~g recognized the concept that no 
1roup has an MNEXiNg unabridgeable right to access to the 
media and that the FCC has primary responsibility to control 
access to the airwave in the public interest. It is said that 
the decision below infringes on that ~X~~ responsibility. 
Congress and the FCC hade chosenk NKXMXR to use the fairness 
doctrine to insure the public interest which allows the media 
to determine the initial access and gives opponents a right to 
responde. To pr'event unfair control of in'tial access, the 
" 
stations are charged with a responsibility of airing pro~ms 
in the public interst, and the FCC enforces that responsibility. 
/'"" 
The dtcision below is said to en$croach. The various n!tw~ks 
involved in this suit say that the decision below will play -.. 
havoc with this system--the ~~most affluent will have access, 
no control over issues that m2Y be to insignificant to_9ir 
will be exercised; valuable time will be wasted on replys. 
""' Finally, the dc~cision is said to ~Nf conflict with the Court's 
opinion in Red Lion where it was said that there was no general 
right of access ENXK but that the public had a 1st amemdment 
right to receive suitable information. 
Resps R do not deny that there are substantial issues that 
kexg~xx the Court will have to resolve, but they say that the 
case is not ripe at this time. The d~cision below does not 
alter station control over broad:cast time--as opposed to 
commerical x±em time--and it was broadcast time that was the 
subject of Red T.ion. Horeover, all that has been done is to 
I 
remand to the FCC to devise rules; therefore, all the horribles 
such as ~NNKXNX dominance by the affluent, are mere speculation 
at this time. And since many stations do not follow a policy 
of a ~ flat ban on editorial advertisements, it cannot be 
accurately said that such horribles will in fact followe. 
Since the FCC has already begun to study the matter, and might 
inf fact conclude from this study that a flat ban is impermissible 
the Court should stay its hand HRXXH awaiting the results of 
the study. The court below has not denied that the FCC has 
still primary responsibility for regu~ating KN±x br0adcasting. 
To this petrs xe~xk~ reply that there is a difference 
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between a study by the FCC that is free to conclude that all 
~~x editorial advertisement may be banned and a study that must 
permit editorial advertisement, but in a regulated form. 
As a secondary arguemtn, some of petrs say that two old 
cases, Nassachusetts Universalists Convention v. Hildreth & 
Rodgers Co ., 183 F . 2d 497 (1st Cir . 1950); Mcintire v. William 
Penn Broadcasting Co., 151 F . 2d 597 (3rd Cir. 1945)., both 
of which rejected claims of a right of access. But in each 
of these cases, one of the gournds was that the activities of 
private broadcasters was not an act of the state so that the 
ixxxx 1st Amendment was not involved. That theory has since 
been Nix~x~Nixx~x discredited xi because of the involvement 
of the govt in the boradcasting industry. Mcintire , however, 
lA, 
does contain language that is sqarely in opposition to the 
1\ 
opinion below. 
Were this case not so narrow, I am sure that I would 
recommend a grant , EXK but I think that tme Court can wait 
to decide the constitutional ixxe issue. No one is going 
to be required to change his policy toward editorial adver-
tisments immediately, if the Court does not grant review. 
Such a change would come about only after the FCC desings 
its regulations.aNNXXXKRXXKN~~ After that happens, they will 
undoubtedly be appealed, and the case will undoubtedly be 
before the Court on cert again. At that time there will be 
a full record on the feasibility of various ways of regulating 
editorial advertisffiments as well as a set of proposed regulations. 
With such a recodd, the Court could make a better judgment, I 
beWe on the Constitutioal issues. As in many cases, the 




fN For example, in determining whether or not editorial ad-
vertising can be flatly banned, it will be essential to determine 
if there is any good way to limit it. There is no question, and 
CA DC did not hold, that the 1st amendment right of access 
was unlimited. To review this limited right, it is going to 
be necessary to determi'ne what those limits are. Therefore, as 
a ~x*~xxx practical matter, I would deny the case now, and 
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CBS v. Democratic National Committee 
FCC v. Busniess Executives' Move for Vietnam Peace 
Cert to CA DC: Wright, Robinson; dissenting: R~EiKX~K McGowaa 
These cases were combined in the court of appeals 
XEN and have been treated as one case. The Business Executives 
M~KRXSOCMgk~x~~ Move sought to purchase advertising time on WTOP 
in Washington in which it would broadcass a message in opposition 
to the govt's policies in Vietnam, WTOP had a rule against 
selling advertsing time for political mexxxxgexxx messages--
outside of an actual campaign-- and refused to xee sell the time. 
The Bu~ess Executives than sou~ht relief before the FCC which 
ruled against them. The Democrats also sought relief before 
the FCC against CBS and ABC which have policies against selling 
CONTROLLING CASE: Red Lion Broadcasting Co, v, F,C,C., 
395 u.s. 367 (1969)~ Police Dept v. Mosley, 40 LW 4877 (1972). 
advertising time for so-called editorial advertisements. 
The Democrats did not specify precisely what kind of advertising 
they were interested in other than their interest in off"year 
advertisement to help raise money to pay off the ~xm~xxRgx 
campaign debt from 1968. In both case:s the FCC refused to 
rule that the networks and stations had to sell so-called 
editorial advertising. It did not rule that they were prohbited 
from doing so, but only that the fairness requirment imposed t:Y -statute and regulation did not require them to do so. 
The court of appeals reversed the FCC and xameRXNX 
remanded the case for a series of administrative hearings. 
It's actual ruling was ~sxxe quite narrowa 
"We hold specifically that a flat ban on paid public 
issue announcements is in violation of the First KM~RemeR~ 
Amendment, at least when other sorts of paid announcments 
are acdepted. We do not hold, however, that the planned 
announcements of the petttioners--or, sxx for that matter 
of any ohter particular applicant for air time--must 
necessarily be accepted by b~dcast licensees. Rather, 
we confine ourselves to invaiioating the flat ban alone, 
leaving it up to the licensees and the Commission 
to develop and administer reasonable procedures and 
regulations determing which and how many "editorial 
advertisements" will be put on the air." 
Because, as of this date, there are no briefs filed in this 
case by resps, I will go into the reasoning of the court of 
appeals in some depth in order to balance the quite extensive 
briefs filed by the FCC and the three major networks. My discussion 
will no doubt miss some of the tri::R things raised in the resps' 
briefs, so I urge you to give them special attention when they 
come in. 
Although resps argued before the court of appeals 
from the statutory public interst and fairness requi{ment ~ 
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the opinion below was based on the Constitutional ~i:aii:x claim, 
The Ml!m~ doctrine that constitutional claims should be avoided 
xReXex where there are available statutory claims was circumvented 
by the argument that the non-constiturional arguments closely 
~:ax:aiiie paralleled the xx:ax constitutio~l ones, the implication 
being that if, and only if, there was a constitutional violation, 
there was also a statutory violation, It may well be that 
resps will argue that the statutory claims are seperate and 
that they are entitled to be reconsidered on a remand in ~ke 
the event that the Court rules against them on the constitutional 
ground, 
The opinion :klii!IJ§XXHex below next establishes that 
the First Amendment is applicable here. It does so by first 
noting that the Red Lion case defined a first amendment i:xxNe 
interest of the general public as underlying the fairness 
doctrine, From this, it is concluded that the dominant first 
amendment iaterest is that of the public, and not of the networks 
and stations, The latter follows in part and ties in with the -;_;.;.~ 
argument that there is governmental action when a network or u.....<'c;/~ 
station refuses to sell advertising time, N Broadcasters are 
not mere private businesses :kle~:a:Na:ax because of the extensive 
involvement of the government in a regulatory role, Almost 
no other busniess is so intimately regulated and involved with 
the government, Moreover, there is J!!Xex specific governmental 
involvement in this case because the FCC gavm its imprimatur 
to a flat ban on editorial advertising, In other cas~, the 
specific acquiescence of a governmental regulatory agency in an 
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activity of a private, regulated business has been held to be 
x governmental action. In Public Utilities v. Raxxak Pollak, 
343 u.s. 451 (1952), the Court found governmental action sufficient 
to bring the First Amendment into play, whe.n a g regulatory 
agency had held hearings on and dismissed a complaint against 
piping in radio programs on city buses in the District of ~aiMEM 
Columbia. Secondly, the court neted that broadcasting was 
an important almost essential form of communication in this 
society. So essential is it, that it cannot be regarded as purely 
private. 
Having brought the First Amendment into play, the court 
noted that there was no first amendment interest of the broadcasters 
involved, because the focus was on advertising, in which persons 
other than the boradcaster spoke, rather than on normal programming 
in which the broadcaster was the speaker. The question then is 
what is the public's First AmendmentxixxMexiRX interest in 
advertising time. The court of appeals identified theee interests. 
The first was specifically recognized by the Court in Red Lion, 
which was in having access to a 1!1XXJ!!Rilfg spectrum of information. 
Second, the public has an interext in an uninhibited presentation 
of that infromation. Third, memeers of the public have an 
interest in effective self-expression. This last interest does 
not mean that every member of the public has an unabridgeable 
right to aceess to the airwaives; such a right would be physically 
impossible. But the public has a limited interest in being able 
to use the air waves to present its views. Because advertising 
is iRiK iniated and its content for the most part controlled by 
the advertiser, rather than by the braodcaster, as is the case in 
£very JN'f,-/;u./ 
v 1 ewj>o ;11f 




fJ ro.j r et m .,...'I!!),; 
onl! m ~.Jcr 
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in normal programming, it is important to wide-open debate 
and individual self-expression, Even if regular programming 
could contain the entire x~e«g spectrum of political views, 
it could not present them all in the same ways that memeEe 
advertisers could and would, and the fact that it was supervised 
and controlled by the broadcaster would tend to have some inhibiting 
effect, IBxkE* Moreover, it is zxxxx fairly obvio~s that 
regular programming cannot present all viwpoints, 
The court of appeals argues that even considering only 
the Jiju public's First Amendment interest EI§E«xf«:Xxxx~xxe«ag»xx 
specifically recognized in Red Lion, the interest i:RX in access 
to a wide spectrum of views, it is clear that xxxxxkaxexxi: that 
~~/ 
interest cannot be met by programming alone, Ti\eee a per se 
ban on editorial advertising admittedly interfer&s to some 
-exxe»lli extent with a xai::xlli valid first amemdment i:xxx interest, 
Recognizing all this, the court considered the specific 
• a<'<-· .. t 1 
case of a stat~on or network which exc .pts advertising but not 
political advertising, It left open the question of a station 
that e accepts no advertising, It notes that several lower 
courts have already ruled that stations cannot distinguish 
between non-controversial advertising and controversial advertising 
unless they can show a clear and present llixg»exxxssx« danger 
would result from the latter. The clear and present danger 
test or something like it requires that before access to a 
fprum is prohibited, there must be some compelling reason, 
This requires a balance, with significant weight being attached 
to the constitutional value, Prohbited speech cannot be 
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distinguished on the basis of content alone, becauee those 
who control~ the forum have no right to censor the flow of 
ideas or to discriminate between ideas they like and those 
that they do not like, 
Thus, the court argued that the networks could not 
distinguish editorial advertising because it was controversial 
political 
because such a distinction favored the/status quo and apathy 
and because the line was difficult to draw. Some would find 
Army recruitment ads controversial and reflective af a repugnant 
~NXX« political view, Some other justification is necessary, 
In the court beN it was arguecdl that if editorial advertising 
were accepted, there would be too much of a dmeand thereby 
creating chaos, the rich could buy up the time, thereby creating 
an imbalance, and broadcasters who accepted advertising on one 
side of an issue might have to give up a lot of free time for 
equ~treatment which would be financially disasterous, The 
court rejected all these arguments as J!!Xft:IXI!! premised on the 
assumption that if editorial advertising were permitted it 
would have to be unlimieed, The court acknowledged that 
broadcasters were not common carriers who had to accept all 
advertisements; it ruled only that editorial advertisements 
should be considered and that some should be aired, That 
advertisement would be sub~ect to regulation by the broadcasters, 
An outside limit on the total amount of such time sold could 
be imposed as could a limit on where and when the advertisments 
could be aired, The details of the regulation were left to 
the FCC to decide on remand Nat: after hearings, Guidelines 
could be developed to make sure that all the time was not sold 
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to persons of one persuasion, Nor would the fairness ru~e 
have to be enforced with such rigidity to bring about financial 
«xx disaster. None of these problems are serious enough to 
outweigh First Amendment interests. 
Judge McGowan filed a brief dissent to the court's 
lengthy opinion, He emphasised his belief that the result of 
the court's opinion would be the dominance of the editorial 
advertising by the xXfxMe»« affluent who were likely t to be 
of the same political ~exxMxxxxaxx persuasion. He expressed 
doubt that the FCC could work out rules that would prevent 
such a result, 
PrrRS' AR~Ems 
The focus of petrs is on the entire programming of 
broadcasters, not just on advertisments. This entire programming 
is governed by the fairness requirement, which this Court approved 
in Red Lion, and which requires a balanced presentation o~onflicting 
views on public issues, This doctrine recognizes that the 
broadcasters' First Amendment rights are XMEax»XaxxxMEax subordinate 
to those of the general public, But when it comes to how the 
public's interest should be promoted, Congress has empowered the 
FCC with discretion and power to make these complex and difficult 
decisions, There is no set way to promote this interest, and 
the Commission must necessarily be given some leeway, provided 
of course that the means it chooses are consistent with the 
First AMe»NexxAMeN Amendment, If the Commission rejects &R 
xffxxmxxx a certain approach because it regards it as impractical, 
its judgment should be sustained if possible. Such an approach 
recognizes that these are complex matters not easily resolved 
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by courts and are more properly left to the expertese of the 
administrative agency to which Congress has committed the 
decision. 
In this case the FCC's decision is sustainable. It 
is clear that broadcasters are not common carriers who have 
to accept advertisements from everyone who is willing and able 
to buy time; the federal statutes clearly rejected a provision 
~ 
that would required licensed ENXRNN broa~casters to be common 
carriers. But the NX decision of the court of appeals in this 
case approaches such a requirement. The Commission's app~ch 
of studying the matter is a superior and permissilbe x one. 
iKX~RRNNKXEexa The court of appeals erred by focusing on 
advertising time only; the proper question is whether in the 
entire amount of broadcasting time, is ~ enough1 time devoted 
to discussion of public issues. That goal, which is all the 
First Amendment ~aRxme requires, can be met without selling 
editorial advertising. 
There are, in addition, practical reasons why editorial 
advertising may be rejected by broadcasters. Only those persons 
of sufficient wealth will have a right of acess, yet the Court 
in Red Lion disapproved a system in which only the highest bidder 
would axe have an opportunity to speak. A firt-come~first-serve 
approach would not resolve this problem, and if the FCC were 
required to regulate who could speak, in order to achieve a 
balanced approach, it »NX would be interjected into day-to~day 
decisions in a way that it is probably incapble of handling. 
Mor~er, it is possible that the Commission's decision requiring 
-9-
broadcasters to occasionally give free time to achieve a balanced 
presentation of views from persons who cannot afford to buy time 
might be applied to editorial advertising, This ooight result 
in an unreasonable erosion of advertising revenues. If the 
Fairness Doctrine xxe were suspended to avoid these problems, 
the presentation would not be balanced, Finally, since the 
amount of editorial advertising would no doubt be limited, 




and thi'K would require it to choose between persons, 
than affirm~ the court of appeals, the Court should 
the FCC to continue the comprehensive inquiry it has 
already begun conce'ning coverage of controversial public issues. 
II 
The FCC does not argue, but the networks do argue that 
governmental .---- -
there is no :sx:xxe/action when a braodcaster, iE licensed by 
the govt, NeHie:s refuses to sell advertising time. Broadcasters 
are said to be private persons who themeselves have First 
Amendment rights XJ!!X~xax:e~x assertable against the govt and 
not a part of the government. The mere existence of :iiER~e:sRiR~ 
licensing and regulation, plus the Commissions specific enlflorsement 
of the challenged policies, dOE!S not convert their actions 
into governmental action, 
A slightly different a~ument than the Commission°s, 
which the networks advancep is that the only First Amendment 
right the public has in this case is the right to hear varying 
views on public issues. It has never before been held to have 
a right to assert those views ix:sei« itself. Resps have not 
proven that this right has been abridged. Quite the contrary 
-10= 
I 
with respect to the ~XRRX Vietnam war, it is clear that the 
public has been exposed ot all views, 
DISCUSSION 
1. STATE (GOVERNMENTAL) ACTION 
The threshold ±Rxex question is whether or not there is 
sufficient involvement of the national govt in thel activities of 
licesned broadcasters so as to infuse their action in refusing 
to sell advertising time with governmenatl action. If there 
is no gmceacxR governmental action, x:Rexe the First Kalelhi:m:.eR:Kj{ 
Amendment does not apply, While I think that ~here is clearly 
govt action in this case, I am not sure that a :fxRN::icg finding 
that therel was no govt action would get petrs off the hook, 
For one thing, resps sued under the Federal Communications Act 
fairness standard as well as the First Amendment. The l!fl!IXL'Court 
of appeals found that the statutory standards were so related 
to the First Amendment that i~xx it was easier to res~e that 
issue, but even if it were held that the First Ameddment did 
not apply, there would still be a statutory claim. Since that 
statutory claim seems to be at least closely related to First 
Amendment concepts, regardless of whether the First Amendment 
itself actually adheres, something very close to First Amendment 
analysis would seem necessary in this case at any rate, In 
addition, there is the fact that the FCC is involved as a party 
in the case. There can be no question that action by the FCC is 
governmental action,since it is an agency of the national govt. 
Thus, the First Amendment would apply to actions of the FCC, 
and it could at least be argued that there is a First Amendment 
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violation as a result of FCC actions approving the refusals 
to sell commercial time for ~~« editorial advertisements, 
I am convinced that in any case there is ample govt 
action. As you know from Moose Lodgeythe question of govt 
action is one of dgree, the issue being whether there is sufficent 
govt involvement to say that there is govt action in the actions 
of anN otherwise private party, In the Wilmington Parking Lot 
case, the Court found state action in a situation where a state 
state-owned 
leased a space in a/building to a private restaurant, In this 
case, Congeess has determined that the national govt must 
hand out and control the use of the limited number of air spaces 
x that are available for bmaodcast use, Those licenses are, 
needless to sayx, quite valuable and essenatill privileges, 
Licensees are regulated to a d~ree that probably surpasses 
regulation of any other industry, Thus, the govt has said that 
only certain private persons may utilize this vital means of 
communication,and that they may communicate according to rules 
set by the national govt, It seems to me that that is sufficient 
gll§Elt govt involvement so that it can be said that denying 
others the use of the media for advertising ~~ purposes is 
state action. The private licensees only have the power to 
do this because of their govt-granted licenses and because of 
govt regulations, Mll§XNRX~X¥XXHX Moreover, in this case, the 
govt agency specifically apjbroved the ~i policy of denying 
editorial advertisements, if the licensee so chose, so that 
the denial of access to the airwaves carries with it a specific 
govt imprimatur. Surely, this case is far removed from the 
-12-
Moose Lodge situation both in the nature of the license granted 
E~XX8NXXXXE~Hxxxx by the govt in relation N to theJeperations of 
the private party and in the amount of xgxxegNxaxN regulatory 
involvement of the govt. In Moose Lodge, for example, the 
Court disapproved E of the state regulation requiring licensees 
to g~x follow the provisions of their ~kaxge charters because 
one of the provisions of the Moose charter was white's only 
and because adherence to that regulation and that provision of 
the chatter would have placed the xN§~x imprimatu/f of the state 
behind the discrimination. The govt involvement in this situation 
seems to be sig!b.ificantly greater than that involvement in 
Moose Lodge which did establish a limited state action. 
Perhaps the final word <hn govt action can be taken by 
implif ation from footnote 3 in the Moose Lodge case which reads: 
" Unlike the situation in Public Utilities Comm'n v. 
Pollack, 343 u.s. 451 (1952), where the regulatory 
agency had affirmatively approved the practice of the 
regulated entity after full investigation, the Pennsyl-
vania Liquor ~~Hgxf&:RN Control Board has xe:i}C neither 
approved nor endorsed the racially discriminatory 
practices of Moose Lodge." 
2. FIRST AMENDMENT 
It seems to me that a valid starting point for analysis 
of this problem is a case, in which you joined, that was decided 
after the opinion in the Court of Appeals. Police Department of 
the City of Chicago, v. Mosley, concerned a Chicago ordinance 
which ~~x prohibited all picketing :iH£xxx in front of schools 
except labor picketing. This seems to me analagous to the 
challenged broadcaster rules which permit private persons to 
buy air time for commercial messages but which prohibit ~~mmex~xa 
-13-
political messages. In M~x~x~ Mosley, the Court ruled in no 
uncertain terms that a government may not under the Equal Protection 
clause (which this Court has ruled is part of the Fifth Amendment 
Due Process clause and applies to the federal govt as well as 
to the states) and the First Amendment x~xkxx~k grant or deny 
the use of a forum on the ba!lis of the content, That is precisely 
what is done here and what the court of appeals has said cannot 
be done, In keeping with the Court's pronouncement in Red Lion, 
the court of appeals ruled that there was no unabr~eable 
First Amendment right of access to the airwaves, ~N but it 
ruled that where broadcasters sell time, they cannot choose to 
sell or not to sell time on the basis of whether the message 
is commercial or political, 
It is important to focus on the narrow holding of the 
opinion below, The court did not rule that time had to be 
sold to every person who wanted it to put forth a political 
message. The traditional discretion of the broadcaster over 
providing the proper ERXRN~~x~x amount and balance of controversial 
material, which exists at present with respect to programming, 
would be maintained with respect to advertising, As petfs point 
out in their briefs, the content of advertisements is not 
completely uncontrolled by the broadcasters at present. This 
control would be ffjintained. Nor did the court of appeals rule 
that the broadcasters had to provide and unreasonble amount of 
time for political messages or that they had to pnovide free 
time to RHMex answer those messages. It left those matters to 
the expert supervision of the FCC. It ruled only that where 
-14-
' time was sold for advertising, a flat ban on so-called political 
advertising could not be permitted, I believe that this result 
is dictated by Mosley. 
It is argued by petrs that the ~NEXX~ only First Amendment xx 
right involved in this case is the public's right of access 
which the Court said was paramount in Red Lion. Even Kk were 
this a correct reading of Red Lion xNxKkaK there would still 
be a violation of ex equal protection under Mosley, but that is 
not a correct reading of Red Lion, In Red Lion , the Court 
wa~oncerneJ with balancing the First Amendment rights of 
broadcasters with the First Amendment rights of the public. 
The Court acknowledged that there were other First Amendment 
rights that existed, but in striking the balance, it found the 
interest of the public in xex receipt of balanced information 
was paramount. It did not rule, howeverp that there were not 
other First Amendment rights that were protectable in a proper 
case. The Court did say that there was no unabridgeable right 
to access, but it did not imply that there was no right, albeit 
non-absoulte, And in terms of the First Amendment 9 xx it is, 
to say the least, conceptually difficult to conceive of a 
First Amendment ~ght to re~~ive information, but not First J 
T/te Fio:s+ A.m,~rnvn+- JfJetd15 c:rF ·Fr if ec ntJt".f'rAJM, -/., l:rltn, 
Amendment right to sen out ormation. That right is admitte y 
not absolute, but it exists to some extent and cannot be * 
disregarded as the broadcasters would argue. 
Although Mosley ~ seems to say that it is always impermissible 
to discriminate on the basis of the content of the expression, 
it goes on to consider the discrimination in that case as if 
it were based on some other factor which might be permissilbe 
-15-
in some circumstances. The appraoch is the stan 
i.t:. I p~ Sj:t"t'c."' 
equal protection approach when a undamental right is being 
impaired. To justify an impairment of that fundamental xxgkNX 
right, it is necessary for the government to demonstrate a 
compelling interest. If that approach were adopted here, 
I would still think that the court of appeals should be affirmed. 
The justification for the discrimination against political 
messages xeeemx seems to be that if they are xxaxx»ex available 
for sale, either one of two sxxaxxi unsatisfactory alternatives 
will result. First, axxxxkexxxmexx%xxx»exEasgkkxs~x»~ the rich 
and affluent will buy up the vast majority of the time. Or, 
second, to prevent this imbalance, the networks and broadcasters 
will have to give away a lot of free time thereby imperiling 
their financial situation by cutting their advertising revenues. 
On analsysis neither of these reasons holds up. 
Both are premised on the belief that the opinion of 
the court of appeals affords political advertisers unlimited 
access to the airwaves. As I have tried to emphasise, the 
opinion of the court Nfa of appeals does not so xx rule. It 
only says some access must be afforded to some advertisers, 
not that every advertiser has a right to preeent his message 
if he can pay for it. It further leaves it Xk to the FCC to 
~xeg draw up xxsxxsxx rules that will prevent just the kind 
of unfortunate situations the petrs predict. Petrs sayx that 
no such workable rules can be drawn up, but I am unable to see 
why. All Xk~ the FCC need say is that a small percentage 






Presumably., a small enough xxmxe time would be set aside so 
that there were many more potential advertisers than theee 
were time. In this situation, the broadcasters, as they do 
with regular advertising and programming, would have to pick 
and choose between potential political advertisers in an attempt 
('"'\, 
to provide a bal) anced spectrum. While one side~ of the 
~~Xi~ political spectrum might be better able to afford the 
cost of these ads than another, gtxeR there will be some who 
can afford it from both sides, particililarly when resources are 
pooled into political organizations as was done by resps in 
E~Xk these cases. Thus, an imbalance is unlikely given a 
limited amount of air space, and it is also unlikely that much 
free time will have to be alloted. These regulations can, after 
all, be reasonable ones; petrs assume that they will be un-
reasonable. 
The other practical argument against the opinion of 
the court of appeals is that it will XRKX~ involve k the FCC 
too much in the day-to-day functioning of individual broadcastlers. 
I frankly do not understand why the involvement will be sufficiently 
OVf!r-alf 
greater than at the present where the FCC supervizes t e 
of regular programming and of advertising in the case of X:Rk:e 
the broadcasters who permite political ads. At present, FCC 
control is pretty loose; the broadcasters are generally entitled 
to exercise their own discretion in maintaining a balance, and 
the issues only come before the FCC when there is a licensing 
renewal hearing at which the entire record of the broadcaster 
is reviewed, And even if it were true that more FCC involvement 
-17-
would result~, that disadvantage, which is speculative at best, 
hardly seems to rise to the level of a compelling reason for 
the restriction of free expression. 
It should be finally recognized that thex system, where 
it exists of forbidding political or controversial advertising 
.) 
is a kxl§kxz:ae haphazard one that is arbitrary in its application, 
For example, the railroads have put on the national networks 
:kl:ixx blatant poltical ads in which an :a::s:xxxxxsgk:kx astronaught 
urges the viewer to XN:kextix£Nxge:kxxx write his Congreesman 
(I forget whether it is for or against) a certain bill, Oil 
companies are putting on ads trying to show how much they are 
doing to fight polution. While I§Xe::s:sa~x:kl:ie~ presumably this 
builds good will, it no doubt is also intended to mobilize 
public support against what the oil companies view as extreme 
forms of regulation of the oil industry for environmental purposes, 
Could the Sierra Club run counter ads saying that oil companies 
x cause oil spills, or would that be I§N:iXxx~x political or too 
controversial7 Or could the Quakers or a pacifist group run 
ads opposing Army recruiting ads?NKX:kkexgxNNKX The NExXNNi~ 
NExXNMi obvious problem is that political or controversial 
ads cannot be seperated from commercial ads or public service 
messages. It is this reason ultimately why broadcasters should 
not impose this rule :ixa~xxxxg forbidding all editorial ads, 
because such a rule e inevitably supports the political ::s:x:aNx 
status quo and that in itself is a form of political censorship 
and discrimination, Indeed if the Democrats are unsuccessful 
in this suit, and if, as is quite possible, their well-known 
-18-
financial problems intensify, after this election they may 
bex ruined XN financially if they have no access to the mass 
media to raise money. If the court of appeals is reversed, 
they will have no such access outside of an election campaign. 
Thus, the decision of the networks not to accept political 
ads may have a profound effect on the viability of a two party 
system. 
I want to again emphasize the narrow appreach that 
the ~~Nx court of appeals took. It does not xa~xx require 
that the Nexxesx networks be flooded with poltical advertisements, 
that they xeeX sell to all customers, that they give away time. 
It says only that if they sell time, they must sell some time 
for editorial advertisements,and it leaves to the FCC the job 
of working out how xka this goal can best be accomplished so 
as to maximize free expression and to minimiz~ if not prevens 
any adverse effect on the networks. 
AFFIRM Fox 
N.B. I neglected to deal with the argument that the 
public is already exposed to a balanced treatment of the 
controversial issues xk~xx through regular programming. 
First, the public has, as I have argued before, some limited 
and abridgeable right to spe~k as well to receive information. 
Second, there is a considerable difference in the quality of a 
message when it is reported by a neutral reporter on a news 
program from when it is put forth by an advocate. The public 
cannot get as adequate coverage if its receipt of i:Imx information 
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can necessarily give only one or two views of the major xa~gmNx 
factions of a political issue. This necessarily leaves out 
smaller factions whose views are still different; there are 
after all more than two sides to most issues. Since MNXKXNX ~ 
xkex~xBX~NR good proportion of the public gets all its information 
about current and political events from radio and television, 
many persons will be unexposed to views that do not fall into 
either of the two major camps and which are therefore not 
included within network news shows. Thus, unless one is either 
a member of a major political camp or an extemist type who 
says things wild enooghJ to make news, one has no way of presenting 
his views to a large percenta~e of the public. 
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CHAMBE R S OF 
.JUSTICE WILLIAM 0 . DOUGLAS February 4, 1973 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE: 
In 71-863, C.B.S. v. Democratic 
National Committee and companion cases I will in 
due course circulate a dissenting opinion. 
( 
William o. Douglas 
The Conference 
cc: Law Clerks 
I 
CHAMBERS OF 
A\u:prtmt {!fo1trt of tqt ~nittb ~tatts 
Jrasirmgton, ~. <!J. 2ll~"~j 
JUSTICE WM. J. BRENNAN. JR. February 5, 1973 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE 
RE: Nos. 71-863 to 71-866 - Columbia Broadcasting 
System v. Democratic National Committee 
In due course I shall circulate a dissent in the 
above cases. 
W. J. B. Jr. 
I 
CHAMBE R S OF 
.JUSTICE POTTER STEWART 
Dear Chief, 
~lt}trttttt <!Jcnrt cf t4t ~ttittb $5tatttt 
~nttlyi.ttgtcn. ~. <!J. 20.S:J~~ · 
February 6, 1973 
No. 71-863, etc., - CBS v. 
Democratic Natl Committee 
You have done an extremely thorough job in 
this important case, and I agree with the result you reach. 
I also agree with much of your proposed opinion, but por-
tions of it, particularly Part IV, cause me considerable 
concern. 
The upshot is that I shall probably write a 
short concurrence, but shall await the dissenting opin-
ion before undertaking to do so . 
. Sincerely yours, 
The Chief Justice 
Copies to the Conference 
CHAMBE R S OF 
JUSTICE POTTER STEWART 
Dear Chief, 
.:§nvrtmt <!Jcn:rt cf t4t 'Jllnittb .:§tateil 
~atl4inghm. gl. <!f. io.?J!-,;l 
February 6, 1973 
No. 71-863, etc., - CBS v. 
Democratic Natl Committee 
You have done an extremely thorough job in 
this important case, and I agree with the result you reach. 
I also agree with much of your proposed opinion, but por-
tions of it, particularly Part IV, cause me considerable 
concern. 
The upshot is that I shall probably write a 
short concurrence, but shall await the dissenting opin-
ion before undertaking to do so. 
Sincerely yours, 
The Chief Justice 
Copies to the Conference 
CHAMBERS OF" 
.JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE 
.iu:vrttttt (!fttnrt cf tqt ~ttittlt ~tatts 
1Jaslri:nghtn, lfl. <!f. 211~'!-~ 
February 9, 1973 
Re: Nos. 71-863, 71-864, 71-865 and 71-866 - Columbia 
Broadcasting System, Inc . v. Democratic 
National Committee 
Dear Chief: 
Because you reach and decide the First Amendment 
issue as a statutory matter in Part IV, I do not see the 
reason for Part III, which concludes that the conduct of 
private broadcasters does not constitute official action 
subject to review under the First Amendment. Indeed, I 
thought the Court normally avoided constitutional issues 
that were unnecessary to decision . 
I would n~in any event agree with Part Ill. The 
broadcasters make substantial claims that their conduct 
is either authorized or requireq by the Fairness Doctrine, 
and your Part IV seems to recognize that the Fairness 
Doctrine and other Communications Act policies are· greatly 
implicated in the challenged broadcaster policy. I had 
thought that an otherwise private act ordered or 
authorized by statute or other official policy constitut-
ed governmen~a1 conduct for constitutional purposes. 
Peterson v. City of Greenville, 373 U.S. 244 (1963); 
Lombard v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 267 (1963); Reitman v. 
Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967); Moose Lodge 107 v. Irvis, 
407 u.s. 163, 178-179 (1972). 
Otherwise I am in agreement with your opinion. 
Sincerely, 
The Chief Justice 
If~ 
Copies to Conference 
~u.pumt ~curt of tqt ~ttittb ~tutts 
2Jifa:slthtgtott.lJ. <!J. 2.0gt'!.;1 
CHAMBERS OF" 
JUSTICE WILLIAM 0 . DOUGLAS February 10, 1973 
Dear Chief: 
I had hoped to have a dissent 
around by Monday the 12th in No~.71-863, 
71,864, 71-865 and 71-866 - CBS v. 
Democratic National Committee. 
But I'll not be able to do so. 
I may possibly have it by Friday the 16th. 
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At this stage I will not try to respond specifically to comments 
and memos received, except to make the following points: 
1. There appears to have been some confusion about the purpose 
of Part IV of the opinion. Some have asked whether it is necessary to 
reach the 11 governmental action 11 issue in Part III since Part IV appears 
to decide, on both statutory and First Amendment grounds, that the CA --
erred in imposing a right of access. It was not my i~tention, however, 
to decide that the statutory and First Amendment issues are identical, 
but rather to suggest that there are 11 constitutional aspects 11 to the statu-
tory question since Congress has most explicitly incorporated First 
Amendment 11 values 11 into the Communications Act. Nevertheless, if it 
-r"~ 
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will help, I am willing to clarify Part IV by stressing that there we deal 
only with the statutory question and deal separately with the First Amend--
ment issue. But we cannot escape deciding whether the First Amendment --
itself requires a right of access, unless we stop with a holding of no 
governmental a.ction. I cannot be persuaded that governmental acguies-
cence equals gpvernmental action or that there is governmental action 
here. No case of this Court comes close to sustaining such a holding here. 
2. The approach taken in Part IV of the opinion, of course, will 
depend on whether or not there is general agreement on "governmental -
action 11 is sue. -----
If the lack of votes "persuades" me to omit Part III, I think we 
would be obliged to say, of course, that even assuming, arguendo, bu,t 
without intimating an affirmative view, that there is "governmental action" 
present, never~heless the CA is wrong on holding a First Amendment 
. ' 
right of access. To me that is a cart-before-the-horse approach. 
I firmly feel this is an appropriate case to rely on alternative 
grounds since it is not a case that can be disposed of without dealing with ......---
' . 
both the !!.sJ: and the First Amendment. This opinion should be structured - --
so that 
· A. We find no governmental action. 
B. Even assuming governmental action, we find no 
violation of First Amendment rights. 
' J 
· C, No violation of the Act. 
- 3 -
I now have spent months in tearing that issue apart, and I see ----
in the Court of Appeals 1 holding a greater threat to "free press" than 
some others may acknowledge. If a "governmental acquiescence" leads 
~==============:-
to a "governmental action11 holding, I suggest we ponder the implications 
in two areas: 
(a) the Fourteenth Amendment, on which I will say no more 
than suggest a reading of Professor Jaffe's thoughtful 
article in ~rv. L. Rev. 768, 782-87; and 
(b) the printed media, which we must recognize is heavily 
subsidized by special mailing rates, which for some 
publications may be the margin of survival, and by anti-
trust immunity, without which many large newspapers 
could not exist. (Professor Jaffe's article also provides 
a helpful analysis on this problem.) 
For my part, I do not want to enlarge governmental action concepts so as 
to embrace what government permits as distinguished from what it .££!!!_-
mands. 
-.. -
This case is crucial to the media, and I have approached it with 
a view to giving broadcasters a posture as nearly as possible like that of 
a private newspape~, consistent with the regulatory scheme. I do not 
want broadcasters regulated more than they are now, which would surely 
be the result of a Court of Appeals' holding. 
Lzx~·· 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST 
~u.vumt Q}llttd O"f tJrt ~ttiltb ~tafts: 
jlra:s:lrhtghm, ~. <!}. 20gt'!~ 
February 15, 1973 
Re: No. 71-863 - CBS v. Democratic National Committee, etc. 
Dear Chief: 
I agree with your memo of February 14th, and with 
Potter's comments earlier circulated, to the effect that 
g~rnmental acquiescence on the facts of this case does 
n9t amount to governmental "action" for First Amendment 
purposes~would favor the suggestion made by you in 
your memorandum that Part IV include the statement that 
. --· there only the statutory question is dealt with, so that 
there can be no misunderstanding. Assuming that that 
sort of a change will be made, I join your opinion. 
Sincerelyy 
The Chief Justice 
Copies to the Conference 
J 
I 
CH AMBE RS OF 
..JUSTICE POTTER STEWART 





CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Committee/~~ _tv-
Nos. 71-863 through 71-866 ll .... r 
~ 11.~ " 
Dear Chief, 
I don't know if you expected responses to your memo-
randum of February 14, but, if so, here is a brief and belated 
one. I am in general agreement with much that is said in your 
memorandum, and in particular I agree with what you say on 
page 3. My specific thoughts, in a nutshell, are these: 
(1) We obviously ll,!Ust deal with both the constitution-
al and !!_atutox:_y i~sues, because the petitioners cannot prevail ~ 
unless the respondents are wrong on both issues. I am con- . 
vinced the respondents are wrong on both issues. 's 
(2) I . do not believe that in the context of this case an~~ 
i~epend~nt decision of a radio station or of a r~dio network is gs rt 1..:Je 7& 
a decision of the Government. ( ~ ,"}_,1-zdJ.. a-<-~ ) q ~ ,;;r, 
(3) Since the First Amendment is a restriction upon ~· 
governmental action only, the decisions of the radio stations 
and networks in this case do not implicate that provision of the 
Constitution. 
(4) Propositions (2) and (3) above are so clear to me 
that I would be quite unwilling to "assume" that the broadcasters' 
decisions were Government decisions, even arguendo. 
(5) If the Government (i.e., the FCC) did impose the 
respondents' suggested restriction upon the broadcasters' 
freedom of independent decision, then the broadcasters would 
have a very serious First Amendment claim. " 
- 2 -
(6) I think the respondents' statutory claim is totally 
invalid-- almost frivolous. I would deal with it dlrectly and 
briefly without mentioning the First Amendment or any other 
provision of the Constitution. 
(7) Perhaps my thinking has been unduly influenced 
by Hugo Black, but I am instinctively leery of talk about "First 
Amendment 'values' " or of the "values" of any other provisions 
of the Constitution. 
All of the above may seem, to you and to my other 
brethren, too abecedarian a view of the issues involved in this 
litigation. But that is the way I see them. 
The Chief Justice 




;%u.prnttt <!Jonrt of tire ~lniit~ ~tatca­
:Wna-lri:ttgtcn. p. ~· 20~'1-.$ . 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE WILLIAM 0 . DOUGLAS March 29, 1973 
Dear Chief: 
In Noo 71-863 - CBS Vo 
Democratic National Committee - you 
are quite right o My opinion is not 
a dissento I concur in the judgment 
of reversal and will circulate a new 
drafto 
The Chief Justice 
cc: Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 
.jtqtrtmt Q):ttu.rt ttf tqt 'J[ttittlt ~tetfts 
'Dasftingftttt, !lJ. Q):. 20gi'!~ 
.JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL March 29, 1973 
Re: 71-863, 71-864, 71-865, and 71-866 
Dear Chief: 
In response to your memorandum of 
today on the above cases I had joined Bill 
Brennan's dissent this morning. 
Sincerely, 
The Chief Justice 
cc: Mr. Justice Blackmun 




~uvrtutt Qfttttd of t~t 'J)lnitttt ~tafts 
11htslyingLnt. ti). <q. 20~>1~ . 
JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL March 29, 1973 
Re: Nos. 71-863, 71-864, 71-865, and 71-866 
Dear Bill: 
Please join me in your dissent . 
. Sincerely, ~l___ 
T.M. 




THE CHIEF .JUSTICE 
.:§u.prtut~ Qfllltri of t4~ ~b .:§taus 
Jfasfringhm. ~. <!f. ~ll~~~ 
March 29, 1973 
Re: 71-863 - CBS v. Dem. Natl. Com. 
71-864 - FCC v. Bus. Exec. Move for VN Peace 
71-865 -Post-Newsweek Stations v. Bus. Exec. 
71-866 - ABC v. Dem. Natl. Comm. 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE: 
This case is beginning to take shape in terms of the 
"line-up" and I will undertake to suggest a "score sheet" as it 











concurs with possible separate 
opinion as to ~art IV since he 
feels Part III disposed of the 
case 
possible concur except as to 




will concur with possible 
reservations as to Part IV which 
may now be removed if Part IV 
is limited to the statutory claims. 
The net of this is that there are now four votes for a judgment 
t~rse, and if Thurgood, Harry and Lewis stay witli thei r co ilierenc'e 
votes, then the vote willlike1y be 6-3 to reverse with varying positions 
among the six. 
2 
I will therefore now address myself to possible recon-
ciliation of divergences among the six. 
Among other things, I will make it clear that Part IV 
is directed at the statutory claims. 
Potter, Bill Rehnquist and I are probably firm in the i 
view of "no governmental action. " In preparing the opinion 
I placed this point in Part III so as to facilitate the sorting out 
process. Only if Harry and Lewis conclude to join this will 
there be a Court for Part III. With or without a Court on Part 
III, I believe we cannot and should not avoid discussion of the 
factors in Parts III and IV. 
I will now circulate a new draft to see if reconciliation 
is possible. 
CHAMBERS 01" 
THE CHIEF .JUSTICE 
Re: 
To: 
j;u.prtntt <!Jltltrl: of tqt 'J!lnittb j;Wts 
JfasJringhtn. J. "f. 2ll&f't~ 
March 29, 1973 
71-863 - CBS v. Dem. Natl. Comm. 
71-864 - FCC v. Bus. Exec. Move for VN Peace 
71-865 - Post-Newsweek Stations v. Bus. Exec. 
71-866 - ABC v. Dem. Natl. Comm. 
Mr. Justice Marshall 
Mr. Justice Blackmun/ 
Mr. Justice Powell 7 
I address this separate memorandum to you three because 
you may be pondering Part III, the "governmental action" aspect. 
If the action of a broadcaster is "governmental action" 
I submit that conclusion would create some large new problems 
under the Establishment Clause. 
1. Can "governmental action" be permitted to 
sponsor church service programs on radio and 
TV? 
\l 
2. Can we say that broadcaster action is ••govern- \ 
mental 11 for the Speech Clause but not for the 
Establishment Clause? 
With the volume of mail hitting each desk these days, I 
send this only to those who have not responded on the circulated 
draft and the February 14 memorandum treating Part III in parti-
cular. 
CBS v. Democratic National Committee 
No. 71-863 and companion cases 
\\CK 
April 12, 1973 
I have now reviewed in detail all of the circulations 
in these cases. In present form, the Chief's opinion 
relates the factual and regulatory background,in the 
Introduction and in Parts I and II ; finds no governmental 
action,in Part III; and finds no violation of the public 
interest standard of the statute,in Part IV. Footmote 
17, at the beginning of Part IV, reserves the First 
Amendment question as a technical matter but goes on 
' 
to state that the First Amendment question is indistinguishable 
from the stat• utory one. 
With the mmnor exceptions which I will note at the 
end of the memorandum, the statutory discussion is 
I think in accordance with your views both of the 
statute and of the First mendme.nt, and I recommend 
that you join the statutory discussion. In contrast, 
I find the Chief's discussion 1 ' ?i; of governmental 
action wholly unpersuasive for the reasons I will 
outline below. And since the opinion, in effect, 
decides the First Amendment question in accordance 
with your views, the decision on the governmental action 
point is unnecessary--at minimum, the governmental 
action question is a difficult constitutional question 
which the Court ought not to reach out to decide. 
I. 
There is, in my view, governmental action here on 
( 
either of two related theories, The first is essentially 
Justice Brennan's theorya 1) the broadcast industry 
is subject to fairly heavy regulation as is evideced 
by the provisions detailed in footnote 8 of Brennan's 
~ 
opinion, by the Fairness Docttine imposing ~umber of 
specific content-related obligations on the industry, 
and by the requirement that one have a license to 
broadcast==I emphasize that these are in conjunction 
and not alone; and 2) having passed the threshhol~ 
of general regulation, the FCC in addition investigated 
the specific policy challenged here and declined to 
I find this case indistinguishabl~om - __...._____ ___ Act. 
Public Utilities Comm'n v, Pollak, 343 U,S, 451(1952), 
There, the public ualities commission had general 
regulatory authority over a privately-owned bus 
company, When the bus company played irritating 
music on the buses, a citizen complained, the Commission 
investigated, and then the Commission dismissed the 
citizen complaint, The Court stateda 
"We do recognize that Capital Transit operates its 
service under the regulatory supervision of the 
Public Utilities Commission of the District 2of 
Columbia which is an agency authorized by Congress, 
We rely particularly ._ upon the fact that that 
agency, purasuant to protests against the radio 
program, ordered an investigation of it and, 
after formal public hearings, ordered its investigation 
dismissed on the ground that the public safety, 
comfort and convenience were not impaired thereby," 
i 343 u.s,, at 462. 
The Chief at~pts on page 24 of his draft to 
distinguish Pollak, He asser~, without a single 
-3-
supporting citation, that "Congress has not established 
a regulatory scheme for broadcast licensees as pervasive 
\\ 
as that in Pollak, He then shifts to a discussion of 
the extent to which Congress wished to leave broadcast 
decisions to the licensees. He does not discuss in 
this context the Fairness Doctrine, though later in the 
opinion he relies fairly heavily on it in showing that 
there is no need for"advertorial" access. Then, a~ 
if to recognize the weakness of the foregoing arguments, 
he states a 
"Perhaps a more basic distinction between Pollak 
and this case is that Pollak was concerned with 
a transportation utility that itself derives no 
protection from the First Amendment." 
Apart from the fact that I do think a traxnsportation 
utility has some First Amendment rights, the distinction 
between Pollak and this case .. relates not to governmental 
~ 
action but to the substance of the First Amendment. -
Certainly, in deciding whether the policy of refusing 
advertorials is ~ consistent with the First Amendment . 
one ought to weigh heayily the First Amendment rights 
of the broadcaster, but I fail to see how this relates 
to governmental action. 
This brings me to the second theory of governmental 
action. I was suprised to see that Justice Brennan 
did not cite and rely upon Railway Employe• s' Dept 
v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225(1956) and its progeny, 
-4-
Hanson upheld over a First Amendment challenge a provision 
of the Railway Labor Act which authorizes rai• lroads 
and unions to enter union shop agreements. The Court 
reached the First Amendment question only after finding 
governmental actionY 
"The enactment of the federal statut te authorizing 
union shop agreements is the governmental action 
on which the Constitution operates, though it takes 
a private agreement to invoke the federal • sanction". 
351 u.s., at 232. 
Hanson was reaffirmed in Intl Ass'n of Machinists 
v. Street, 367 U.S. 740(1961) in which the Act was 
construed "to avoid serious doubt of its constitutionality" 
as forbidding unions to spend dues for political 
purposes over the ob• jection of individual mem• bers. 
Finally, in Latn..prop v. Donahue, 367 u.s. 820(1961), 
the Court upheld the Wisconsin requirement that a 
lawyer join an integrated bar, noting that the case 
resembled Hanosn and suggesting by implication that 
Street princi• ples would prohibit the bar from using 
mem .. bership fees to. engage in poli• tical activities 
offensive to its members. It seem$ to be that 
a es stand collectively for the pro osition 
or 
near-monopoly and places it in private hands, those ........___., 
who control the or near-monopoly are engaged ------------... 
to some extent in governmental action for the purposes 
of First Amendment limitations. Of course, mere licensing 
-5-
does not place such power in private hands. The Moose 
Lodge involved in Irvis had only one of more than 
100 liquor licenses in the area, and those were liquor 
licneses rather broadcast frequencies. Here, at least 
arguably, the government drove private persons off 
the air in order to establish the present regulatory 
scheme and severly restricted the number of licenses. 
In short, I think that there is governmental action 
here. I find Pollak almost conslusive as a matter of 
precedent, and while the Street argument is a more 
g , D -!-
complex one calling for further elaboration and limitation 
by this Court, it should not be ignored and ought not 
to be foreclosed in a case where decision on the 
governmental action point is not necessary. 
II. 
I take it from Justice White's circulation that 
he is in basic agreement that the Court need not and 
' 
should not decide the governmental action question. 
. __ --., ~---
Informally, I understand that Justice Blackmun is 
also uncertain on this point. That leaves the Chief 
and Justices Stewart and Rehnquist. 
Jus ice Stewart seems to have been the moving force 
in pl~ng emphasis on the governmental action question, 
As I see it, he wants to rely on this point alone 
in order to preserve his freedom in a subsequent case 
to state that the FCC may in no case regulate the 
content of broadcasting. This, of course, is inconsistent 
-6-
with Red ~ion, where the constitutionality of the 
obligations imposed by the Fairness Doctrine was 
upheld. In addition, Justice Stewart's earlier 
circulation suggests that he would denude the 
stat• utory discussion of any but the most 
obliques references to the First Amendment. In sum, 
his position is that because there is no governmental 
action, the First Amendment is not implicated, and 
that the statutory claim is frivolous and relates only 
to the "public interest" a vague standard the 
administration of which is always left to the relevant 
agency. I do not think that this accords with 
your '\iew. 
An additional comment seems appropriate regardihg 
the "parade of horribles" offered by the Chief in 
his circulation of March 29, 1973. There, he 
asks 
"Can "governmenatl action" be permitted to sponsor 
church service programs on radio and TV7" 
In my view, the answer is "yes", for two reasons. 
To state that an action of the broadcaster approved 
ala Pollak is gover~ental action is not to conclude 
that the boradcaster does .not himself have First 
Amendment rights. Surely the storeowners in Logan Valley 
and the company in Marsh were not stripped of their 
First Amendment rights by the Court's conclusion that 
they must respect the First Amendment rights of others. 
-7-
The second point is that the First Amendment also has 
;· 
a Free Exercise Clause, which may permit or(conceivably) 
require boradcasters to allow religious programs. 
The general point is that these are all questions of 
First Amendment balancing made more difficult and 
touchy by the peculiar nature of the broadcasting 
medium--broadcasting is peculiar for First Amendment 
purposes and we therefore often defer to the FCC, 
but I have seen no reason to support the conclusion 
that boradcasting is special for governmental action 
purposes. 
III. 
There are a few nits which I would pick with 
Part IV of the Chief 0 s opinion. We have alrea~ discussed 
two of them, when the cHief circulated his first draft. 
One is on page 30, There, the qinion statesa 
"To agree - that debate on public issues should 
be 'uninhibited, robust, and wide-open' does not 
mean that we should exchange the 0 public trustee' 
broadcaster for the unregulated • editorial huckster, 
and for no better reason than that we are already 
compelled to bear with an overabundance of 
unwelcome commercial hucks:ertbsm." 
I find this offensive and wholly unnecessary. W~ 
have no reason to believe that the particular persons 
who sought access in this case are hucksters, nor 
that the general run of such people would be, 
A second is on page 32, Again, I see no point in 
referring to the material sought to be presented as 
"unwanted propaganda" thrust upon the public. 
-8-
Finally, I find footnote 26(page 34) a gratuitous insult 
to the Court of Appeals. This is, after all, a difficult 
and important case in• which the CA wrote a scholarly 
opinion. 
IV. 
In corli1usion, I would join the statutory discussion 
without the offensive passages, but would await 
a brief opinion from Justice White or write one 
yourself indicating that the statutory discussion 
disposes as well of the First Amendment claim and 
stating that you would not reach the question whether 
there was governmental action here. 
i9u.ptttttt Of4tnrl ttf tltt ~tb ~Udtg 
' 11Jas£rhtgf4tn. W. Of. 2llp'!~ 
CHAMBERS OF 
.JUSTICE BYRON R. WHITE 
April 16, 1973 
Re: ##71-863, 71-864, 71-865 & 71-866 -
Columbia Broadcasting System v. 
Democratic National Committee 
Dear Chief: 
As I have previously indicated, I join 
Parts I, II and IV of your opinion in these 
cases, as well as the Court's judgment. I am 
still having difficulties with Part III, how-
ever, but will either join it or shortly 
circulate a brief opinion. 
Sincerely, 
~· 
The Chief Justice 




CHAMBERS O F 
.JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST 
~ltltftmt C!fourl of t4t ~tb .i%tatts 
-ufrington, ~. <q. 2rlbf~~ 
April 19, 1973 
Re: Nos. 71-863, 71-864, 71-865 and 71-866 - CBS v. 
Democratic National Committee, etc. 
Dear Chief: 
Please join me. 
Sincerely, 
The Chief Justice 





April 19, 1973 
Re: Nos. 71-863, 71-864, 71-865 and 71 -866 
CBS v. Democratic National Committee, etc. 
I hesitate t o mention language changes in an opinion which has 
been as difficult and complex as the above, and in a case to which you 
have cootr ibuted so much to a satisfactory result. 
It does occur to me, however, that the language of the opinion 
in some instances may unnecessarily invite criticism. On page 30, the 
opinion refers disparagingly to ''unregulated editorial huckster(s)", and 
to "an overabundance of unwelcome commercial hucksterism". While 
I certainly agree with you as to the characterization of much commercial 
advertising, and suspect you are right in your estimate of many of the 
"editorials" that would result, I would not wish to brand all parties in 
both categories as "hucksters". The same thought occurred to e as 
to the phrase "unwanted propaganda" being thrust on the public (page 32). 
No doubt most of the paid editorials would be unwanted propaganda, but 
I can think of some that I myself would like to pay for to counteract 
what I now regard as the biased and often distorted "reporting" of the 
regulated media. 
I thought I might share these thoughts with you. 
Sincerely, 
The Chief Justice 
lfp/ss 
Re: Nos. 71-863, 71-864, 71-865 and 71-866 
CBS v. Democratic National Committee, etc. 
Dear Chief and Harry: 
In view of our conversations, both of you know that I have had 
difficulty with Part III of the Chief's fine opinion for the Court. 
I have concluded after further study, including a review of 
,Jaffee's article, PubJic Utilitie~q_~mmission v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451, 
and other authorities that I remain in doubt on the governmental action 
issue as it is presented in this case. Nor do I think it necessary for 
us to decide that issue. 
Accordingly, I write to join in the Court's judgment and in 
Parts I, II and IV of the opinion. I will also join in Harry's concurring 
opinion. 
Sincerely, 
The Chief Justice 
Mr. Justice Blackmun 
cc: The Conference 
j5u.prtm:t Qfmtrl of tlr~ ~ j5taf:ts 
Jlas4ittghtn. J. OJ. 2Ll~'1~ 
CHAMBERS OF" 
THE CHIEF' JUSTICE 
-... ....,.,. 
May 23, 1973 
Re: 71-863 - CBS v. Dem. Natl. Comm. 
71-864 - FCC v. Bus. Exec. Move for VN Peace 
71-865 - Post-Newsweek Stations v. Bus. Exec. et al 
71-866 -ABC v. Dem. Natl. Comm. 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE: 
The third and probably final draft of the above opinion went 
to you earlier today, and I had intended to send a cover letter 
calling attention to a substantive change in. Part IV. The 
change restores the first draft approach of dealing with both 
the statutory claims of the First Amendment claim in Part IV. 
In the second draft Part IV was not an explicit First Amend-
ment treatment as it now is. There will probably be a Court 
on Part IV since Justices White, Blackmun, Powell and 
Rehnquist have indicated in prior voting an acceptance of 
Part IV as now written. 
P. S. -- For the record I would appreciate hearing from 
those woo join. 
'· 
CHAMBERS OF" 
.JUSTICE WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST 
~u.ptttttt <!fonrl cf t4t ~tti:ttb $5hdt-0' 
~htslpngtcn. ~. <!f. 2llc?4~ 
May 24, 1973 
Re: Nos. 71-863, 71-864, 71-865, and 71-866 - CBS 
v. Democratic National Committee, et al. 
Dear Chief: 
Had Part III of your opinion gotten a Court, I would 
have preferred to see Part IV cast in nonconstitutional terms. 
However, since Part III did not get a Court, I join you in 




The Chief Justice 
Copies to the Conference 
~ltprttttt . <!}curl cf t~t 'Jllttittb ~taftg 
1 'lhtlllrhtgtcn. ~. <!f. 2llbl'-~~ 
CHAMBERS OF 
.JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE 
May 24, 1973 
Re: Nos. 71-863, 71-864, 71-865 and 71-866 -
CBS v. Democratic National 
Committee 
Dear Chief: 
As before, I join Parts I, II and IV of 
your opinion (Draft No. 3) as well as the judg-
ment of reversal. 
Sincerely, 
The Chief Justice 
Copies to Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 
.SuvrtttU ~ourt o-f t4t ~ttittb .itatts 
'c$as!pttgton. ~. ~· 2ll.;i'-!..;l 
JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN 
May 24, 1973 
Re: No. 71-863 - CBS v. Democratic National 
Committee and related cases 
Dear Chief: 
I join your recirculation of May 23, with the explana-
tion of the limits of my joinder as set forth on page 1. 
Sincerely, 
j/. u. If. 
The Chief Justice 
cc: The Confe renee 
.ju:pt"ttttt C!fou.rt of tqt 'J!!ttittb ~tattg 
~aglrittgtou:. ~. QJ. 2llc?'~;t 
CHAMBERS OF 
.JUSTICE POTTER STEWART 
. "". ~ ...... 
'ot!; ~~. 
May 24, 1973 
Re: No. 71-863, CBS v. Dem. Natl. Comm., 
and Related Cases 
Dear Chief, 
In response to your memorandum of May 23, 
this will confirm that I continue to join Parts I, II, 
and III of your opinion. 
The Chief Justice 
Copies to the Conference 
Sincerely yours, 
(/<;' I . ,. 
/ 
Re,ferring to your third draft, recirculated May 23, I write 
to confirm that l join in Parts I, nand I,V. ,ofyour opinion for the 
Court t rewain with Uarry in his conc~rring opinion. 
In Part IV the Court determines "whether, assuming 
governmental action, broadcasters are required" to accept 
editorial advertisements ''by reason of the First Amendment." 
Ante, at p. 26. The Court concludes that the Court of Appeals 
erred when it froze the "continuing search for means to achieve 
reasonable regulation compatible with the First Amendment 
rights of the public and the licensees" into "a constitutional 
holding." Ante, at p. 37. The Court's conclusion that the 
First Amendment does not compel the result reached by the 
Court of Appeals demonstrates that the governmental action 
issue does not affect the outcome of this case. I therefore 
refrain from deciding it. 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE POTTER STEWART 
~u:p-umt <ijourt of t4t 'Jllnitt~ ~tattt.l 
~ail4htghm. g:l. <.q. 20~,~~ 
May 25, 1973 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE 
Re: Nos. 71-863 et seq., CBSv. Dem. Nat'l Comm., etc. 
In the light of Harry Blackmun' s revised concurring 
opinion, I have had to make changes in my opinion. Enclosed 
herewith are a revised first paragraph and first sentence of 
the second paragraph of Part ll of my opinion. I trust that 
the printer will be able to make these changes in time to bring 
these cases down on Tuesday. 




CBS v. DNC, Etc. 
PS cone 
II. 
Part IV of the Court's opinion, as I understand it, seems 
primarily to deal with the respondents' statutory argument --
that the obligation of broadcasters to operate in the "public 
interest" supports the judgment of the Court of Appeals. Yet two 
of my concurring brethren understand Part IV as a discussion of 
the~~ First Amendment issue that would exist in these 
cases wer e the action of broadcasters to be equated with govern-
mental action. So, according to my Brother Blackmun, "the 
governmental action issue does not affect the outcome of this 
case." Post, at . The Court of Appeals also conflated the 
constitutional and statutory issues in these cases. It reasoned 
that whether its decision "is styled as a 'First Amendment deci-
sion' or as a decision interpreting the fairness and public interest require-
ments 'in light of the First Amendment' matters little." 450 F. 2d 642, 
at 649. 
I find this reasoning quite wrong and wholly disagree with it, 
for the simple reason that the. First Amendment and the public 
interest standard of the statute are not coextensive. 
CHAMBERS OF 
j;up-rmu <!feud ltf tJrt ~ttitt~ .~hdts 
._,asfringbm. ~. <!f. 2ll.;t~$ 
JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN 
May 25, 1973 
Re: No. 71-863 - CBS v. Democratic National 
Committee and related cases 
Dear Lewis: 
The enclosed is what I am sending down to the 
Printer as a substitute for my circulation of May 14, in 
which you have joined. 
I am assuming, from our conversation of this 
morning, that this will be acceptable to you. It is in 
somewhat different form from that which you handed me 
at conference, but I feel certain that the content is the 
same. 
Sincerely, 
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Vietnam Peace. 
American Broadcasting Compa-




On Writs of Certiorari 
to the United States 
Court of Appeals for 
the District of Co-
lumbia Circuit. 
[February -, 1973] 
MR. CHIEF JusTICE BuRGER delivered the opinion of 
the Court. 
We granted the writ in these cases to consider whether 
a broad~st licensee's general policy of not selling adver-
tising time to individuals or groups wishing to speak out 
on issues they consider important violates the Federal 
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Communications Act of 1934. 47 lT. S. C. ~151 el seq., or 
the First Amendment. 
1n two orders announced the san1e clay, the Federal 
Communications Commission ruled that a broadcaster 
who meets his public obligation to provide full and fair 
coverage of 1)ublic issues is not required to accept edi-
torial aclYertisements. In re Busi11ess Executives' Jl,fove 
fo~elnarn Peace, 25 F. C. C. 2cl 216; !11 re Democratic 
Kationnl CommiLLee, 25 F. C. C. 2d242. A divided Court 
of Appeals reversed the Commi:::sion, liolclitw that a 
broadcaster's fixed policy of refusing editorial advertise-
ments violates the First Amendment; the court remanded 
the cases to the Commission to develop procedures and 
guidelines for administering a First Amendment right of 
accesf'. Business Executives' }.1 ave For Yietnmn Peace 
v. FCC,- U. S. App. D. C.-, 450 F. 2cl 642 (1971). 
The complainants in these actions are the Democratic 
Committee (DNC) and the Business Executives' Move 
for Vietnam Peace (BEM). a national organization of 
business owners and executives opposed to the Vietnam 
War. In January l 970, BEM fi]ccl a complaint "·ith the 
Commission charging that radio station WTOP in \Vash-
ingtoll, D. C., had refused to sell it time to broadcast 
a series of one-minute spot announcements expressing 
BEM vie\\·s on the Vietnam \Var. \YTOP, in common 
with many but not all broadcasters, follo\\·ed a policy 
of refusing to sell time for spot announcements to in-
dividuals and groups to expound their vie\YS on con-
troversial issues. WTOP took the position that it pre-
sented full and fair coverage of important public ques-
tions. including the Vietnam \Var, and, therefore, it "·as 
justified in refusing to accept editorial acl vert ism en ts. 
WTOP also submitted evidence shO\\·ing that the sta-
tion had aired the views of war critics on numerous oc-
casions. BEM challenged the fairness of WTOP's cover-
71-~fi:>, ETC.-OPil\ION 
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ago of antiwar vie\\·s, but it presented no evidence in 
support of that claim. 
Four months later, in May 1970, the DNC filed with 
the Commission a req uost for a declaratory ruling: 
"That under the First Amendment to the Consti-
tution and the Communications Act, a broadcaster 
may not. as a general policy, refuse to sell time to 
responsible entities, such as the DXC, for the so-
licitation of funds and for comment on public issues." 
DNC claimed that it intended to purchase time from 
radio and television stations and from tho national net-
works in order to conduct a national campaign to present 
the viC\YS of the Democratic Party and to solicit funds. 
Unlike BEM, DNC did not object to the policies of any 
particular broadcaster but claimed that its prior "ex-
periences in this area make it clear that it will encounter 
considerable difficulty-if not total frustration of its 
efforts-in carrying out its plans in the event the Com-
mission should decline to issue a ruling as requested." 
DNC cited Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 3!)5 U. S. 
367 (HH39), as establishing a lin1ited constitutional right 
of access to the airwaves. 
In t"·o opinions issued the same clay, the Commission 
rejected the respondents' claim that "responsible" in-
dividuals and groups have a right to purchase advertis-
ing time to comment on public issues without regard to 
whether the broadcaster has complied with the fairness 
doctrine. The Commission vie\Yed the issue as one of 
major significance in the administration of the electronic 
media, one "going to the heart of the system of broad-
casting ''"hich has developed in this country .... " 2& 
F. C. C. 2d, at 221. After reviewing the legislative his-
tory of the Communications Act, the provisions of the 
Act itself, the Commission's decisions under the Act and 
71-SO;}, VfC.-OPI~ION 
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the difficult problems inherent in administering a right 
of access, the Commission concluded that the demands 
of BEM and DNC must be rejected. 
The Commission also denied BEM's claim that WTOP 
violated the Fairness Doctrine by failing to air views 
on the war such as those held by members of BEM; the 
Commission pointed out that BEM had made only a 
"general allegation" of unfairness in WTOP's coverage 
of the war and that the station had adequately rebutted 
the charge by affidavit. Tho Commission did, however, 
uphold DNC's position that tho statute recognized a 
right of political parties to purchase broadcast time for 
the purpose of soliciting funds. The Commission noted 
that Congress has accorded special consideration for 
access by political parties, see 47 U. S. C. § 315 (a) and 
that solicitation of funds by political parties is both 
feasible and appropriate in the short space of time gen-
erally allotted to spot advertisements.1 
A majority of the Court of Appeals reversed the Com-
mission, holding that "a flat ban on paid public issue 
announcements is in violation of the First Amendment, 
at least when other sorts of paid announcements are ac-
cepted." 450 F. 2d, at 646. Recognizing that tho broad-
cast frequencies arc a scarce resource inherently unavail-
able to all, the court nevertheless concluded that the First 
Amendment mandated an "abridgeable" right to pre-
sent editorial advertisements. The court reasoned that 
a broadcaster's policy of airing commercial advertise-
ments but not editorial advertisements constitutes un-
constitutional discrimination. The court did not, how-
ever, order that either BEM's or DNC's proposed 
announcements must be accepted by the broadcasters; 
1 The Corrunission's rulingl:> against BEl\I's Fairncs~ Doetrinc rom-
plaint and in favor of DNC's claim that political partirs should be 
J)Crmitted to purchase airtime for solicitation of funds wcrr not ap-
pralcd to the Court of Appeals and arc not before u;; hrrc. 
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rather. it remanded the cases to the Commission to de-
velop "reasonable procedures and regulations determining 
which and how many 'editorial announcements' will be 
put on the air." Ibid. 
Judge McGoYmn dissented; in his view, the First 
Amendment did not compel the Commission to 'U11der-
t~kc thetaSk assigned to it by the m~ority: 
"It 1s presently the obligation of a licensee to 
advance the public's right to know by devoting a 
substantial amount of time to the presentation of 
controversial views on issues of public importance, 
striking a balance which is always subject to redress 
by reference to the fairness doctrine. Failure to 
do so puts continuation of the license at risk-a 
sanction of tremendous potency, and one which the 
Commission is under increasing pressure to employ. 
"This is the system which Congress has, wisely 
or not, provided as the alternative to public owner-
ship and operation of radio and television communi-
cations facilities. This approach has never been 
thought to be other than within the permissible lim-
its of constitutional choice." 450 F. 2d, at 666. 
Judge McGowan concluded that the court's decision to 
overrule the Commission and remand for development 
and implementation of a constitutional right of access 
put the Commission in a "constitutional strait jacket" on 
a highly complex and far-reaching issue. 
We granted certiorari because of the fundamental im-
portance of the Court of Appeals' decision to the Com-
munications Act and the First Amendment. 
I 
Mn. JusTICE WHITE's opinion for the Court in Red 
Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U. S. 367 (1969), 
makes clear that the broadcast media posef unique and 
\ 
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special problems not present in the traditional free speech 
case. Unlike other media, broadcasting is subject to an 
inherent physical limitation. Broadcast frequencies are 
a scarce resource; each frequency must be portioned out 
among applicants, and those so allocated must in turn be 
subdivided among all those who would usc it to com-
municate. All who possess the financial resources and H 
the desire to communicate over the airwaves cannot be· 
satisfactorily accommodated. The Court spoke to this 
reality when, in Red L1:on, we said "it is idle to posit an 
unabridgeable First Amendment right to broadcast com-
parable to the right of every individual to speak, write, 
or publish." Red Lion, s~tpm, 395 U. S., at 388. 
Because the broadcast media utilizes a valuable and 
limited public resource, th~·e j§__also p~~1t an unusual 
o~ of First Amendment values. In Red Lion we dis-
cussed at length the application of the First Amend-
ment to tho broadcast media. In analyzing the broad-
casters' claim that the Fairness Doctrine and two of its 
component rules violatrd their freedom of expression, \Yo-
held that "Ln]o one has a First Amendment right to a 
license or to monopolize a radio frequency; to drny a 
station liecnse because 'the public interest' requires it 'is 
not a denial of free speech.'" Red Lion, supra, 395 
U. S., at 389. While tho broadcaster is not without pro-
tection under the First Amendment, United States v. 
Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U. S. 131. 166 ( Hl48), 
"[i]t is the right of tho viewers and listeners. not the 
right of tho broaclcastrrs. which is paramount. . . . It 
is the right of tho public to receive suitable accrss to 
social, political, esthetic. moral and other ideas and 
experiences which is crucial here. That right may not 
constitutionally be abridged either by Congress or by 
the FCC." I d., at 300. 
Balancing the various First Amendment interests in-
volved in tho broadcast media and cletermini ng \Vhat best 
servos the public's right to be informed is a task of a great 
71-Sii:3, ETC.-OPI;\lOK 
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difficulty. The process must necessarily be undertaken 
" ·ithin the framework of the regulatory scheme that has 
evolved over the course of the past half-century. For 
during that time, Congress and its administrative agency 
have established a delicately balanced system that is 
intended to best meet the interests of all concerned. Ad 
hoc tampering may \Yell upset the balance and destroy 
·what has thus far been accomplished. The problems of 
regulation are rendered more difficult because the broad-
cast industry is dynamic in terms of technological change. 
Solutions adequate a decade ago arc not necessarily so 
now, and those acceptable today may well be outmoded 
10 years hence. 
Thus. in evaluating the First Amendment claims of re-
spondents, \YC must afford great "·eight to the decisions 
of Congress and the experience of the Commission. Sec 
Red Lion, supra, 395 U. S., at 381. Professor Chafee 
aptly observed: 
"Once we get away from the bare \YOrc.ls of the 
[First'] Amendment, we must construe it as part of 
a Constitution which creates a government for the 
purpose qf i)crforming several very important tasks. 
The [First] Amendment should be interpreted so as 
not to cripple the regular work of the government. 
A part of this "·ork is the regulation of interstate 
and foreign commerce, anc.l this has come in our 
modern age to include the job of parceling out the· 
air among broadcasters, which CongreFs has entrusted 
to the FCC. Therefore, every free speech problem 
in the radio has to be considered with reference to 
the satisfactory performance of this job as well as to 
the value of open discussion. Although free speech 
should weigh heavily in the scale in the event of 
conflict, still the Commission should be given ample 
scope to do its job." II Chafec, Government and 
Mass Communications 640-641 (1949). 
7H~fi0, ETC.-OPii'\10'\' 
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The judgment of the legislative branch cannot be 
ignored or undervalued simply because one broadcast 
constituency casts its claims under the umbrel1a of the 
First Amendment. That is not to say we "defer" to the 
judgment of the Congress and the Commission. nor 
that we shirk any duty to invoke the Constitution should 
we determine that the Commission has not fulfilled its 
task with appropriate sensitivity to the interests in free 
expression. The point is, rather, that when we face a 
complex problem with many hard questions and few easy 
answers it makes sense to pay careful attention to how 
the other branches of government have addressed the 
same problem. 
II 
This Court has on numerous occasions recounted the 
origins of our modern system of broadcast regulation. 
See, e. g., Red Lion, supra, 395 U. S., at 375-386; Na-
tional Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U. S. 190, 
210-217 ( 1943); FCC v. Sanders Brothers Radio Sta-
tion, 309 U.S. 470, 474 (1940); FCC v. Pottsville Broad-
casting Co., 309 U. S. 134, 137-138 (1940). We have 
noted that prior to the passage of the Radio Act of 1927, 
44 Stat. 1162, the broadcast media was marked by chaos. 
The unregulated and burgeoning private use of the new 
media in the 1920's had resulted in an intolerable situ-
ation demanding congressional action: 
"It quickly became apparent that broadcast fre-
quencies constituted a scarce resource whose use 
could be regulated and rationalized only by the Gov-
ernment. \Vithout government control, the medium 
would be of little use because of the cacaphony of 
competing voices, none of which could be clearly 
and predictably heard." Red Lion, supra, 395 U. S., 
at 376. 
But, once it was accepted that broadcasting had to be 
regulated because of its use of the public domain, Con-
71-868, ETC.-OPINION 
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gress was confronted with a major dilemma: how to· 
strike a proper balance between private and public con-
trol. Cf. Farmers Union v. W. Day, 360 U. S. 525, 528 
(1959). 
One of the earliest and most frequently quoted state-
ments of this dilemma is that of Herbert Hoover, when 
he was Secretary of Commerce. While his Department 
was making exploratory attempts to deal with the infant 
broadcasting industry in the early 1920's, he testified be-
fore a House Committee: 
"We cannot allow any single person or group to 
place themselves in [a] position where they can 
censor the material which shall be broadcastecl to the 
public, nor do I believe that the government should 
ever be placed in the position of censoring this 
material." Hearings before the House Committee 
on the Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 68th Cong., 
1st Sess. (1924). 
When Mr. Hoover's single sentence is parsed carefully, 
it will be seen that he was saying the government must 
walk a tightrope in regulating the broadcast media. The 
Congress, the Commission and the courts have struggled 
with this problem ever since. Congress appears to have 
concluded, however, that of the two choices government 
censorship would be the most pervasive, the most self-
serving, the most difficult to restrain and hence the one 
most to be avoided. 
The legislative history of the Radio Act of 1927, the· 
m.odel for our present statutory scheme, see FCC v. 
Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. 134 (1940), reveals 
that in the area of discussion of public issues Congress 
chose to leave broad discretion with the licensee. Con-
gress specifically dealt with-and firmly rejected---=tiie 
argumenttiiat the broa~st facilities should .be opel~ 
a nonselective basis to all persons wishing to talk about --" 
il-SG:~, ETC.-OPINION 
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public issues. Some members of Congress, those whose 
views were not ultimately to prevail, strenuously ob-
jected to the unregulated power of broadcasters to reject 
applications for service. Sec, e. g., H. R. Rep. No. 404, 
69th Cong., 1st Sess., at 18 (minority report). They 
regarded the exercise of such power to be "private censor-
ship," which should be controlled by treating broad-
casters as public utilities.~ The provision that came 
closest to imposing an unlimited right of access on broad-
casters •vas part of the bill reported to the Senate by 
the Committee on Interstate Commerce. The bill that 
emerged from the Committee contained the following 
prOVISIOn: 
"[I] f any licenf::ee shall permit a broadcasting sta-
tion to be used ... by a candidate or candidates for 
any public office, or for the discussion of any ques-
tion affecting the public, he shall make no dis-
crimination as to the usc of such broadcasting sta-
tion, and with respect to such matters the licensee 
.'{hall be deemed a common carrier in interstate com-
merce: Provided, that such licensee shall have no 
po,ver to censor the material broadcast." 
Rce 67 Cong. Rec. 12503 (1926) (emphasis added). 
When the bill came to the Senate floor, the principal 
architect of the Radio Act of 1927 and the Chairman of 
the Commerce Committee, Senator Dill, offered an 
amendment to the provision to eliminate the common 
"Conl!rc;:~mnn Dn 1·is , for exaniJ>I<', ~tat eel 011 thr floor oft lw Hou~r 
the Yicw thnt Cong:rr~:,; found un:H·crptaolr: 
'' l do not think nny mrmlwr of thr committrr \Yill drn~· th:il it i>< 
ab,olut!'ly inr1·it:1blr th:1t wr arr !!Oing to haw to rrg:ulatr tlw radio 
public utiliti<:>s just as wr rrg:ulatc othrr public utilitir-;. \Yr arr 
g:oing to lww to rcg:ulatr the ratrs and the !'<:'!Tier. and to fo rcr 
t.ht'lll to g:i1·r C'(]llal srn ·icr :111cl rqunl trratmcnt to all." 07 Cong. 
Hrr. 54R3. Srr also Gi Cong. Rcr., at M84. 
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carrier obligation and to restrict the right of access to 
candidates for public office. Senator Dill explained the 
need for the amendment: 
"When we recall that broadcasting today is purely 
voluntary, and the listener-in pays nothing for it, 
that the broadcaster gives it for the purpose of build-
ing up his reputation, it seemed unwise to put the 
broadcaster under the hampering control of being a 
common carrier and compelled to accept anything 
and everything that was offered him so long as the 
price was paid.'' Ibid. 
The Senators were also sensitive to the problems involved 
in legislating "equal opportunities" with respect to the 
discussion of public issues. Senator Dill stated: 
"f"Public questions") is such a general term that 
there is probably no question of any interest what-
soever that be discussed but that the other side of 
it could demand time; and thus a radio station 
would be placed in the position that the Senator 
from Iowa mentions about candidates, namely, that 
they "·ould have to give all their time to that kind 
of discussion, or no public question could be dis-
cussed." 67 Cong. Rec. 12504. 
The Senate adopted Senator Dill's amendment. The 
provision finally enacted, § 18 of the Radio Act of 1927, 
44 Stat. 1170, was later re-enacted as § 315 (a) of the 
Communications Act of 1034,' but only after Congress 
a Srrtion 015 (a) now read~: 
"If an~· Jicrn~rr shall permit any pcr::on who i,; a lrgally qualifird 
eandidn tc for an~· public offic·c to URC a broaden~( ing stat ion, hr· 
~hall afford rqual opportunitirs to nil othrr such eanclicl:ltes for thnt 
ofiirr in thr usc of such broadcasting stntion; Prnvided. That smh 
lircmre shall havr no powrr of rcn;.;or~hip ovrr the matrrial broacl-
eaRt under thr provisions of this srction. No obligation is impm;cd 
71-863, ETC.-OPINIOX 
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rejected another proposal that would have imposed a 
limited obligation on broadcasters to turn over their 
microphones to persons wishing to speak out on certain 
public issues.• Instead, Congress after prolonged con-
1mder this subsection upon an~· liccnsef' to nllm1· ti1C' u~C' of it~ ~tation 
b~· nny such candidate'. Appearame b~· a legnll~· qu:t!ified cnndi-
dntc on any-
" ( 1) bona fide newsrast, 
"(2) bona fide nf'WR inten·iew, 
"(3) bona fide new~ doctll11C'llt:u~· fif tlw appenranrr of the r:tndi-
cbte if' inridental to the presentation of the subjrct or subjects 
conred by the news documentar~·], or 
" ( 4) on-the-spot co1·emge of bona fide news events fincluding 
but 110t limited to political conventions and activitirs incidental 
thereto], 
":<ball not be deemed to be u"c of a broadcasting station IYithin 
the meaning of this subsection. Kothing in the foregoing ;;cntPnre 
shall be C'nnstrucd as relieving broadcaster, in connection with the 
prc~Pntation of newscasts, news interviews, news documcntarie~, and 
on-the-spot coverage of news event, from the obligation impor-;ed 
upon them under this chapter to operate in the public interest and 
to nfford reasonable opportunity for the discussion of conflicting 
Yiews on issues of public importance." 47 U.S. C.§ 315 (n). 
'1 The Senate passed a pro1·ision providing that: 
" ... if an~· licensee sh[lll permit any person to use a broadcasting 
stat ion in support of or in opposition to any candidate for public 
office, or in the prpsenlation of vieu·s on a public question to be 
voted upon at an elertion, he shall afford equal OJJportuuity to an 
equal number of other persons to use such station in support of nn 
OJlposing candidate for such public office, or to reply to a person 
who has used such broadcasting station in support of or in opposi-
tion to a candidate, or for the presentation of opposite views 011 
such public questions." 
Sec Hearings before the Senate CommiHee on InterRtate Commerce, 
73d Cong., 2d Sc~~ .• on S. 2910, nt 19 (March 1934) (emphasis 
[lddf'd). The provision for discussion of public ist>ue~ was deleted 
by the House-Senate Conference. See H. R. Rep. No. 1918 on 
S. 3285, 73d Cong., 2d Se~s., at 49. 
Also noteworth~· nrc two bills offered in 1934 that would have 
rc~trictcd the cant rol of broadcaster::; oYer the di~cu::~sion of rertain 
is::~uc::;. Congres::;man Me Fadden propo::;cd a bill that would have 
71-863, ETC.-OPINION 
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sideration adopted § 3 (h), which specifically provides 
that "a person engaged in radio broadcasting shall not, 
insofar as such person is so engaged, be deemed a com-
mon carrier." " 
Other provisions of the 1934 Act also evince a legis-
lative desire to regulate broadcasting within the context 
of private journalism required to fulfill certain public· 
obligations. Although the Commission was given the-
forhidden broadcastPrs from discriminating against programs f<pon-
sorc'd b~, religious, charitable, or educational aRsociation~. H. R. 
7986, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934). The bill wns not reported out of 
committee. And, during the debates on the 193.J. Act, Senators 
Wagner and Hatfield offpred an amendment that would hnve ordered 
the Commission to " re~erve and allocate only to educationnl, rPli-
!!;ious, agricultural, labor, coopera tive, and similar non-profit-mnking 
associntions one-fourth of all the radio broadcasting facilities within 
its jurisdiction." 78 Cong. Rec. 8828. Senator Dill explained 
why the Committee had rejected the proposed amendment, indicat-
ing that the practical difficulties and the dangers of cen:;orship were 
crucial: 
"MR. DILL. . . . If we should provide that 25 percent of 1 ime 
shall be allocated to nonprofit organizations, ·omeone would have 
to determine-Congress or somebody else-how much of the 25 
percent should go to education, how murh of it to labor, how much 
of it to fraternal organizations, and so forth. When we enter this 
field we must determine how much to give to the Catholics probably 
and how murh to the Protestants and how much to the Jews."· 
78 Cong. Rec. 8843. 
Senator Dill went on to say that the problem of determining the 
proper allocation of time for di:;cussion of t hese subj ects should be 
worked out by the Commission. 78 Cong. Bee. 8844. The Senate 
rej ected the amendment. 78 Cong. Rec. 8846. 
"Section 3 (h) prO\·idel:i as follows: 
"'Common carrier' or 'carrier' means any person engaged aii a 
common carrirr for hire, in inten;tate or foreign communication by 
wire or radio or in interstate or foreign radio trausmi~~ion of energy, 
except where reference i::; made to common carriers not subj ect to 
this ehaptcr; but a per;;on engaged in radio broadcasting shall not, 
insofar as such pen:lon is so engaged, be deemed a common carrier."· 
4~ Stat. 1065, as amended, 47 U. S. C. § 153 (h). 
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authority to issue renewable three-year licenses to broad-
casters 6 and to promulgate rules and regulations gov-
erning the use of those licenses, 7 both consistent with 
the "public interest, convenience and necessity," ~ 326 
of the Act specifically forbids the Commission from 
censoring the material broadcast by licensees or from 
promulgating regulations that would "interfere \Vith the 
right of free speech by means of radio communication." 8 
From these provisions it seems clear that Congress in-
tended to permit private broadcasting to develop as far 
as is consistent with its public obliga.tions without the 
interference of the Federal Government. Only when 
the interests of the public are found to outweigh the 
legitimate journalistic interests of the broadcasters will 
government step in. 
Subsequent developments in broadcast regulation illus-
trate how this regulatory scheme has evolved. Of par-
ticular importance, in light of Congress' flat refusal to 
r. 4F: Rtat. 10R0, a~ ;lmC'ndcd, 47 U. S. C. § 807. 
7 80rtion 3m of th0 Comrmmications Art of 1!J:H, 4R Rtat. 10R2, 
a~ anwndrd, 47 U. S. C. § 303. pro\'idr~ in rriP\'ant pari: 
" Excrpt :1~ othrr\l'i~r pro1·idrd in thi~ chaptc·r, thr Commi~.-ion from 
timr to tim0, :1::; public com·rniC'll('<', intrr0,.:t or nrcc"'sit~ - n · quirr~, 
shnll-
"(h) Prescribe t hr nnt urr of t hr srn·ire to br n•ndrrrd h~ - rnch 
rlnss of lif'rnsrcl stations and rarh stntion within an~· cl:i~" ; 
" ( 4) makr :;:nrh nrlrs :1ncl r0gulat iom nnd prrsrribc snch rrst rir-
tions nne! condition'. not ineon.~istrnt \l'ith lmr, n~ may br nC'('f'>'"nry 
to rn rr~ - out t hr proYi>'ions of this rh:-~pt rr. . .. " 
' Rrrtion 32f\ of thr Comrnnnieations Art of 1084, 4S Stat. IO!H, 
as nmrndrd. 47 U. S. C. § 826. proYidr": 
" :\othing in this rlwptrr shall br undrr~toocl or ron"trurd to gi1·0 
thr C'ommi";;;ion thr powN of rrnsorship m·rr the radio romrnnni-
('afions or signnl~ tmnsrnitt0cl h~- an~' radio ~tntion, ami no rrgnl:i-
tion or condition i-'hnll be promulgatrd or fixrd h)· thr Commi.,;:ion 
which Rh:J!l intNfrrr with thr right of frrr sp00C'h b~- mrnn~ of radio 
rommuniration." 
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impose a "common carrier" right of access for all persons 
,\·ishing to speak out on public issues, is the Commis-
sion's "Fairness Doctrine," which evolved gradually over 
the years spanning federal regulation of the broadcast 
media.° Formulated under the Commission's power to 
issue regulations consistent with the "public interest," 
the doctrine impose two fundamental responsibilities 
on the broadcaster: coverage of issues of public impor-
tance must be adequate and it must fairly reflect differing 
viewpoints. Sec Red Lion, supra, 395 U. S., at 377. In 
fulfilling its Fairness Doctrine obligations. the broad-
caster must provide free time for the prcsclltation of 
opposing vien·s if sponsorship is unavailable. Cullman 
Broadcasting Co., 25 P & F Radio Reg. 895 (1963), and 
it must initiate programming on public issues if no one 
else seeks to clo so. Sec John J. Dempsey, 6 P & F 
Radio Reg. 615 (1950); Red Lion, supra, 395 U. S., at 
378. Since it is physically impossible to provide time 
for all viewpoi11ts, however, the right to exercise editorial 
judgment was granted to the broadcaster. The broad-
caster, therefore, is allowed significant journalistic dis-
cretion in deciding how best to fulfill its Fairness Doctrine 
obligations. '0 although that discretion is bounded by rules 
0 In 1959, Congrr~~ amrnclrd § 3115 of thr Af•t to giYr ~Ia tutor~· 
npprontl to thr Faimr~~ Dortrinr. Act of Srptrm])('r 14, 19.19, § 1, 
7il Stat. 557, as amrnckd, +7 F. S. C. §;)].')(a). 
For a sum mar~· of 1 hr clr\·rlopmrnt am! nat me of 111C' F:tirur~s 
Doctrine, i:'rr Red Lion, supra. 395 U. S., nt 87.'5-380. 
' 0 Ser 11fadalun Murrau . . ') P & F Radin Hrg. 2cl 263 (1965). 
Factor~ that thr broadcaster mu"t 1akr into nrrount in rxrrri~ing 
his di-:cretion inrludr the following: 
"In detrnnining whrt hrr 1 o honor ~prrific rrqur~t~ for timr, the 
~tat ion will inr\·itably be confroll!rcl with ~uch qur~t ions as whrthrr· 
t hr ~ubjrct. i~ worth considrring, whrt her t hP viewpoint of 1 hr rr-
que~tin~ part~' hm; alrratly rccri\'<'Cl a ~>nfficirnt amount of broadcnst 
timr, or whrther 1hrrr may not be other avuilahle group~ or individ-
ual~ who might be more appropriate spokesmen for the particular· 
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designed to assure that the public interest in fairness 
is furthered. In its decision in the instant cases, the 
Commission described the boundaries as follows: 
"The most important consideration in this respect 
is that the licensee cannot rule off the air coverage 
of important issues or views because of his private 
ends or beliefs. As a public trustee, he must present 
representative community views and voices on con-
troversial issues which are of importance to his 
listeners. . . . This means also that some of the 
voices must be partisan. A licensee policy of exclud-
ing partisan voices and always itself presenting 
views in a bland, unoffensive manner iYould run 
counter to the 'profound national commitment that 
debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, 
and wide open.' New York 'Pimes Co. v. Sullivan, 
376 U. S. 254, 270 ( 1964); see also Red Lion Broad-
casting Co., Inc. v. F. C. C., 395 U.S. 367, 392 (n. 18) 
(1969) .... " 25 F. C. C. 2d, at 222- 223. 
Thus, under the Fairness Doctrine broadcasters are 
responsible for providing the listening and viewing public 
with access to a balanced presentation of information 
on issues of public importance.11 The basic principle 
point of view than the pcr~on [or group] making the req11e1<t." 
Hrport in the I\'Ia1ter of Editorializing by Broadrar:;t Licensee~, 13 
F. C. C. 1246 (1949). 
11 The Commission has al so ndopted variom; component regula-
tions under the Fairne"~ Doctrine, the most notable of \Yhi r h arc 
the "personal att::trk" and " political Pditorializing" rules which we 
upheld in Red Lion Broadcasters v. FCC, supra. The " per~onnl 
attack" rule provides that "when, during the prer:;entation of views 
on a controversial iso;ue of public importame, an attnrk is made on 
the hone:-:ty, character, integrity, or likr pPrsonal qunlitieR of an 
identified per;:;on," thr licensee mw;t notify the prr"on at tacked and 
give him an opportunity to re::;pond. E. g., 47 CFR § 73.12:3. Sim-
ilarly, the "political editorializing" rule prm·idcs that, when a lircn~ce 
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underlying that responsibility is "the right of the public 
to be informed, rather than any right on the part of the 
government, any broadcast licensee or any individual 
member of the public to broadcast his own particular 
views on any matter .... " Report on Editorializing, 13 
F. C. C. 1246, 1249 (1949). Consistent with that philos-
ophy, the Commission on several occasions has ruled that 
no private individual or group has a right to command 
the use of broadcast facilities. 1 ~ See, e. g., Dowie A. 
Crettenden, 18 F. C. C. 2d 499 (1969); Mrs. Margaret 
Z. Scherbina, 21 F. C. C. 2d 141 (1969); Boalt Hall Stu-
dent Assn., 20 F. C. C. 2d 612 (1969); J.Wrs. Madalyn 
endorses a political candidate in an editorial, he must give oi her 
candidates or their spokei<men an opportunity to respond. E. g., 
47 CFR § 7:3.123. 
The Commission, of coursr, has taken other steps be)·ond the 
Fairness Doctrine to expand the diversit)' of expression on radio and 
television. The chain broadcasting and multiple ownership rulPs 
are longstanding examples. E. g., 47 CFR §§ 73.131, 73.240. More 
rrcently, the Commission promulgated rule~ limiting tdPvision net-
"·ork i'yndirat ion pract icPs and reserving 25% of prime time for non-
nrtwork programs. 47 CFR §§ 73.658 (j), (k). 
'"The C urt of AppPals, and respondents here, have relied on 
dirtum in United Broadcasting Co., 10 F. C. C. 515 (19-l-5), as 
illustrating Commission approval of a privatr right to purrhase air 
time for the discussion of controversial issues. In that raRe the 
complaint alleged not only that the station had a policy of refusing 
to sell time for the discussion of public i;;surs, but also that the 
station had applied its policy in a discriminatory manner, a factor 
not shown in the cases presently before UR. FurihPrmore, thP c!Prision 
was handed down four year!" before tlw Commission had full)· de-
v<:>lopecl and articulated the Fairnes Doctrine. See Heport on Edi-
torializing by Broadcast Licensers, 13 F. C. C. 1246 (1949). Thu~, 
eYen if the decision is read without referPHce to i he allegnt ioll of 
discrimination, it stands as merely an i~olated statenwut, made during 
the period in which the Commission was still working out the prob-
lrms a~~ociatrcl with the discu::;sion of public i~sups; the dictum has 
not, been followed since and has been modified by the Fainwss 
Doctrine. 
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Murray, 40 F. C. C. 647 (1965); Democratic State Cen-
tral Committee of California, 19 F. C. C. 2d 833 (1968); 
U. S. Broadcasting Co., 2 F. C. C. 208 ( 1935). Con-
gress has not yet seen fit to alter that policy, although 
since 1934 it has amended the Act on several occasions 1 3 
and considered various proposals that would have vrstcd 
private individuals with a right of access.' '' 
III 
That "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the ]~ 
freedom of speech, or of the press" is a restraint on gov- V l 
'"In Hl59, for rxnmplr, Congrr~:-; nmrndrd § :~15 (n) of thr 
.\ct. to gi1·r ~tntntor.1' npproY:tl to thr Commis~ion'R Fnirnr~' Dor-
trinr. Art of Septrmbrr 14, 19.j9, § 1. 73 Stat. 557, nmrnding 47 
U. S. C. § 315 (a). Vrry rrrrntl~ · . Congrr~s nmrndrd ~ ~12 (a) of 
the 19:;4 Art to aut horizr t hr Cmmni:; .. ion to rcYokr :1 ~tnt ion JirrnRr 
·' for flllful or rrpratrcl failmr to :1ll011' rrnsonnblr arrr.'" to or prrmit 
pmehnsr of rrn><onnhlr amounts of timr for thr ll>'C' of :1 hmndrn~ting 
:-tat ion b~· a lrgnll~: IJlla!ifird rnndidntr for frdrr:1l rlrrt i1·r offirr on 
hrh:'tlf of his rnndidnr~· ." Cnmpnign Communicntion~ Rrform Art 
of 1973, Pub. L. No. 92-22ii. This nmrndmrnt r:-;~rnti:lll~ · rodifird 
ihr Commi~"ion'R prior inirrprrtniion of§ 315 (n) a~ n•CJuiring broad-
rn.·d rr" io m:1kr i imr nl'a ilablr to pol it ieal randid:d C'". Farmers 
[ 'nion , .. lrDAJ', :3fi0 U.S. 525,534 (1959). 8rr FCC ~Trrnomndnm 
on Srrond Srntrnrr of Srrtion 315 (n). in Political Bro:ldr:l~t,-E1Jll:1l 
Time, Ilraring' brforr 8nhrommii1l'(' of thr Hou~r 1ntrr-:tntr nnd 
Forrign Commrrrr Commis~ion, SSth Cong .. 1st Sr~"·· on IT . .T. Tirs. 
247, pp. S4-90. 
11 8re, e. (1., n. n. :3:395, 80th Cong., lHt Rr~'· (19-fi) .. \ l\101'(' 
rrrrnt propo~:d wa~ ofTrrrd b.1· Srn:1tor ]<u!brighl. ITi" bill would 
hn 1·r nnlt' ndrcl § ~1.5 of t hr Art to pro.1·idr: 
"(cl) Lirrnsrrs Rhnll prcll'idr a rra"onnhlr amount of puhlir ~<'I'I'i<'r 
time to :lllthorized rrprr,rnt:liivrs of thr Srn~1tr of ihP Unitrd Statr~, 
:mel ihr Hon"o ol' Rrprr~rntntivr:-; of tho Unitrd Stntr" , to j)l'('."<'nt 
lhr l'iC'\\'~ of thr Srnntr :md tlw Hou>'r of Hrprrsl'ntat in·~ on i~"nrs 
of pnhlir imporl:1nrr. ThP public ~C'I'I'irr timr rrqnirrd to hr pro-
Yided undrr thi,: subsrrt ion shall br m:Hlr :11·nil:lhlr to ('.1<'11 snrh 
uuthorizl' cl rrprrsrntati1·r at lraRt , but not limitrd to. four timrs 
during ('f\Ch ralrndnr ~ '(':11'. 11 S. J. n('~ . 209, OlRt Cong., 2cl Rr~:-; .. 
(1970). 
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emment action, not that of private persons. Public 
Utility Commission v. Pollack, 343 U.S. 451 , 461 (1952). 
We have not yet had occasion to consider whether the 
action of a broadcast licensee such as that challenged 
here, is "governmental action" for purposes of the First 
Amendment. The holding under review thus presents a ~ 
novel question, and one with far-reachmg implications. 
See L. Jaffe, The Editorial Responsibility of the Broad-
caster, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 786 (1972). 
The Court of Appeals held that broadcasters arc in-
strumentalities of the government for First Amendment 
purposes, relying on the thesis, familiar in other con-
texts. that broadcast licensees are granted usc of part of 
the public domain and arc regulated as "proxies" or 
"fiduciaries of the people." 450 F. 2d, at 652. This I 
characterization is not without validity for some pur-
poses, but it docs not resolve the sensitive constitutional 
issues inherent in deciding whether a particular licensee 
policy is subject to First Amendment restraints. 
In dealing " ·ith the broadcast media. as in other con-
texts, the line between private conduct and governmental 
action cannot be defined by reference to general formulas 
unrelated to particular exercises of governmental author-
ity. ·when governmental action is charged there must 
be cautious analysis of the quality and degree of govern-
mont relationship to the particular acts in question. 
"Only by sifting facts and weighing circumstances can 
the non-obvious involvement of the State in private 
conduct be attributed its true significance." Burton Y. 
Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715,722 (1961). 
In deciding whether the First Amendment encom- l ~ 
passes the conduct challenged here, it must be kept in \1 
mind that we are dealing with a vital part of our system \\ 
of communication. The electronic media have swiftly be-
come a major factor in the dissemination of ideas and 
information. More than 7,000 licensed broadcast sta-
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tions undertake to perform this important function. To 
a large extent they share with the printed media the role 
of keeping people informed. 
As we have seen, with the advent of radio a half cen-
tury ago Congress was faced "·ith a fundamental choice 
between total government ownership and control of the 
new medium-the choice of most other countr.ies-or 
some other alternative. Long before the impact and po-
tential of the medium was realized. Congress opted for 
a system of private broadcasters licensed and regulated 
by Government. The legislative history suggests that 
this choice was influenced not only by traditional atti-
tudes toward private enterprise, but by a desire to main-
tain for licensees, so far as consistent with necessary 
regulation, a traditional journalistic role. The historical 
aversion to censorship led Congress to enact § 326 of 
the Act, which explicitly prohibits the Commission from 
interfering with the exercise of free speech over the 
broadcast frequencies. Congress also refrained from di-
vesting broadcasters of their control over the selection 
of voices; § 3 (h) of the Act stands as firm congressional 
statement that broadcast licensees are not to be treated 
as common carriers, obliged to accept whatever is ten-
dered by members of the public. Both these provisions 
clearly manifest tho intention of Congress to maintain 
a substantial measure of journalistic independence for 
the broadcast licensee. 
The regulatory scheme evolved slowly, but very early 
the licensee's role developed in terms of a "public 
trustee" charged with the duty of fairly and impartially 
informing the listening and viewing public. In this 
structure the Commission acts in essence as an "over-
seer," but the initial and primary responsibility for fair-
ness, balance and objectivity rests with the licensee. This 
role of the Government as an "overseer" and ult.imate 
arbiter and guardian of the public interest and the role 
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of the licensee as a journalistic "free agent" call for a 
delicate balancing of competing interests. The main-
tenance of this balance for more than 40 years has called 
on both the regulators and the licensees to walk a "tight-
rope" to preserve the First Amendment values written 
into the Radio Act and its successor, the Communications 
Act. 
The tensions inherent in such a regulatory structure 
emerge more clearly when we compare a private news-
paper with a broadcast licensee. The power of a pri-
vately owned newspaper to advance its own political, 
social, and economic vie>vs is bounded by only two factors, 
first the acceptance of a sufficient number of readers-
and hence advertisers-to assure financial success, and 
second the journal_istic integrity of its editors and pub-
lishers. A broadcast licensee has a large measure of 
journalistic freedom but not as large as that exercised by 
a newspaper. A- licensee must balance what it might 
prefer to do as ~e entrepreneur with what it is 
required to do as a "public trustee." To perform its 
statutory duties, the Commission must oversee without 
censoring. This suggests something of the difficulty and 
delicacy of administering the Communications Act-a 
function calling for flexibility and the capacity to adjust 
and readjust the regulatory mechanism to meet chang-
ing problems and needs. 
The licensee policy challenged in this case is closely I 
related to the journalistic role of a licensee for which it · 
has been given initial and primary responsibility by 
Congress. The licensee's policy a ainst accepting edi-
torial advertising canno e examined as an abstract 
..........__ - -
}~on, but musT be viewed 111 the context of its 
journalistic role. It does not help to press on us the 
ic~rial ads are "like" commercial ads, for their 
purposes are very different. The editorial ad-if analo-
gies have value here-are more properly classified with 
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editorial commentary and balanced news coverage. The 
licensee's policy against editorial spot ads is expressly 
based on an editorial judgment that 10- to 60-second ~pot 
announce~11ents are ill suited to intelligible and i!_1elli-
gent treatment of public i sues; the broadcaster has 
chosen to prov1 e a balanced treatment of controversial 
questions in a more comprehensive form. Obviously the 
licensee's evaluation is based on its own editorial judg-
ment of priorities and nmysworthiness. 
Moreover, the Commission has not fostered the licensee 
policy challenged here; it has simply declined to com-
mand particular action because it fell within the area of 
editorial discretion. The Commission explicitly empha-
sized that "there is of course no Commission policy 
thwarting the sale of time to comment on public issues." 
25 F. C. C. 2d, at 226. The Commission's reasoning, 
consistent with nearly 40 years of precedent, is that so 
long as a licensee meets its "public trustee" obligation 
to provide balanced coverage of issues, the station has 
broad discretion to decide how that obligation "·ill be 
met. We do not reach the question "·hether the Act 
can be read to preclude the Commission form deter-
mining that in some situations the pub1ic interest re-
quires licensees to re-examine their policies with respect 
to editorial advertisements. The Commission has not 
yet made such a determination; it has, for the present 
at least, found the policy to be within the sphere of 
journalistic discretion which Congress has left \\'ith the 
licensee. Its determination is consistent with the statute. 
Thus, it cannot be said that the government is a (. 
"partner" to the action of broadcast licensee complained 
of here, nor is it engaged in a "symbiotic relationship" 
with the licensee, profiting from the invidious discrimi-
nation of its proxy. Compare Moose Lodge No. 107 v. 
hvis, 407 U. S. 163, 174-177 (1972), with Burton v. 
Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U. S. 715, 723- 724 
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(1061). The First Amendment docs not reach actions 
that neither the Congress or the Commission have sought 
to make their own. 
Our conclusion is not altered merely because the Com-
mission rejected the claims of BRM and DNC and 
concluded that the challenged licensee policy is not 
inconsistent with the public interest. It is true that in 
Public Utilities Comm'n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451 (1952), 
we found governmental action sufficient to trigger First 
Amendment protections on a record involving agency 
approval of the conduct of a public utility. Though we 
held that the decision of a District of Columbia bus 
company to install radio receivers in its public buses was 
within the reach of the First Amendment, there Con-
gress had expressly authorized the agency to undertake 
plenary intervention into the affairs of the carrier and 
it was pursuant to that authorization that the agency 
investigated the challenged policy and approved it on 
public interest standards. !d., at 462. Here, Congress 
has not established a regulatory scheme for broadcast 
licensees as pervasive as that in PoUak. More specifi-
cally, as we have noted, Congress has affirmatively indi-
cated in the Communications Act that certain journalistic 
decisions arc for the licensee, subject only to the restric-
tions imposed by evaluation of his overall performance 
under the public interest standard. In Pollak there was 
no suggestion that Congress had considered worthy of 
protection the carrier's interest in exercising discretion 
over the content of communications forced on passengers .. 
Perhaps a more basic distinction between Pollak and 
this case is that Pollak was concerned with a transporta-
tion utility that itself derives no protection from the 
First Amendment. See United States v. Paramount Pic-
tures, Inc., 344 U. S. 131, 166 (1948). 
Were we to read the First Amendment to spell out 
governmental action in the circumstances presented here, 
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fmy licensee decisions on the content of broadcasts or the 
processes of editorial evaluation would fail to be poten-
tial targets for constitutional scrutiny. In this sensitive 
area so sweeping a concept of governmental action would 
go far in practical effect to undermine nearly a half 
century of unmistakable congressional purpose to main-
tain-no matter how difficult the task-essentially pri-
vate broadcast journalism held only broadly accountable 
to public interest standards of fairness. To do this 
Congress, and the Commission as its agent, must remain 
in a posture of flexibility to chart a \vorkable "middle 
course" in its quest to preserve a balance between the 
desired public accountability and private control of the 
media. Possibly the only alternative is the total govern-
ment control Congress abjured at the outset of broad-
cast regulation. 
More profoundly, it would be anomalous for us to 
hold, in the name of promoting the constitutional guar-
antees of free expression, that the day-to-day editorial 
decisions of broadcast licensees are subject to the partic-
ular restraints of the First Amendment urged by re-
spondents. Journalistic discretion would in many ways 
be lost to the rigid limitations that the First Amendment 
imposes on government. Application of these standards 
to broadcast licensees would be antithetical to the very 
ideal of vigorous, challenging debate on the issues of the 
day, particularly since every licensee is already held 
accountable for the totality of its performance. 
The concept of private, independent broadcast jour-
nalism, regulated by government to assure protection of 
the public interest, has evolved slowly and cautiously 
over more than 40 years and has been nurtured by proc-
esses of adjudication. That concept could not co-exist 
with a reading of the conduct of the Commission or the 
licensee as governmental action. Nor could it exist with-
out administrative flexibility to meet changing 11ceds and 
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the S\\"ift technological developments. We therefore con-
clude that the policies complained o~e 
governmental action violative of the First Amendment. 
Sec M cl?ilire v. Wilham Penn Broadcasting Co., 151 
F. 2d 597 (CA3 1045), cert. denied, 327 U.S. 770 (1946); 
Massachusetts Universalist Convention v. Heldreth & 
Rogers Co., 183 F. 2d 497 (CAl 1950); Post v. Payton, 
323 F. Supp. 799 (EDNY 1971). 
IV 
A conclusion that there is no governmental action in a. 
broadcaster's rejection, pursuant to a fixed policy, of paid 
editorial advertisements would ordinarily end the con-
sideration of any constitutional aspects of the claims as-
serted. But ongress expressly wrote First Amendm~nt 
values into the ommumcations Act and, as we noted 
~' DNC urges that a licensee's refusal to accept 
editorial ads violates the "public interest" standard of 
the Act. We therefore go on to consider whether the ~ 
statute, including the First Amendment principles em-
bodied in the Act, requires a licensee to grant the right 
of access claimed by respondents. 
The Commission's conclusion that the Act does not 
require a licensee to grant private access to broadcast 
time is, of course, entitled to great weight. See, e. g., 
Red Lion, supra, 395 U. S., at 382; Zemel v. Rusk, 381 
U. S. 1, 11-12 (1965). In Red Lion, supra, at 381, we 
noted the "venerable J,?rinciple that the construction of 
a statute by those charged with its execution should be 
followed unless there are compelling indications that it is 
wrong. . . ." We find no such indications here. The 
Commission's conclusion wholly comports with the con-
stitutional holding of Red Lion. There we emphasized 
the right of the public to have access to "ideas and 
experiences," not the interest of every individual to 
broadcast what he believes the public ought to hear. 
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"vVhat is essential is not that everyone shall speak, 
but that everything "·orth saying shall be said." A. 
Meiklejohn, Political Freedom, 26 (1948). The appli-
cation of this valid generalization is a delicate exer-
cise, calling for a flexible discretion sensitive to all 
the considerations embraced in the Communications 
Act. Anything approaching an absolute right of access 
to broadcast time would disrupt the mechanism Con-
gress enacted to permit the Commission to adjust to 
the changing conditions of a dynamic medium. 
At the outset it \\'Oulcl seem clear that the public 
interest in having access to the marketplace of "ideas 
and experiences" would scarcely be served by a system 
so heavily weighted in favor of the financially affluent. or 
those with access to wealth. Cf. Red Lion, supra, 395 
U. S., at 392. Even under a first-come-first-served sys-
tem, proposed by the dissenting Conunissioner in these 
cases,'" the vie,Ys of the affluent could \Yell prevail over 
those of others, since they \YOulcl have it within their 
power to purchase time more frequently. Moreover, 
there is the substantial danger, as the Court of Appeals 
acknovvledgecl. 450 F. 2cl. at 664, that the time allotted 
for editorial advertising could be monopolized by those 
of one political persuasion-or a few affluent zealots. 
These problems vvould not necessarily be solved by ap-
plying the Fairness Doctrine, including the Cullman 
doctrine, to editorial advertising. If broadcasters were 
required to provide time, free when necessary, for the 
discussion of the various shades of opinion on the issue 
discussed in the advertisement. those ''"ith financial re-
sources could still determine in large part what .issues 
arc to be discussed. Thus, the very premise of the Court 
of Appeals' holding--that a right of access is necessary to 
allow individuals ancl groups the opportunity for self-
'"Sec 2.) F. C. C. 2d 21G, 2:~-1-2:~5 (.Tohn~on, di,~rntiug). 
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initiated specch-"·oulcl have little meaning to those who 
could not afford to purchase time in the first instancc.1 r. 
If the F~c~ were applied to editorial ad- ) 
vertising, there 1saJ8o the substantial danger that the 
effective operation of that doctri11e would be jeopardized. 
To minimize financial hardship and to comply fully with 
its public responsibilities a broadcaster might well be 
I forced to make r·cgular programming time available to those holding a view different from that expressed in an editorial advertisement; indeed, BEM has suggested as much in its brief. The result would be a further erosion 
of the journalistic discretion of broadcasters in the cover-
age of public issues, and a transfer of control over the 
treatment of public issues from the licensees "·ho arc 
accountable to private individuals who are not. The 
public interest would no longer be "paramount" but 
subordinate to private v,;him especially si11ce, under the 
Court of Appeals' decision, a broadcaster would be 
largely precluded from rejecting editorial advcrtisments 
that dealt with matters trivial or insignificant or al-
ready fairly covered by the broadcaster. 450 F. 2d, 
at 657. n. 36, 658. If the Fairness Doctrine and the · 
Cullman doctrine were suspended to alleviate the~e 
problems, as respondents suggest might be appropriate, 
the question arises whether we would have abandoned 
1nore than we have gained. The congressional objective 
of balanced coverage of public issues would be threatened. 
Nor can we accept the Court of Appeals' view that 
every potential speaker is "the best judge" of what the 
'"To on•rcomr thi,; ineon~i~trnc.1· it has brrn ~up:gr~trd thnt a 
" ~nbm~1rkrt ratr H.nstem" br C'Htnbli;;hcd for tho~r nnablr to afford 
tl\C' normal c·oHt for airtimr. Srr ~.') Hnn·. L. llr1·. G~9. G9!i-69fl 
(Hl/2). That proposnl lm~ brrn ('ritic·izrd. IH' think .inHtifiabl~·. as 
rai~ing ''incrrcliblc admini~t rati1·c JHoblem,.;." L .. T:1fl'c, Tlw hi it orial 
Hr,.ponHibilit~· of thr Broacka~tC'r: Heflections on Fnimr~~ :md Ar-
C'<'~~, ~5 Hm'l'. L. Hrv. 7oS, 7S9 (1972). 
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listening public ought to hear or indeed the best judge 
of the merits of his or her views. All journalistic tra-
dition and experience is to the contrary. For better or 
worse, editing is what editors are for; and editing is 
selection and choice of material. That editors-news-
paper or broadcast-can and do abuse this power at times 
is beyond doubt. but that is not reason to deny the 
freedom Congress provided; calculated risks of abuse 
arc taken in order to preserve higher values. 
It is reasonable for Congress and the Commission to 
conclude that the public interest in being informed re-
quires periodic accountability on the part of those 
vvho are entrusted with the use of broadcast frequencies, 
scarce as they arc. In the delicate balancing historically 
followed in the regulation of broadcasting Congress and 
the Commission could appropriately conclude that the 
allocation of journalistic priorities should be concentrated 
in the licensee rather than diffused. This policy gives 
the public some assurance that the broadcaster will be 
answerable if he fails to meet their legitimate needs. 
No such accountability attaches to the private individual,. 
whose only qualifications for using the broadcast facility 
may be a "deep pocket" and a point of view. To agree 
that debate on public issues should be "uninhibited, 
robust, and wide-open" does not mean that we should 
exchange the "public trustee" broadcaster for the un-
regulated editorial huckster, and for no better reason 
than that we are already compelled to bear with an over-
abundance of unwelcome commercial hucksterism. 
The Court of Appeals discounted those difficulties by 
stressing that it was merely mandating a "modest re-
form," requiring only "that broadcasters be required to 
accept some editorial advertising." 450 F. 2cl, at 662. 
The court suggested that broadcasters could place an 
"outside limit on the total amount of editorial adver-
tising they will sell'' and that the Commission and the 
? 
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broadcasters could develop " 'reasonable regulations' de-
signed to prevent domination by a few groups or a. few 
viewpoints." 450 F. 2cl, at 663, 664. If the Commission 
decided to apply the Fairness Doctrine to editorial ad-
vertisements and as a result broadcasters suffered financial 
harm, the court thought the "Commission could make 
necessary adjustments." 450 F. 2d, at 664. Thus, with-
out providing any specific answers to the substantial ob-
jections raised by the Commission and the broadcaster, 
other than to express repeatedly its "confidence" in the 
Commission's ability to overcome any difficulties, the 
court remanded the cases to the Commission for the 
development of regulations to implement a constitutional 
right of access. 
By minimizing the difficult problems involved in im-
plementing such a constitutional right of access, the 
Court of Appeals failed to come to grips with another 
problem of substantial importance to broadcast regula- r 
tion and to the First Amendment-the risk of an enlarge-
ment of government control over the content of broad-
cast discussion of public issues by the new voices pur-
chasing time. Sec, e. g., Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 
U. S. 67 (1953); l\'iemotko v. Maryland, 340 U. S. 268 
(1951). This risk is inherent in the Court of Appeals ~ 
remand requiring regulations and procedures to sort out 
requests to be heard-a process involving the very edit-
ing that licensees now perform as to regular programming. 
Although the use of a public resource by the broadcast 
media permits a limited degree of Government surveil-
lance, as is not true with respect to private media, sec 
National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U. S. 
190, 216-219 (1943), the Government's power over li-
censees, as we have noted, is by no means absolute and is 
carefully circumscribed by the Act itself." Under a 
17 Sec 47 U. S. C. § 326. 
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mandatory right-of-access system urged by respondents 
and mandated by the Court of Appeals, the Commission 
\\"ould be required to oversee far more of the clay-to-day 
operations of broadcasters' conduct, deciding such ques-
tions as whether a particular individual or group has had 
suffi.cien t opportunity to present its viewpoint and 
whether a particular viewpoint has already been suffi-
ciently aired. Under the Fairness Doctrine the Com-
mission's responsibility is to judge whether a licensee's 
overall performance indicates a sustained good faith 
effort to meet the public interest in being fully and fairly 
informed.1 ~ The Commission's responsibilities under 
a right-of-access system would tend to draw it into a 
continuing case-by-case determination of who should be 
heard and when. Indeed, the likelihood of Government 
involvement is so great that it has been suggested by 
some that the constitutional principles against control 
of speech content would need to be relaxed with respect 
to editorial advertisements.'!) We fail to sec the need 
for such a sacrifice of the First Amendment values of the 
Act for no assured gain. 
The Commission is also entitled to take into account 
the reality that in a very real sense listeners and viewers 
constitute a "captive audience," especially vulnerable to 
those who wish to thrust unwanted propaganda upon - . them. Cf. Public Utilities Commission v. Pollak, 343 
U. R. 451, 463 (1952); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U. S. 77 
(1949). This problem was recognized as early as Hl24, 
when Secretary Hoover remarked at the Fourth N a-
tional Radio Conference that "the radio listener docs not 
have the same option that the reader of publications 
has-to ignore advertising in which he is not interested-
' ' Srr Editorinlir.ing b~ · Broadra~t Li<•rJvr<·~ , 1:1 F. C. C. 12-Hi, 
1251-1252 (19-l9). 
'" f-l<•r 85 Han·. L. Ht>L 689, G07 (Hl72). 
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and he may resent its invasion on his set." "0 As the 
broadcast media became more prcvasivc in our society, 
the problem has become more acute. In a recent decision 
upholding the Commission's power to promulgate rules 
regarding cigarette advertising, Judge Ba~:clon, \Yriting 
for a unanimous Court of Appeals, noted some of the 
effects of the ubiquitous commercial: 
"Written messages arc not communicated unless 
they arc read , and reading requires an affirmative 
act. Broadcast messages, in contrast, are 'in the 
air.' In an age of omnipresent radio, there scarcely 
breathes a citizen •vho does not know some part 
of a loading cigarette jingle by heart. Similarly, 
an ordinary habitual television watcher can avoid 
these commercials only by frequently leaving the 
room, changing the channel, or doing some other 
such affirmative act. It is difficult to calculate the 
subliminal impact of this pervasive propaganda, 
\Yhich may be heard even if not listened to, but it 
may reasonably be thought greater than the impact 
of the written word." Banzhaf] v. FCC, - U. S. 
App. D. C. -, 405 F. 2d 1082, 1100-1101 (1968). 
It is no answer to say that because we tolerate pervasive \ 
commercial advertisement we can also live with its politi-
cal counterparts. 
These considerations, we think, compel the conclusion 
that the Court of Appeals erred in imposing a right-of-
access on the broadcast media either under tho First 
Amendment or the Act."' The rationale for the Court of 
"" Hrprintrd in Hrarinl!;;; bdorc lhr ~rnalr Commillrr on Inter-
~latr Cornqwrec on H~dio Control , G9th Cm1g;., bt Sl'~~ .. at 5-t. (HJ~G). 
"' DXC hn~ urg;rd in this Court thai wr at lrn~l rrrog-nir.c• ~~ right 
of our national partirH to purrha~r airtimr for thr pmpo~r of di;;-
<'U~~ing; publie i s~tH'H. Wf' ~rr no prinriplrd mean~ under the Fir;;; t 
AmendmNJ(. of fa \'oring neec:;H b~ · org;anir.rd political partie:; o\·cr 
other g;roup:; and indi,·iduak 
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Appeals' decision \vas that the licensee impermissibly 
discriminates by accepting commercial advertisments 
while refusing editorial aclvertisements.~2 The court re-
lied on decisions holding that state supported school 
ne,•;spapers and public transit companies were forbidden 
by the First Amendment from excluding controversial edi-
torial advertisements in favor of commercial advertise-
ments.23 The court also attempted to analogize this case 
to some of our decisions holding that States may not con-
stitutionally ban certain protected speech 'vhile at the 
same time permitting other speech in public areas. Cox 
v. Louisiana, 379 U. S. 536 (1965); Fowler v. Rhode Is-
land, 354 U. S. 67 (1953); Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 
U. S. 268 (1951). This theme of "invidious discrimina-
tion" against protected speech is echoed in the briefs of 
BEM and DNC to this Court. Respondents also rely on 
our recent decisions in Grayned v. City of Rockford, 40 
U.S. L. W. 4881 (U.S. June 26, 1972), and Pol£ce Dept. 
of City of Chicago v. Mosley, 40 U. S. L. W. 4877 (U. S. 
June 26, 1972), where we held unconstitutional city 
ordinances that permitted "peaceful picketing of any 
school involved in a labor dispute," but prohibited dem-
" 2 The Court of Appeals disclaimed :-tny intention to deridr whrthrr 
broadcasters who nrrept no advcrti~emrnts whatrnr must nevcr-
thrles:; air paid rditorial advertisrments. The court's disclaimer, 
howeYcr, is somewhat puzzling in light of its conrln~ion that the 
Fairness Doctrine i ~ inadequate to protect the pnblir's intrrest in 
bring informed and fosters a "paternalistic schrme in whirh the 
1 irensres and bureaucrats decide what issurs arc 'important,' how 
'fully' to cm cr them, and the format, time and st .dr of the cov-
erage." 450 F. 2cl, at 656. 
""Lee v. Board of R!'ge11ts of State Colleoes, W. D. Wi~., :lOo F. 
Snpp. 1097 (1969), atT'd, 7 Cir., 4,11 F. 2d 1257 (1971); Zucker 
v. Panitz, S. D. N. Y., 229 F. Snpp. 102 (1969) ; Kisoiuoer , ._ New 
r ork City Transit Authority, S. D. N. Y., 27 4 F. Supp. 438 ( 1967) ; 
llillsid!' Cornmunitu Church, Inc . v. City of 'l'acoma, Wash., 455 
P. 2d 350 (1969); Wirta v. Alameda-Contra Costa Tra11 sit District, 
6-t Cal. Rptr. 430, 434 P. 2d 9 2 (1967). 
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onstrations for any other purposes on the streets and 
side>Yalks within 150 feet of the school. 
These decision provide little guidance, however, in re-
solving the question of a constitutionally mandated pri-
vate right of access to the broadcast media. In none of 
those cases did the forum sought for expression have an 
affirmative and independent statutory obligation to pro-
vide full and fair coverage of public issues. Here Con-
gress has made a deliberate choice to compel broad-
casters to devote a reasonable amount of time to coverage 
of public issues. In short, there is no "discrimination" 
against controversial speech present in this case. The 
question here is not whether there is to be discussion of 
controversial issues of public importance on the broad-
cast media, but rather who shall determine what issues 
are to be discussed by whom, and when. 
The opinion of the Court of Appeals asserts that the 
Fairness Doctrine, insofar as it allows broadcasters to 
exercise certain journalistic judgment over the discussion 
of public issues, is inadequate to meet the public's inter-
est in being informed. The present system, the court 
held, "conforms ... to a paternalistic structure in which 
licensees and bureaucrats decide what issues are 'im-
portant,' and how 'fully' to cover them, and the format, 
time and style of the coverage." 450 F. 2d, at 656. 
The forced sale of advertising time for editorial spot an-
nouncements would, according to the Court of Appeals 
majority, remedy this deficiency. That conclusion was 
premised on the notion that advertising time, as opposed 
to programming time, involves a "special and separate 
mode of expression" because advertising content, unlike 
programming content, is generally prepared and edited 
by the advertiser. Thus, that court concluded that a 
broadcaster's policy against using advertising time for 
editorial messages "may well ignore opportunities to 
enliven and enrich the public's overall information." 
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450 F. 2d, at 658. As we have already noted, that ap-
proach would transfer the responsibility for balanced 
broadcasting from an identifiable, regulated entity-the 
licensee-to tho unregulated speakers who could afford 
the cost. 
We reject the suggestion the Fairness Doctrine per-
mits broadcasters to preside over a "paternalistic" regime. 
Sec Red Dian Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, supra, 395 U. S., 
at 390. That doctrine admittedly has not always brought 
to the public perfect or indeed even high quality treat-
ment of all public events and issues; but neither is it as 
disma.l as respondents would have us believe. The Com-
mission stressed that. while the licensee has discretion in 
fulfilling his obligations under the Fairness Doctrine, 
he is required to "present representative community views 
and voices on controversial issues which are of importance 
to his listeners," and he is forbidden from "excluding 
partisan voices and always itself presenting views in a 
bland, inoffensive manner .... " 25 F. C. C. 2d, at 222. 
A broadcaster neglects that obligation only at the risk of 
losing his license. '&o reeord befe~1 e as docs ne~t demon • 
stFttte that, at tho present stage of broadea.et teehnolo§-y, 
the Fairml~S DoGtrino do€s not ~€P'e the publie's interest 
in being informed. 
Conceivably at some future date Congress or the Com-
mission may devise some kind of limited right of access 
that is both practicable and desirable. The Commission 
noted in these proceedings that the advent of cable tele-
vision will afford increased opportunities for the discus-
sion of public issues. In its proposed rules on cable tele-
vision the Commission has provided that cable systems 
m major television markets 
"shall maintain at least one specially designated, 
non-commercial public access channel available on 
a first-come, nondiscriminatory basis. The system 
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shall maintain and have available for public use 
at least the minimal equipment and facilities neces-
sary for· the production of programming for such 
channel." 37 Feel. Reg. 3289, § 76.251 (a) (4). 
For the present, the Commission is conducting a wide-
ranging study into the effectiveness of the Fairness Doc-
trine to sec what needs to be done to improve the cov-
erage and presentation of public issues on the broadcast 
media. Notice of Inquiry in Docket 19260, 30 F. C. C. 
2d 26, 36 Feel. Reg. 11825. Among other things. the study 
will attempt to determine whether "there is any feasible 
method of providing access for discussion of public issues 
outside the requirements of the fairness doctrine." 30 
F. C. C. 2d, at 33. The Commission made it clear, how-
ever, that it docs not intend to disca.rcl the Fairness 
Doctrine or to require broadcasters to accept all private 
demands for air time.~~ The Commission's inquiry on 
this score was announced prior to the decision of the 
Court of Appeals in this case and hearings arc underwa.y. 
The problems perceived by the Court of Appeals ma-
jority are by no means new; as we have seen. the legisla-
tive history and the activities of the Commission over a 
period of 40 years reflect a continuing examination of 
means to achieve reasonable regulation compatible with 
First Amendment interests of the public and the licensees. 
The Commission's pending hearings arc but one step in 
~~ Ruhsequent to thr nnnounrrmrnt of the Court of Apprnls' dr-
ri~ion, thr Commisf'ion expnndrd the scope of the inqnir~· to comply 
with the Court of Appeals' mrrndatr. Further Notirr of Inquiry 
in Docket 19260, 33 F. C. C. 2d 554, 37 Fed. Tieg. 3383. After 
wr gmntrd rrrtiomri nnd ~ta~·f'd the mnndatc of thr Conrt of Ap-
penb, the Commis~ion wit hdrrw th:"lt not ire of nn ex]Xtnded inf]uiry 
nnd continued its Rtud~· :1f' originnllv planned. Order nnd Fnrthcr 
:\"otire of Tnqnir~· in Dorkrt 19260, 33 F. C. C. 2d 798, 37 Fc•d. 
Heg. 4080. 
71-863, ETC.-OPINIOK 
36 COLUMBIA BROADCASTING v. DEMOCRATIC COMM. 
this continuing process. At the very least, courts should ~r·· 
not embalm this necessarily dynamic )roccss into a hard 
and fast constitutional olding. See Amencan om-
mercial Lines, Inc. v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co., 392 
u. s. 571, 590-593 (1968). 
The judgment of the Court of Appeals IS 
Reversed. 
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MR. JusTtCE BHENNAN, dissenting. 
~~~ w;_u 
~~~~ 
These casrs require us to COilSickr whether radio and ~/' 
television broadcast lict•nsres may. " ·ith the approval of ~~ 6 // 
the Federal Communications C'ommission.' refuse abso- ;7_</! __ /-<; ..._ 
'St•P Fiusiness !?.recutwe...: Moue jol' \ ' i Pt1llllll fJcw· e. :2.5 1; . C'. C. 
2d :2-l:2 ( lHiO); Deiiii!CI'ot it .Vat imwl ( 'ollull i lt ee . :2.5 .F . C' . <.' . :2d :2Hi 
(1970) , 
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lu,tely to sell any part of their advertising time to groups 
or individuals wishing to speak out on controversial issues 
of public importance. In practical effect, the broadcaster ,)-
policy here under attack p~ts airing of onb:: those paid ~ a--D 
presentations which advertise productsQ_r ctea1 with "non- J 
controversial'' matters. while relegating the discussion of 
COJ1troversial publiC1ssue7tOlarmats such as aocument- I 
aries, the news, or panel shows, which are tightly con-
trolled and edited by the broadcaster. The Court holds 
today that this policy-including the absolute ban on 
the sale of airtime for the discussion of controversial is-
sues-is consistent with the commands of the First 
Amendment." I cannot agree. In my view, the principle 
2 The Court al~o holdR that thi:,; rxclu:sionary policy doe:,; not vio-
late the "public intrrr~t" requirrment::; of thr CommunicationR Act 
of 19:34, 47 U. S. C. §§ :307 (dJ, :309 (a). Thi~ :statutory quel:ition 
i:s, of cour:se, inextricably linh•d to the con:stitutional question, for 
the "public intrre~t :standard of the Act necrs ·arily implie:s reference 
to the Fir::;t Amendment'::; goal::;." Red Lwn Broadcasting Co. v. 
FCC, 395 U. S. 367, 390 (1969). And, a::; the Court of Apprals 
rrcognizrcl, whrther Its "drci::;ion Is ~~~·Ire! as a ·Fir~t Amendment 
decision' or a~ a deci;;ion mterpreting the fairnes::; and public interest 
requirement::; 'in light of the Fir::;t Amendment' matters little." 
- U. S. App. D. C. -, 450 F. 2d 64:3, 049 (1971). 
There i::; one a:spect of thr Court's statutory cli:scu::;,;ion, however, 
that merit::; at least brief attention. In upholding the absolute ban 
on thr ::;air of editorial adverti:sing, the Court relies hravily upon 47 
U. S. C. § 15:3 (h), which drclarrs that broadcastrrH :shall not br 
clremed ''common carrirr:s" In m~· view, th1:s reliance I::; mi:splaced. 
Even a cursory examination of tlw legi:slativr hi::;tory of this pro-
vi:sion reveals that It was rnactecl in recogmtwn of the fact that 
traditional doctrine~:> govrrning true ·'common earners," :such a::; 
transportation companieH, would not :>Uit the particular problem::; 
of radio broadca~:>tmg. Specifically, It wa~ feared that HLich "common 
carrier" Hiatus for broadcaster~:> would mran that they "would havr 
io give aJ.l their time to [vublic i:ssur~J." 67 Cong. Rcc. 12504 
(Sen. Dill) (empha~i~ added); :ser abo ibid. (Sen. Brow;~ard); 
td .. at 12:35fi (Sen. Fe~:;) . Srctwn 15:3 (h) wn~ intendrd :soldy 
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at stake here is one of fundamental importance, for it 
concerns the people's right to engage in and to hear 
vigorous public debate on the broadcast media. And bal-
ancing what I perceive to be the competing interests of 
broadcasters, the listening and viewing public, and in-
dividuals seeking to express their views over the electronic 
media, I can only conclude that the exclusionary policy 
upheld today can serve only to inhibit. rather than to 
further, our "profound national commitment to the 
principle that debate on public issues should be unin· 
hibited, robust, and wide-open." ·f.:ew York 1'imes Co. 
v. Sulliva·n, 376 U. S. 254, 270 (1964). I would there-
fore affirm the determination of the Court of Appeals that 
thE' challenged broadcaster policy is violative of the First 
Amendment. 
I 
The command of the First Amendment that "Congress 
shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech, 
or of the press'' is, on its face, directed at governmental 
rather than private action. Nevertheless, our prior de· 
cisions make clear that " [cIon duct that is formally 'pri-
vate' may become so entwined with governmental policies 
or so impregnated with a governmental character as to 
become subject to thE' constitutional limitations placed 
lo a~~ure that hrondca~trr:> would not lw reqnirrd to ::;urrrncler all 
of t hrir airtiml' to willing pnrcha~rr:,:; it dar~ not brn r upon the 
qur:>tion whrt hrr lhr~· rna~· br rrqun'('(l to HE'll a reasonable aud 
limited amount of airtime to mrmhcrs of thr public for diHcn~Hion 
of controvcr,;ial i~8UP~. Sr(' :2 Z. Chafrr, Govrrnmrnt and Ma~H 
Communication:,: 6:35 u. 75 (1947). lndrrd , thr Commi~::;iou ha~ 
it8rlf rejrctrd thr Comt'~ intprprrtatiou of § 15:3 (h) wheu it dP-
clarPd, ovrr 25 ~·par~ ago, that "t hr oprrution of anr station under 
l hP rxtn•mr principlrs that no time ~ hall br sold for t hr discu ::;~ ion 
of controvrr::;ial public is::.;u<·~ ... '" incon::;istent with thr concept 
of publ1c intere:>t r~tabli:shcd b~· tlw Commumcations Act. ... " 
United Broadcasting C'o., 10 F. C.(' . 51.'i. 511-1 (1945) . 
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upon [governmental! action." Evans v. LYewton, 382 
U. S. 296, 299 (1966). Thus, the reach of the First 
Amendment depends not upon any formalistic "private-
pu~ but, rather, upon more functional 
C2.QSiderations concerning the extent of governmental in-
volvement in, and public character of, a particular "pri-
vate" enterprise. "Only by sifting facts and weighing 
circumstances can the nonobvious involvement of the 
[Government l in private conduct be attributed its true 
significance." Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 
365 U. S. 715, 722 ( 1961); sec Moose Lodge No. 107 v. 
lrvis, 407 U. S. 163, 172 (1972). And because of the 
inherent complexity of this case-by-case inquiry, "[t]his 
Court has never attempted the 'impossible task' of form-
ulating an infallible test" for determining in all instances 
whether particular conduct must be deemed private or 
governmental. Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U. S. 369, 378 
(1967); see Kotch \'. Pilot Comm'rs, 330 U. S. 552, 556 
(1947). 
This docs not mean, of course. that our prior experi-
ence in this area offers no guidance for the purposes of 
our present inquiry. On the contrary, our previous de-
cisions have focused on myriad indicia of "governmental 
action,., many of which are directly applicable to the 
operations of the broadcast industry. As the Court of 
Appeals recognized, "the general characteristics of the 
broadcast industry reveal an extraordinary relationship 
between the broadcasters and the federal government-
a relationship which puts that industry in a class with 
few others.'' 450 F. 2d, at 651. More specifically, the 
public nature of the airwaves. the governmentally 
created preferred status of broadcast licensees, the per-
vasive federal regulation of broadcast programming, and 
the Commission's specific approval of the challenged 
broaclcaster policy combine in thif' case to bring the 
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promulgation and enforcement of that policy within the 
orbit of constitutional imperatives. 
At the outset, it should be noted that both radio and · 
television broadcasting utilize a natural resource- the 
electromagnetic spectrum '-that is part of the public · 
domain. And although broadcasters are granted the tem-
porary use of this valuable resource for terminable three-
year periods, "ownership" and ultimate control remain 
vested in the people of the United States. Thus, ~ 301 
of the Communications Act of 1934, 47 U. S. C. ~ 301, 
specifically provides : 
"It is the purpose of this lAct] ... to maintain 
the control of the United States over all channels of 
interstate and foreign radio transmission; and to 
provide for the use of such channels, but not the 
ownership thereof. by persons for limited periods of 
time, under licenses grantee! by Federal authority, 
and no such liceuse shall be coustrued to create any 
right, beyond the terms, conditions, and periods of 
the license . . .. " 
Such public "ownership'' of au essential element in the 
operations of a private enterprise is, of course, an im-
portant and established indicia of "governmental involve-
ment." In Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 
supra, for example, we emphasized the fact of "public 
ownership' ' in holding the proscriptions of the Four-
t eenth Amendment applicable to a privately owned res-
~ Sre grnrrall~· Bu~iness Executives Move fo1' Vtetnam Peace, 25 
F. C. C. 2d 242, 25:3-204 (1970) (di~;;rntin!); opinion), whrrein Com-
mi~~ionrr .T ohnson idrntifird no lr~~ 1 han r1ght separate indi cia of 
''govrrnmrntal action" lllvolved 1ll thr promulgation nnd Pnforcc-
mrnt of 1 he rhallrn!);rd broadcaster poltr~ · 
1 For a disru~H ion of t hr a tt ribu tr::; of t hr elect romagnet 1r sprctrum, 
~er gPnerally W . .Tonr~. Ti rgulat ed lndu;;trirs 1019 (1967); Levin, 
The Hadio Spectrum HP~ourrr. 11 .I La w & Eron. 4:-l:3 (19(iX). 
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taurant leasing space in a building O\vnecl by the State." 
In reaching; this result, we explained that, in part be-
cause of the "public ow1wrship" of the building, the 
f-'tate "has elected to place its pov,:er, property alld 
prestige behind the" actions of the privately owned res-
taurant. :365 U. S .. at 725. A.nd viewing the relation-
ship in its entirety, we concluded that "I tJhe State 
has so far insinuated 1tself into a position of inter-
dependence with I the rcstaura11t I that it must be recog-
nized as a ,ioint participant in thP challenged ac-
tivity ... .' ' !bid.; see also Moose Lodge ,\'o. 10?' v, 
lrvis, supra, at 172- 173, 175; Turner v. City of Memphis, 
3()9 U.S. 350 ( 1962); Kissi·nger v . • Y ew York City Transit 
Authority, 274 F. Supp. 438 ( SD~Y 1D67); Farmer v. 
Moses, 232 F. Supp. 154 (SDNY 1D04J . 
A second indicia of '·governmental involvement" de-
rives from the direct dependence of broadcasters upon 
the Federal Government for their " right " to operate 
broadcast frequellcies . There can be 110 doubt that, 
for the industry as a whole, governmeutal regulation 
alone makes "radio communication possible by . . . lim-
iting the number of licensees so as not to overcrowd th<" 
spectrum. " Red Lion Broadcasting ('o . v. FCC, 395 
" lt i ~ true, of rom~r . 1hnt unlikP thr Stntr in Burton , thr Frdpm] i 
CiovPrnrnpn t bt•n• dor~ no I rrr<'JVP ~ub~t ant 1al fi naneial compc•nsa t ion 
for tlw u~e of tlw " public '' proprrt~· St•r Burton v . Wilmi11gton · 
fJarkinQ Authority, wpra. at 72:3- 7:2-J. ; J1Joose Lodgl' No . 107 v, 
lrvis, supra, at li..J.- 175. N('VNtlwlr~~. thr ab~Pnrc· of ~uch n finan-
rial arrnngrnwnt rrprr~rnt ~ . in prart1ral rffrrt , goYNnmrnt :-;ub~ idiza­
lion of broadra ~ ((•r~. thrrrb~· rnhanring tlw drgrrr of govrmmrntal 
involvrmrnt. Cf. KaiYrn , Broadrn~t ing , Puhlir Polic· :~· and t hr FirHt 
Amr ndnwnt , 10 .J Law ,~,: !<:ron. 15, :n (H)(i7) . :\lorrovrr, m; in 
Burton , thr pubhrl~· O\I'JH'd propc•rt .\' ~~"not ~mplu" ~tatr proprrty" 
hut , rather, ron~t1tutr~ an "intrgrnl and , llldrPd , indi ~p<'n"ablr part " 
of ihr go\'t'rnrnrntal ~ehrnw Burtlm \'. IT'ilmiugton Parking Au-
.thority. supm. at 72:3- 7:2-+, ::irr al~o -+7 l1 R, C. § :10:1 (g) , 
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U. S. 367, 389 (1969). 0 Moreover, with respect to in-
clivicluallicensees, it is equally clear that "existing broad~ 
casters have often attained their present position,'' not 
as a result of free market pressures' but. rather. "bew 
cause of their initial government selection .... " !d., 
at 400. Indeed, the "quasi-monopolistic" advantages 
enjoyed by broadcast licensees "are the fruit of a pre-
ferred position conferred by the Government," !bid, 
Thus. as CHIEF JusTICE (then .Judge) BuRGER has himw 
self recognized, "la] broadcaster seeks and is granted the 
free and exclusive use of a limited and valuable part of 
the public domain; when he accepts that franchise it is 
burdened by enforceable public obligations." Office of 
C01mnuuication of Lhe Um:ted Church of Ghrist v. FCC, 
- U. S. App. D. C. - . 359 F. 2d 944. 1003 (1966). 
And, along these same Jines. vve have consistently held 
that "when authority derives in part from Government'~ 
thumb on the scales. the exercise of that power by pri.,. 
vate persons becomes closely akin , in some respects, to 
its exercise by Government itself." American Commu,~ 
nications Assn. v. Douds, 339 U. S. 382, 401 ( 1950); 
see, e. g., Public Utilities Commission v. Pollak, 343 U. S. 
451. 462 n. 8 (1952). 
A further indicia of ''governme11tal involvemeut" in 
the promulgatim1 and enforcement of the challenged 
broadcaster policy may be seen in the extensive govern-
mental control over the broadcast industry. It is true, J1 
{hu,.t of course.A this "Court has never held" that actions of 
an otherwise private entity necessarily constitute govern-
" For <l diHcu;;;; ion of thr Fairn('Ho; Doctrinr and It~ rrlrvancr to thi::; 
raHr, :-;rr trxt and not r~ . at llll. 15-:34, infra . 
' Indrrd , thr Communication,; Act of 19:3-J. makr::; it a criminal 
ofTr n"'<' to opr rntr a broadca"'t tran~miitrr without a lieC'JIH('. SrC' 
47 lT. S. C. § 501. Thu,;, t hr Frdrral C:ovrrumC'nl ~preifi<"ally inHu-
lafr~ tlw JirenHrP from an~· rral. tlurat of rronomir romrwtitiou. 
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mental action if that entity "is subject to ... regula~ \J 
tion in any degree whatever." Moose Lodge i\'o. 107 v. ~ 
Irvis, supra, at 173. Here, however, we are confronted 
not with some minimal degree of regulation but rather, 
with an elaborate statutory scheme governing virtually 
all aspects of the broadcast industry. ' Indeed, federal 
agency review and guidance of broadcaster conduct is 
automatic, continuing and pervasive." Thus, as the 
Court of Appeals noted, "[a Jlmost no other private 
business- almost no other regulated private business-
" Thus, thr Communication::; Art of 19:3-l authorizr::; thr Frdrral 
Communication::; CommiHl:'ion to a:;~ ign frequenc~· band::;, 47 U. S. C. 
§ :~D:3 (c): allocate liccnsr,.; b~· loration , § :3o:3 (d) : rrgulate apparat11,.;, 
§ :~0:3 (r); p,.;tablish ~rrYicP nrra,.;, § :30:3 (a) ; rrgulntr rhain ownPr-
~hip , § ;{0:3 (k) ; rrquire t hr krPtJing of drtailrd rrcorcb, § ::lO::l (j); 
r~tabli~h qualifications of licrnsrrl:', § :30:3 (I) (one): ~u~pPnd Jicrnse::;, 
§ :30:3 (m) (onr) ; in::;prct ::;tat ion facilitl('::; , § :3o:3 (n) ; rPquirr publi-
cation of call letter" and othrr informntion, § :30:3 (p); makr rulr::; 
to rffrct regulation of rHdio and trlrvis10n. §:3m (r); rrquirr that 
telrvioion :;pt~ bP capablr of rrcriving all ~ignals, § :3Q:{ (::; ); rrgulnt!' 
the granting of licPnl:'rs and thr terms tlwrrof, §§ :307, :309; prr-
::icribe information to br HllJlplicd b~ · applicant,; for licrn:;c::;, § :30~ (b) ; 
rrgulatP thr transfE'f of hrensrs, § :310 ; impo:;r ~anction::; on licrni:ier,.: , 
including rPvocation of license , § 312; rrquire fair coverage of con-· 
trovrrsial il:'sllrs, § :315 ; control the operation of transmitting ap-
parn t 11,.;, § :3ls; and prohibit t hr use of offrnl:'ivc la nguagc , § :32(5. 
"Pur~uant to statutory authority , ~rr n. S, SU]Jra, the Commis-
l'iOil ha~ promulgated myriad regulations govPming all a~prct::; of 
licrn:;cr conduct. Sec 47 CFH § 7:3.17 et seq. The~r rt>gulations 
affect ~ncb matiNs a::; hom~ of oprrat ion, § 7:3.2:3; mult iplc ownrr-
~hip of licrn::;c::; b~· a ::;inglc individual , § 7:3.:35 ; stntion location and 
program origination , § 73.:30 ; maintenance of clrtailcd logs of pro-
gramming, oprration , and mamtenanrt• , §§ 7:Ull- llfl ; billing prac-
tices , § 7:3.124; thr prr:;onal attack nnd political rditorial fairnr~::~ 
rrquirrments, § 7:3- 12:3 ; relationship of licPn :;pp~ to JlE'twork,.;, 
§§ 7:U:H- 1:39 ; permi~~ible rquipment, §§ 7.'3.:39- 50. Thr above-
Cited regulations relatE' only to A:\1 radio, but ~1milar rrgulation:; 
<·xist for Ff\1 radio, ~ 7:3.201 1'1 ~Nf .. and triPvision, § 7:3.()01 et seq. 
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is so intimately bound to government .... " 450 F. 2d, 
at 652. 
Even more important than this general regulatory 
scheme, however is the specific _governmental involve-
m~th~ b.£:_adcaster p~licy presently under consid-
eration. There is, for example, an obvious nexus be-
tween the Commission's Fairness Doctrine and the 
absolute refusal of broadcast licensees to sell any part of 
their airtime to groups or individuals wishing to speak 
out on controversial issues of public importance. In-
deed, in defense of this policy, the broadcaster-petitioners 
argue vigorously that this exclusionary policy is author-
ized and even compelled by the Fairness Doctrine. And 
the Court itself recognizes repeatedly that the Fairness 
Doctrine and other Communications Act policies are 
inextricably linked to the challenged ban. Thus, at one 
point, the Court suggests that "[ilf the Fairness Doctrine 
were applied to editorial advertising, there is . . . the 
substantial danger that the effective operation of that 
doctrine would be jeopardized." Ante, at -. Sim-
ilarly, the Court maintains that, in light of the Fairness 
Doctrine, there simply is no reason to allow individuals 
to purchase advertising time for the expression of their 
own views on public issues. See ante, at -.10 Although 
I do not in any sense agree with the substance of these 
propositions, they serve at least to illustrate the extent 
to which the Commission's Faimess Doctrine has influ-
enced the development of the policy here under review. 
Moreover, the Commission's involvement in the chal-
lenged policy is not limited solely to the indirect effects 
of its Fairness Doctrine. On the contrary, in a decision 
10 In addition, ihr l'onrt contend~; that , becansr of the Fairne~ii 
Dortrinr, the rhallmged broadca:strr policy dor>i not di~rriminate 
again~;t controver~ial ::;peech . Srr aute. at - . 
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which must inevitably provide guidance for future 
broadcaster action, the Commission has specifically con-
sidered and specifically authorized the flat ban.1 ' In so 
doing, the Commission-and through it the Federal Gov-
ernment-has unequivocably given its imprimatur to the· 
absolute ban on editorial advertising. And, of course, 
it is now well-settled that specific governmental approval 
of or acquiescence in challenged action by a private entity 
indicates "governmental action." 
Thus, in McCabe v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe 
R. Co., 235 U. S. 151 ( 1914), for example, the Court dealt 
with a statute which, as coi1struecl by the Court, simply 
authorized rail carriers to provide certain types of cars 
. ---for white passengers without offering equal facilities to 
blacks. Although dismissal of the complaint on pro-
cedural grounds was affirmed, we made clear that such 
a statute, even though purely permissive in nature, was 
invalid under the Fourteenth Amendment because a car-
rier refusing equal service to blacks would be "acting in 
the matter under the authority of a state law.'' Id., at 
162. And, some 50 years later, we explained this finding 
of "governmental action" in McCabe as "nothing less 
than considering a permissive state statute as an au-
thorization to discriminate and as sufficient state action 
to violate the Fourteenth Amendment .... " Reitman 
v. Mulkey, 387 U. S. 369, 379 ( 1967). Thus, "[o] ur 
prior decisions leave no doubt" that any action of the 
Government. through any of its agencies, approving, au-
thorizing, encouraging or otherwise supporting conduct 
which if performed by the Government would violate 
the Constitution, "constitutes illegal [governmental] in-
volvement in those pertinent private acts ... that sub-
sequently occur.'' Adickes v. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 
202 (1970) (separate opinion); ser. e. g., Moose Lodge 
11 Srr Business Executives Move fo?' V'il'tnmll Peace. supra, n. 1; 
Demo('f'aLi!' National Committl'e, &u.pm, n (. 
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No. 107 v. Irvis, supra; Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385· 
(1969); Reitman v. Mulkey, supra; Evans v. Newton, 
supra; Robinson v. Florida, 379 U. S. 153 (1964); Lom-
bard v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 267 ( 1963); Peterson v. City 
of Greenville, 373 U. S. 244 ( 1963); Burton v. Wilming-
ton Parking Authority, supra; McCabe v. Atchison, 'J'ow 
peka & Santa Fe R. Co., supra. 
Finally, and perhaps most important, in a case vir-
tually identical to the one now before us, we held that 
a policy promulgated by a r.rivately owned bus company, 
franchised by the Federal Government anc regula e by 
the Public Utilities Commission of the District of Co-
lumbia, ~be subjected to the constraints of the First 
Amendment. Public Utilities Commission v. Pollak, 343 
~
U. S. 451 ( 1952) . In reaching that result, we placed 
primary emphasis on the specific regulatory acquiescence 
in the challenged action of the bus company. Thus, 
after noting that the bus company "operates its services 
under the regulatory supervision of the Public Utilities 
Commission of the District of Columbia which is an 
agency authorized by Congress," we explained that 
our finding of "governmental action'' was predicated 
specifically 
"upon the fact that that agency, pursuant to pro-
tests against the l challenged policy], ordered an in-
vestigation of it and, after formal public hearings, 
ordered its investigation dismissed on the ground 
that the public safety, comfort and convenience were 
not impaired thereby.'' 343 U. S., at 462. 
See Moose Lodge No . 107 v. Tn1is, supra, at 175-176 
n. 3. 
Although the Court strains valiantly today to dis-
tinguish Pollak, it offers nothing more than the pro-
verbial "distinctions without a difference." Here, as in 
Pollak, the broadcast 1icrnsees opcratr "under the reg-
ulatory :mpervision of . . . an ag;Pnc:v authorized by 
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Congress." And, again as in Pollak, that agency received 
"protests" against the challenged policy and, after for-
mal consideratiou, "dismissed" tho complaints on the 
ground that the "public interest, convenience, and neces-
sity" were not "impaired" by that policy. Indeed, the 
argument for finding "governmental action" here is oven 
stronger than in Pollak, for this case co11cems not an ·in-
cidental activity of a bus company but, rather, the pri-
mary activity of the regulated entities-communication. 
Thus, given the confluence of these various indicia 
of "govern men tal action "-including the public nature 
of the airwaves,'" the governmentally created preferred 
status of broadcasters, the extensive Government regu-
lation of broadcast programming, and tho specific gov-
ernmental approval of the challenged policy-! can only 
·conclude that the Government "has so far insinuated 
itself into a position" of participation in this policy that 
the absolute refusal of broadcast licensees to sell airtime 
to groups or individuals wishing to speak out on con-
troversial issues of public importance must be subjected 
to the restraints of the First Amendment. 
TI 
Radio and television have long been recognized as 
forms of communication "affected by a First Amend-
ment interest" and, indeed. it can hardly be doubted 
that broadcast licensees are themselves protected by that 
'" 1\IIorrover, thr appropriatenr~~ of a part1cular forum, even if 
privately owned, for rffective communication ha::; in somr in~tancr~ 
bren rmpha~ized to r~tabli~h thr rclrvancr of FirHt Amrndment pro-
teetion~. Sre, e. (J., Amalgamated Food Employees Union Local 5.90 
v. Logan V a/leu Plaza, inc., :391 U. 8. :308 ( 1968) ; !If arsh v. Alabama, 
:)2() ll. S. 501 (194G) . Herr, a;; the Comt of Appral;; recop:nized, 
"thr broadca~t mrdin arr ~prcifically dedicated to communication. 
Thr~· function a:; both our foremost forum for public :;perch and om 
mo~t important rducntor of an informed prople ." -±50 F. 2d, at 
()5:), Sc(> abo t t>Xt a ncl not r~. at nn . ;).')-:37, i·11[m 
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Amendment. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, supra; 
at 386. See United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 
334 U. S. 131, 166 ( 1948); Z. Chafee, Free Speech in 
the United States 545-546 ( 1941). Recognitio11 of this 
fact does not end our inquiry, however, for it is equally 
clear that the protection of the First Amendment in this 
context is not limited solely to broadcasters. On the 
contrary, at least one set of competing claims to the 
protection of that Amendment derives from the fact that, 
because of the limited number of broadcast frequencies 
available and the potentially pervasive impact of the 
electronic rnedia, "the people as a whole retain their 
interest in free speech by radio and their collective right 
to have the medium function consistently with the ends 
and purposes of the First Amendment." Red Lion 
Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, supra, at 390. 
Over 50 years ago, Mr. Just.ice Holmes sounded what 
has since become a dominant theme in applying the First 
Amendmeut to the changing problems of our Nation. 
"fTlhe ultimate good,'' he declared, "is better reached r 
by free trade in ideas," and "the best test of truth is the 
power of the thought to get itself accepted in the com-
petition of the market .... " Abrams v. United States, 
250 U. S. 616, 630 ( 1919) (dissenting opinion); see also 
Whitney v. California, 274 U. S. 357, 372 (1927) 
(Brandeis, J., concurring); Gitlow v. A'ew York, 268 
U.S. 652, 672 (1925) (Holmes, J., dissenting). Indeed, 
the First Amendment itself testifies to our "profound 
national commitment to the principle that debate on 
public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-
open,'' 1 " and the Amendment "rests on the assumption 
that the widest possible dissemination of information 
from diverse and antagonistic sources is essential to the 
1"New York Times C'o. v. 8uli1van, supra, at 271; ~<'E' al::;o 
Pickering v. Board of Rducation, :391 ll. S, 5fi:3, 57:3 (1968); Mills 
v. Alabama. :384 ll. S. 214, 218 (19Hfi) . 
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welfare of the public .... " Associated Press v. United 
States, 326 U. S. 1, 20 (1945). For "it is only through 
free debate and free exchange of ideas that government 
remains responsive to the will of the people and peaceful 
change is effected.'' Tenniniello v. Chicago, 337 U. S. 
1, 4 ( 1949); see also Thor11hill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 
102 (1940); Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U. S. 319, 327 
( 19,37). 
With considerations such as these in mind, we have 
specifically declared that, in the context of radio and 
television broaclcasti ng, the First Amendment protects 
"the right of the public to receive suitable access to 
social, political, esthetic, moral and other ideas and 
experiences ... :'' Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 
supr-a, at 390.'' And, because "[i] t is the purpose of 
the First Amendment to preserve an uninhibited market-
place of ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail, 
rather than to countenance monopolization of that mar-
ket, whether it be by the Government itself or a private 
licensee," "[ijt is the right of viewers and listeners, not 
the right of broadcasters, which is paramount." Ibid. 
Thus, we have explicitly recognized that, in light of 
the unique nature of the electronic media, the public 
have strong First Amendment interests in the reception 
of a full spectrum of views-presented in a vigorous and 
uninhibited manner-on controversial issues of public 
importance. And, as we have seen, it has traditionally 
been thought that the most effective' way to insure this 
"Thi:-; was not nrw dart rinr, for wr hn vr long rrrognized in a 
variety of COlltrxt~ that t hr First Amrndm<>nt "n<>rr~;;aril~· protects 
the right to rrceivr /.information]." M artiu v. City of Struthers, 
:n9 U S. 141, 14:3 (19·-!:3). ~rr, e. g., Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U. S. 
556, 557 (1969); Time, fur. v. Hill, :385 U. S. :~74, :388 (1967); 
Grisu·old v. Connecticut. :381 U. S. 479, 482 (1965); Lamont v, 
Post1naster General, :381 U, S. 801, :307- 808 (19()fi). 
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"uninhibited, robust, and wide-open" debate is by foster~ 
ing a "free trade in ideas" by making our forums of com-
munication readily available to all persons wishing to 
express their views. Although apparently conceding the 
legitimacy of these principles, the Court nevertheless up-
holds the absolute ban on editorial advertising because1 
in its view, the Commission's Fairness Doctrine, in and 
of itself, is sufficient to satisfy the First Amendment 
interests of the public. I cannot agree. 
The Fairness Doctrine originated early in the history 
of broadcast regulation and, rather than being set forth 
in any specific statutory provision," developed gradually 
in a long series of Commission rulings in particular 
cases."' In essence, the doctrine imposes a two-fold duty 
upon broadcast licensees: ( 1) coverage of issues of pub~ 
lie importance must be adequate," and (2) such cov-
"'The Fairnt'Sii Doctrine waH rt'cognizecl and .implicitly approved 
by Congre~s in the 1959 amendment~ to § :315 of the Communica-
tions Act. Act of September 14, 1959, § 1, 73 Stat. 557, amending 
47 U. S. C. § :315 (a). AH amrnded, § 315 (a) recognizes the obliga-
tion of broadcaster:; ''to operate in the public mtrrrst and to afford 
reasonable apport unity for the cli::;cus;;ion of conflicting views on 
issues of public importnnce." 
1 " The Fairness Doctrine was first fully ~et forth in Heport in the 
Matter of Editorializing b)· Broadcast Licensee, , 13 F. C. C. 
1246 (1949), and was elaborated upon in Applicability of the Fair-
ness Doctrine in the Handling of Cant roverswl Issues of Public 
Importance, 29 Feel. Reg. 10415 (1954) . The ~;ta t utory authority 
of the Comrmssion to promulgate thi8 doctrmr and relat ed regula-
tions derives from the mandate to the "romtmssion from time to 
time, as public convenience , mterest , or neresHity n'quires," to 
promulgate "Ruch rules and regulations and prescribe such restric-
tions and conditwn::; . . . as may be nece:;sa r~· to carry out the 
provision::; of [the Act 1 • • • • " ..J-7 U. S C. §§ 30a, 30:3 (r). 
17 Sec John J. Dempsey, 6 P & F Radio Heg. 615 (1950); see 
also Metropolitan Broadcasting Corp., 19 P & F Radio Rrg. 602 
(1960); The Evening News Assoriation, () P & F Radio Rrg. 28:3 
(1950), 
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erage must fairly reflect opposing viewpoints .'H See 
Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, supra, at 377. In 
fulfilling their obligations under the Fairness Doctrine1 
however, broadcast licensees have virtually complete dis-
cretion, subject only to the Commission's general require-
ment that licensees act "reasonably and in good faith," '" 
11 to determine what issues should be covered, how much 
time should be allocated, which spokesmen should ap-
pear, and in what format.""" Thus, the Fairness Doc-
trine does not in any sense require broadcasters to allow 
11non-broadcaster" speakers to use the airwaves to ex-
press their own views on controversial issues of public 
importance."' On the contrary, broadcasters may meet 
1 ~ If the broadcaster prr~ent~ onr ;;1dr of a que;;tJOn, and does not 
wish to prC';;rnt thf> other ;;ide lmnself, hr can fulfill his fairness 
obligation b~· announcing hi;; willingness to broadcast oppo;;ing virw::; 
by voluntrrr::;. Srr Mid-Florida Television Corp., 4-0 F. C. C. 620 
( 1964). If the broadcastC'r rrject;; a volunteer ;;pokC',;man a,; "inap-
propriate," he mu;;t ;;C'ck out other:>. Srr Richard G. R·ujJ, 19 
F. C. C. 2d 8:38 (1969). The broadca,;ter mu,;t provide frpp time for 
the presentn t ion of opposing VJC'w::; if ;,;poJJ::;orship is unnvailable . Sec· 
Cullman Broadcasting Co., 25 P & F Hadio Reg. R95 (1963). 
"' Applicabil it~ · of 1lw Fairnr"~ Doctnnr in the Handling of Con-
trovrr;;ial Issue::; of Public Importance, SU]J?'a, n. 16, at 10424. 
" 0 Notice of Inquiry: The 1/and/ing of Public issues Under the 
Fairness Doctrine and the Public Interest Standards of the Commu-
nications Act, :30 F. C. C. 2d 2() , 2S (1971); :;eC' abo Applicability of 
the FairnC'HS Doctrine in the Handling of Controversial IssuC';; of 
Public Importnnce, supra, n. 1(), at 10416; Hcport 111 the Mattrr of 
Editorializin~ b~· Broadcast LicC'n~rr~. sU]Jra, n. Hi. 
"'Thus, the Fairnrs~ Doctnnr must be ;;harply di:-~tingui;;hed from 
the ''equal 1 imr" requm?ment, wlurh provide:-; that a broadcaster who 
affords airtime to our political candidate must make C'(j11al time avail-
able to othC'r candidate:; for thr ~ame offirr. 47 U. S. C. § 315. See 
also Nicholas Zapple, 2:3 F. C. C. 2d 707 (1970) (rxten~JOn of "rqual 
t1mr '' rule to cover a cand 1datr ';; :-;upport er:-; whrrr spokrsmen for 
othC'r candidatr:-; are permitted to pureha;;e airtimr) . Similarly, the 
Fmrnc;;s Doctrine must not be confu::;ed wdh the Commi;;sion's "per-
;;onal attack" and '·pol it irnl rditonalizing" rule.::; which wt'rr 11phC'Icl 
7i-sn::l, :ETC.-DiSSENT (A) 
COLUMBIA BROADCASTING v. DEMOCRATIC COMM. 11 
their fairness responsibilities through presentation of care-
fully edited news programs, panel discussions, interviews, 
and documentaries. As a result, broadcasters retain 
almost exclusive control over the selection of issues and 
viewpoints to be covered, the manner of presentation and, 
perhaps most important, who shall speak. Given this 
doctrinal framework, I can only conclude that the Fair-
ness Doctrine, standing alone, is insufficient-in theory 
as well as in practice-to provide the kind of "unin~ 
hibited, robust, and wide-open" exchange of views to 
which the public is constitutionally entitled. 
As a practical matter, the Court's reliance on the Fair.: 
11ess Doctrine as an "adequate" alternative to editorial 
advertising seriously overestimates the ability-or will-
ingness-of broadcasters to expose the public to the 
"widest possible dissemination of information from 
diverse and antagonistic sources." "" As Professor Jaffe 
has noted, "there is considerable possibility that the 
broadcaster will exercise a large amount of self-censorship 
and try to avoid as much controversy as he safely can.""" 
Indeed, in light of the strong interest of broadcasters 
in Red Lion Broadcal3ting Co. v. PCC, supra. Tlw "per~onal attack" 
rule provide~ that "when, during the pre~entatwn of views on a 
controver~ial issue of public importance, an attack i~ made on the 
honest:>' , character, intrgrity, or like personal qualitir~ of nn identi-
fied ])rrson," the licen~ee mu~t notify the prr~on attacked and offer 
him an opportunit~· to respond. 47 CFH § 73.12:3. The ''political 
rditorializing" rulr provides that whrn a licrnsee enclor~es a candi-
date for political oillce it mu~t givr ot hrr candidates or their spokes-
men an opportunity to respond. Srr, e. g., 47 CFR § 73.123. Thus, 
unlike the Fairnrs;; Doctrine, the ·'equal time," "personal attack," 
and "political rditorializing" rulrs grant a particular group or individ-
ual a limit<'d ''right of acce::;s" to the airways not Hubject to the 
''jomnali;;1 ic suprrvi;;ion" of the broadcaster. 
""Associated Press v. United States, :326 U. S. 1, 20 (1945). 
"'1 Jaffe, Thr Editorial RPs]wnsibility of the Broadcaster: Rrflec-
t ion~ on FairnP8~ and Accrs;.;, 85 Harv. 1 . Hev. 758, 77:3 n. 26 ( 1972). 
71-R63, ETC.-biSSE~T (A) 
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in maximing their audience, and therefore their profits, 
it seems almost naive to expect the majority of broad-
casters to produce the variety and controversiality of 
material necessary to reflect a full spectrum of view-
points. Stated simply, angry customers are not good l 
customers and, in the commercial world of mass com-
munications, it is simply "bad business'' to espouse-
or even to allow others to espouse-the heterodox or the 
controver.::ial. As a result, even under the Fairness Doc-
trine, b~ters generally tend to permit only est~b~ I 
lished-or at least moderated-views to enter the broad-----. 
cast world's "marketplace of ideas."~' 
24 See genrrall~· D. Lac~·, Frerdom and Communicat ions 69 
(1961); .Jaffr, supra, n. 2:{, nt 77:~, 26; Cn nb~·. Thr Fir~t Amrndment 
Hight to Per~uade: Accr~s to Radio and Television, 19 U. C. L. A. 
L. Rev. 72:3, 727 (1972); !\falonr, Hroadcastmg, Thr Heluctanl 
Dragon: Will thr Fin:t Amendment Hight of Acce~~ End the Sup-
pressing of Controver;;ial Idra:::'?, 5 U. Mich . .f. 1. Hrv. 19:3, 205-
211, 21() (1972); .John~011 & Wrl:'trn. A Twentieth Crntur~· Soap-
box: Tlw Right to Purchase Radio and Telrvision Time, 57 Va. L. 
Hrv. 547 (1971); Barron, Acces~ to thr Prr:<~-A New First Amrml-
ment Hight, SO Harv. L. Rrv. 1641 (1967); Notr, Fret' Sperch and 
the l\Inso; 11rdia. 57 Va. L. Re\·. ():3(j (1971); Note, A Fair Break 
for Controversial S]Jraker~: Limitations of thr Fairnro;o; Doctrinr and 
the Need for Individual Accr~o;. :39 Gro. Wash. 1. Hev. 5:32 (1971); 
Notr, Wastrl11nd Rrvisited: A !\Iodc•st Attack Upon the FCC's 
Catcgor~· S~·strm, 17 U. C. L. A. L. Hrv. 868, 870-875 (1970); 
Commrnl , Frerdom of Sprrch and the lndividual'c: Right of Acce~H 
to thr Airways, 1970 Law & 'ocw l Order 424, 428; Notr, FCC's 
Fairness Ht'gulations: A Fm;t Step Toward~ Crrntion of a Right 
of Accr~~ to the l\Ja~~ Ylruia, 54 Com. L. Hrv. 294, 29() (1969). 
Although admittmg that thr Fairne::;~ Doctrmr " ha::; not alwayo; 
brought to tlw public pNfrct or indrrd eve n high quality trentment 
of a ll public rvent::; and I ~::;ue;;," the Court nrvrrt hrless l:'uggests that 
a hroadcnstrr who fnils to fulfill hi~ fairnrs~ obligatiOns doe::; so "nt 
thr ri,;k of losing his licen"r." Ante, at-. Thr Court doeo; not 
site a siuglr ll1stnncr. however, in which thi~ sanction ha" ever bern 
.invoked hecausr of a broadcastrr'::; failurr to romp!~ · with thr Fair-
ur~s Dortrinr, lnderd , thi~ i,; not ~mpn~lllg, for thr Commission 
7I-Hfi:j, ETC.-DISSENT (A) 
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Moreover. the Court's reliance on the Fairness 
Doctrine as the sole means of informing the public 
seriously misconceives and underestimates the public's 
interest in receiving ideas and information directly from 
the advocates of those ideas vvithout the interposition 
of journalistic middlemen. Under the Fairness Doc-
trine. broadcasters decide what issues are "important,'' 
how "fully" to cover them, and what format, time and 
style of coverage arc "appropriate." The retention of 
such absolute control in the hands of a few government 
licensee13 is inimical to the First Amendment. for vigorous, 
free debate can be attained on ly when members of the 
public have at least some opportunity to take the initia-
tive ancj editorial control into their own hands. 
Our legal system reflects a belief that truth is best 
illuminated by a collision of genuine advocates. Under 
the Fairness Doctrine, however, accompanied by an abso-
lute ban on editorial advertising, the public is compelled 
to rely exclusively 011 the "journalistic discretion" of 
broadcasters, who serve in theory as surrogate spokes-
men for all sides of all issues. This separation of the 
advocate from the expression of his views can serve only 
to diminish the effectiveness of that expression . Indeed, 
·we emphasized this fact in Red Lim1: "" 
"Nor is it enough that he should hear the argu-
ments of adversaries from his own teachers, pre-
sented as they state them, and accompanied by what 
they oft'er as rf~futations. That is not the way to 
do justice to thl' argumrnts. or bring them into real 
hn~ acircl with grrat rp]ueinncr in tht~ arra, tntrrvrnmg in only thr 
mo~t rxirrmr ca,.;e,.; of broadra~irr abu~r. Srr Canb~·. supra, at 
725-7'27: :\Iallonl' , supra. at :215- :Hii ; ,.;rr also Cox & .JohnHon, 
Broadcastiuo 111 America awl the FCC's Ltcense Renewal Process : 
An Oklahoma Case Study, 14 F. C. C. 2d 1 (1959) 
2
'' Red Lion Broadcastinu ('o. v. FCC. su]Jra. at :392 n. lS, quoting 
.T. ]\fill , OJI Librrty :32 m. :\Jr( 'allum Pd 1947) . 
71-86:), ETC.-DISSENT (A) 
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contact with his own mind. He must be able to 
hear them from persons who actually believe them; 
who defend them in earnest, and do their very utmost 
for them.!' 
Thus, if the public is to be ho11estly and forthrightly 
apprised of opposing views on controversial issues, it is 
imperative that citizens be permitted at least some 
opportunity to speak directly for themselves as genuine 
advocates on issues that concern them. 
Moreover, to the extent that broadcasters actually 
permit citizens to appear on "their" airwaves under the 
Fairness Doctrine, such appearances are subject to exten-
sive editorial control. Yet it is clear that the effective-
ness of an individual's expression of his views is as 
dependent on the style and format of presentation as 
it is on the content itself. And the relegation of an 
individual's views to such tightly controlled formats as 
the news, documentaries, edited interviews, or panel dis-
cussions may tend to minimize, rather than maximize the 
effectiveness of speech. Under a limited scheme of 
editorial advertising, however, the crucial editorial con-
trols are in the speaker's own hands. 
Nor is this case concerned solely with the adequacy 
of coverage of those views and issues which generally are 
recognized as "newsworthy." For also at stake is the 
right of the public to receive suitable access to new and 
generally unperceived ideas and opinions. Under the 
Fairness Doctrine, the broadcaster is required to present 
only "representative community views and voices on 
controversial issues" of public importance."0 Thus, by 
definition, the Fairness Doctrine tends to perpetuate cov-
erage of those "views and voices'' that are already estab-
lished, while failing to provide for exposure of the public 
26 Bl,lsiuess Executives Move for Vietnam Pear·e. wpm, n. 1. at 222:. 
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to those "views and voices'' that are novel, unorthodox 
or unrepresentative of prevailing opinion."7 
Finally, it should be noted that the Fairness Doctrine 
permits, indeed reqU?:res, broadcasters to determine for 
themselves which views and issues are suffi.cienty "im-
portant" to warrant discussion. The briefs of the broad~ 
caster-petitioners in this case illustrate the type of "jour~ 
nalistic discretion" licensees now exercise in this regard. 
Thus, ABC suggests that it would refuse to air those 
views which it considers "scandalous" or "crackpot," ~s 
while ABC' would exclude those issues or opinions that 
are "insignificant""" or "triviaL""" Similarly, NBC 
would bar speech that strays "beyond the bounds of 
normally accepted taste." at and WTOP would protect 
the public from subjects that are "slight. parochial or 
inappropriate.'' '12 
The genius of the First Amendment, however, is that 
it has always defined what the public ought to hear by 
permitting speakers to say what they wish. As the Court 
of Appeals recognized, "[i] t has traditionally been 
thought ... that the best Judge of the importance of a 
27 Inderd, the failurr to providr adequatr means for group::; and 
individtwl;.; to bring nrw i::;sur:; or idea::; to thr attention of the public 
explains, at least to ::;omr extrnt, "the clrvelopment of new mrdia to 
convey unorthodox, unpopular, and nrw idea;;. Sit -in~ and demon-
Htration::; testify to ... thr inahil!ty to Herure accr;;::; to thr ron-
vrntional mran:; of rraching and changing public opinion . I For by] 
the bizarrr and un::;ettling natme of hi;; technique, the demon;;trator 
hope;.; to arrest and divert attention long enough to compel thr 
public to ponder hi::; mes::mge." Barron. supra, n. 24, at 1647; cf. 
Adderley V. fi'londa, :385 n. R :39, 50-51 (19611) (DOUGLAS, J., 
di;;senting). 
28 Brief for American Broadca;;tmg Companir:s, Inr . 52. 
2 fl Brirf for Columbia Broadra~tmg s~'H(Pm. Inc. :{4. 
"
0 ld., at 40 
'J 1 Brief for National Broaden:stmg Company, In('. 10. 
" 2 Brif•f for Po~t-NrwswePk Rtation~. Capital Arra. lnr. :n. 
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particular viewpoint is the in eli vicJ ual or group holding 
the viewpoint and wishing to communicate it to others." 
450 F. 2d, at 656. Indeed, "supervised and ordained dis-
cussion" is directly contrary to the underlying purposes 
of the First Amendment,"" for that Amendment "pre-
supposes that right conclusions are more likely to be 
gathered out of a multitude of tongues. than through any 
kind of authoritativ0 selection.""' Thus, in a related 
context, we have explicitly recognized that editorial ad-
vertisements constitute "an important outlet for the 
promulgation of information and ideas by persons who 
do not themselves have access to lmedia l facilities," and 
the unavailability of such editorial advertising can serve 
only "to shackle the First Amendment in its attempt to 
secute 'the widest possible dissemination of information 
from divers<' and antagonistic sources.'" New York 
'Times Co. v. Sullivan, supra, at 266. 
The Faimess Doctrine's requirement of full and fair 
coverage of controversial issues is, beyond doubt, a com-
mendable and, indeed. essential tool for effective regula-
tion of the broadcast industry. But, standing alone, it 
simply cannot eliminate the need for a further, comple-
mentary airing of controversial views through the limited 
availability of editorial advertising. Indeed, the avail-
ability of at least some opportunity for editorial ad-
vertising is imperative if we are ever to attain "the free 
and general discussion of public issues [that I seems ab-
solutely essential to prepare the people for an intelligent 
exercise of their rights as citizens." Grosjean v. Amen:-
ca11 Press Co., 297 F. S. 233. 250 ( 193fi) . 
"" Tinker v. Des Moines lwfependent Cmmnumty School District. 
:39:3 U. S. 50:3 (1969) . 
"' Cnited StatPs v. Assocwtrd fJress. 5:2 F. Supp. :36:2, 372 (SDNY 
1Y4:3) , nff'cl. :3:2() U.S. I (1945). Sr<> nl~o Thomas v. Collins, :323 
~1 • S. 5W. 545 (1945) (.Jnck~ou , .J. ronrurriug) . 
71-R6:3, ETC'.-DISSE:\T (Al 
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Moreover. a proper balancing of the competi11g First 
Amendment iuterests at stake ill this controversy must 
consider, not only the interests of broadcasters and of 
the listening and viewing public. but also the independent 
First Amendment interest of groups and individuals in 
effective self-expression. See. e. (J., T. Emerson, Toward 
a General Theory of thP First Amendment 4-7 (1967); 
Z. Chafee, Free Speech in the United States 33 ( 1941). 
"rS]peech concerning public affairs ... is the essence 
of self-government," Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U. S. 
64, 74-75 ( 1964). and the First Amendment must there-
fore safeguard not only the right of the public to hear 
debate, but also the right of individuals to participate 
in that debate and to attrmpt to persuade others to their 
points of view. See. e. g., Thomas v. Collins, 323 U. S. 
516, 537 (1944); cf. lv'AACP v. Button, 371 U. S. 415, 
429-430 (1963). And, in a time of apparently growing 
anonymity of the individual in our society. it is impera-
tive that we take special care to preserve the vital First 
Amendment interest in assuring "self-fulfillment r of 
expressiou_l for each individual." Police Dept. of Chi-
cago v. Mosley, 408 U. S. 92, 96 (1972). For our citizens 
may now find greater than ever the need to express their 
own views directly to the public. rather than through a 
governmentally appointed surrogate, if they are to feel 
that they can achieve at least somP measure of control 
over their own destinies. 
ln light of these considerations. the Court would con-
cede. I assume, that our citizens have at least an abstract 
right to express their views on controversial issues of 
public importance. But freedom of speech does not exist 
in the abstract. On the contrary. the right to speak can 
flourish only if it is allowed to operate in an effective 
71-i-ili:-l. ETC.-DISSENT (A) 
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forum-whether it be a public park, a schoolroom, a 
town meeting hall, a soapbox, or a radio and television 
frequency. For in the absence of an effective means of 
communication. the right to speak would ring hollow 
indeed. And, in recognition of these principles, we have 
consistently held that the First Amendment embodies not 
only the abstract right to be free from censorship, but 
also the right of an individual to utilize au appropriate 
and effective medium for the expression of his views. 
flee, e. g., Lloyd Corp., Ltd. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 559 
(1972); Tinker v. Des Moines Indepe-ndent Community 
School District, 393 U.S. 503 ( 1969); Amalgamated Food 
Employees Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, inc., 
391 U.S. 308 (1968); Brown \'. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131 
(1966); Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 ( 1963); 
Kunz v. Xew York, 340 U.S. 290 (1951); Marsh v. Ala-
bama, 326 U. S. 501 ( 1H46); Jamison v. Texas, 318 U. S. 
413 (1943); Srhneider v. Slate, 308 U. S. 147 (1939); 
Hague v. C/0, 307 U.S. 406 (1939). 
Here, of course, there can be no doubt that the broad-
cast frequencies allotted to the various radio and tele-
vision licensees constitute appropriate "forums'' for thP 
discussion of controversial issues of public importance."" 
'"' Thr Court doe~ mnkP thr rather novrl ~ugge::>t1on, howPvrr, 
that rditonal advPrtising might mdrrd br "inappropriatr" bernu::;r 
''IIstenrrs and ,.1rwrrs ron~titnt r· a ·rapt1vr nucliencr,' r::;prcially 
vulnerablr to thosP who w1sh to thrust unwantrcl propaganda upon 
thrm.'' Ante, at - In support of thiH propoHition, the Court 
cites our drri::;wn~ m Public Utilities Comm1sswn v. Pollak, supra, 
and Kovacs v. Cooper. :3:35 lJ. S. 77 (19-J.9). In Po/la!.:, howevC'r, wr 
Pxplicitly rejected a claim that the broadra::;ting of radio programs 
m Htreetcar~ Ywlated thr Fir~t and F1fth Amcndmrnt ngbt~ of pa::;-
~enger::; who did not wi~h to li~tPn to tho~€' program~. And 111 
Kovacs, although we uphrld an ordinanr<·' forbidding the u~r on pub-
lie ~trPC'b of ~ound t ruckti wh1eh rmtt "loud or raucou~ noi~€'::;," W<' 
cl!d ~o i)('cau~r thr ordmancr wn~ roncrrnPcl, not with thr content of 
::;prech, but rathrr wtth thr otTenHivenr~s of tlw sounds thrmselves. 
Herr, howrvN, thr Court srPms prrfPctl!· willing to allow broad-
caHtE'fti to eontmuP to mvade thr "pnvaey" of thr homp through 
71-S():~. ETC.-DISSENT (A) 
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Indeed, unlike the streets. parks. public libraries and 
other "forums" that we have held to be appropriate for 
the exercise of First Amendment rights. the broadcast 
media are dedicated specifically to communication. And. 
since the expression of ideas-whether political. com-
mercial, musical or otherwise-is the exclusive purpose 
of the broadcast spectrum. it seems clear that the adop-
tion of a limited scheme of editorial advertising vvould 
in no sense divert that spectrum from its intended use. 
(~f. Lloyd Corp. , Ltd. \'. Tanner, supra, at 563; Amalga-
mated Food Employees Union Local .590 v. Logan 11 alley 
Plaza, Inc., supra, at 320. 
Moreover, it is equally clear that. with the assistance 
of the Federal Government. the broadcast industry has 
become what is potentially the most efficient and effective 
"marketplace of ideas" ever devisrd."n Indeed, the clec-
rommrrcial adv('r( Jc;inp; and rvf'n controver~ial programming under 
tlw Fairnr;;~ Doctrinf'. Thu~, thr Court draw~ its linr ~olf'ly on the 
ba~J~ of thr contrnt of thr particular ;.;pf'Pch mvolved and , of cour~r. 
wr havr com;i~tcntl)· hPid thnt , whPrf' contrnt i:s at J~i:>Uf' , con~titn­
tionally protPctcd ~perch rna)· not br prohibitrd brcaw:ir of a "mcrr 
dr~ir<' to avoid thP di"comfort and unpl<'a~:wtnf'~~ that alway~ :!<"-
company an unpopular idf'a . '' Tinker v. Des JIJ oines /nde]Jendent 
Community School Dist1·ict, supra, at 509; ~f'<', e. g., Grayned v. 
City of Rorkford, 40R U. S. 104, 117 (1972). Thr HuggE'~tion that 
con;.;titntionall)· protE'ctcd ~prE'ch may br banned hPcan~E' ~ornE' pcr-
!<on::; ma)· fiJJ d the JdE'a:; E'xprP~~ed oH'cnt<iV(' 1~. 111 1t~rlf, off<'n~ivr to 
t lw vrr)· m<'aning of t hr FirRt AmPndmrnt. 
"" lndrrcl. n pproxima t <'l~· 95 ~/c of Amrncan home~ contain a j· 
lra"t onr t rlrvJswn ,;ct , and that :;E't i~ t nrned 011 for an a vrragE' of 
morE' than fi\'0 one-half hour~ JlE'l' day Sec HE'arings on H. H. 
1:37:21 brforr thE' Sulwommit t<'<' on Communicatwn~ <I nd Powrr of 
thr Hou~r Commit lE'<' on Intrr~tatr and Foreign CommE'rC'(', 91~1 
C'ong. , 2d ~<'~"· · 7 (1970) (:;lat<'mrnl of Dpan Burch , Chairman of 
t br FrdNal Commume;ttJOnt< Commi"::;Jon) . A~ to t lw potential 
infiuenrP of thr rlrrtroni:-· media on Amrncan thought, ~cr generally 
A. Krock, Tlw Con:;pnt of tlw Govrmrcl (i() (1971); H. :VIcndE'bohn & 
1 Crrsp1, Poll:; , TPlrvJsion, :md thr :'\rw Politic;.; 251), 264 ( 1970): 
.:Vlal01w, ~upm. n. 24. at Hli. 
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tronic media are today "the public's primary source of 
information,""' and we have ourselves recognized that 
broadcast "technology ... supplants atomized, relatively 
informal communication with mass media as a prime 
source of national cohesion and news .... " Red Lion 
Broadcasting Co. \'. FCC, supra, at 386 n. 15. Thus, 
although "full and free discussion" of ideas may havP 
bern a reality in the heyday of political pamphleteering, 
modern technological developments in the field of com-
munications have made the soap box orator and the 
leafleteer virtually obsolete'. And, in light of the current 
dominance of the electronic media as the most effective 
means of reaching the public. any policy that absolutely 
denies citizens access to the airwaves necessarily renders 
even the concept of "full and free discussion'' practically 
meaningless. 
Regrettably, it is precisely such a policy that the Court 
upholds today. In an C'ffort to justify this result. the· 
Court apparently rests upon the argument that even a 
limited scheme of editorial advertising would impair the 
broadcaster's assertedly overriding interest in exercising· 
absolute control over "his'' frequency."" This analysis, 
'17 H. R. Rrp. No. !H-:257, 9ht Cong., 1st Se:s;;., 6 (1969). Accord-
ing to one :study, 67 % of Amrncans prdrr thr elrctronic mrdia to 
other sources of information. See G Wyckoff, Thr Imagr Can-
didates 13- 14 (1968). Srr abo Amendment of Sections 73 . .3.?, 73.240, 
and 73.636 of the Comm~ssiou's Rules, 22 F. C. C. 2d :339, 344 (1970) 
(59 % of Amrncans rlrprnd on telrvision a:s their principal sourer of 
neWiS) . 
as11 :should be notrd that, although the Fa1rnrss Doctrinr is at 
least arguably relrvant to thr public's mterest m rece1ving suitable· 
rxposmr to "uninhibitrd, robust , and wide-open" debatr on contro-
versial 1ssues, it IS not in an)· :srn::;r rrlrvant to t hr individual's 
intrrrst 111 obtaming accrss to thr :urwavr:s for the purpose of rffPc-
tive srlf-rxprrssion. For tlw individual';; intrrrst in rxpressing his 
own virw;; in a mannrr of h1;; own choosing is an mhrrrntly prrsonal 
onr, and it can nrvrr br :;at1sfird b~· the exprrsswn of "~imilar" virws 
by a :-;urrogatr ::>pokr;;;man .. 
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however, hardly reflects the delicate balancing of interests 
that this sensitive question demands. Indeed, the 
Court's "absolutist" approach wholly disregards the com-
peting First Amendment rights of all "non-broadcaster'; 
citizens. ignores the teachings of our recent decision in 
Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, supra, and is not 
supported by the historical purposes underlying broad" 
cast regulation in this Nation . 
Prior to 1927, it must be remembered, it was clearly 
recognized that the broadcast spectrum was part of the 
public domain. As a result. the allocation of frequen~ 
cies was left entirely to the private sector,"" and groups 
and individuals therefore had the same right of access 
to radio facilities as they had. and still have, to the 
printed press- that is. "anyone who will may transmit." '" 
Under this scheme, however. the number of broadcasters 
increased so dramatically that by 1027 every frequency 
was occupied by at least one station, and ma11y were 
occupied by several. The result was "confusion and 
chaos. With everybody on the air. nobody could be 
heard." Yational Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 
319 U. S. 190. 212 (1943). It soon became "apparent 
that broadcast frequencies constituted a scarce resourc~ 
whose use could be regulated and rationalized only by 
the Government." Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 
supra, at 376. Thus. in the Radio Act of 1927, 44 ~tat. 
1162 ( 1927). Congress placed the broadcast spectrum 
under federal regulation and sought to reconcile com-
peting uses of the airwaves by setting aside a limited 
" ' Indrrd, prr-1927 reguJatiOJI of radio gavr no di~crrt10n to the 
.Frdrral Govrrnmrnt to drny thr right to oprratr a broadcast 1:>tatiou. 
Srr 1 A. Socolow, Thr Law of Hadio Broadcasting :38 (1939) ; 
H. Warnrr, Hadio & Trlevi,.;Ion L11w 757 et seq. (194R) ; ~er gt>n-
rrally National Broadr-asting C'o. v. United States. :H9 U. S. 190, 
210-214 (194:3) . 
'"(i7 Cong. Rrc . 5-!79 (Ht>p Whitr) . 
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number of frequencies for each of the important uses 
of radio:' 1 And, since the number of frequencies allo-
cated to public broadcasting was necessarily limited, the 
Government was compelled to grant licenses to some 
applicants while denying them to others. See generally 
Red Lion Broadcasting Co . v. FCC, supra, at 375-377, 
388; National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, supra, 
at 210-214. 
Although the overriding need to avoid overcrowding 
of the airwaves clearly justifies the imposition of a ceil-
ing on the number of individuals who will be permitted 
to operate broadcast station., and, indeed, renders it 
"idle to posit an unabridgeable First Amendment right 
to broadcast comparable to the right of every individual 
to speak, write or publish," '" it does not in any sense 
dictate that the continuing First Amendment rights of 
all nonlicensees be brushed aside entirely. Under the 
41 These includr, of coun;e, not only public broadca:,;ting, but al~o 
"amatrur operation, aircraft, police, defrm;e, and navigation .... " 
Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, supra, at 888. 
4
" Although thi~ licensing scheme nrresl:iarily reBtrictl:i the First 
Amendment right · of tho~r groups or individual~ who are denied the 
"right" to oprrate a broadca,;t station, it doe:,; not, in and of itself, 
violate the Fin;t Amenclmrnt. For it has long been recognized that 
when "[c]omprting demands 011 tlw tlame [forum] ... compel the 
I Governmrnfl to make rhoirr:s among potential usns and uses," 
neutral rule" of allocation to govern that scarce communications 
rrsourre are not pe1' se unron~t itutional. Police Dept. of Chicago 
v. Mosley, 408 U. S. 92, 98 (197:2); cf. Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U. S. 
536, 554 (1965); Cox v. New Hampshire. 312 U.S. 369, :374·(1940); 
Schneider v. State, 308 U. S. 147, 160 (19:39). And, in the con-
text of broadcasting, it would br iromc indeed ''if the First Amend-
ment, aimed at protecting and furthering communications, prevented 
the Government from making radio communication posBible ... 
by limiting thr number of license:; so a~ not to overcrowd the 
~pectrum." Red Lion Broadcasti11g Co. v. FCC, SU]Jra, at 389 .. 
•·a Rea Lion Broadcasting Co. v, PCC. supra, at :38R. 
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existing system, broadcast licensees arc gran ted a pre-
ferred status with respect to the airwaves, not because 
they have competed successfully in the free market but, 
rather, "because of their initial government selec-
tion .... " Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, supra~ 
at 400. And, in return for that "preferred status,'' 
licensees must respect the competing First Amendment 
rights of others . Thus, although the broadcaster has a 
clear First Amendment right to be free from Government 
censorship in the expression of his own views " and, 
indeed, has a significant interest in exercising reasonable 
journalistic control over the use of his facilities, " [ t J he 
right of free speech of a broadcaster ... does not ern-
brace a right to snuff out the free speech of others." !d., 
at 387. Indeed. after careful consideration of the nature 
of broadcast regulation in this country, we have specifi-
cally declared that. 
" ... as far as the Ftrst Amendment is concerned 
those who are licensed stand no better than those 
to whom licenses are refused. A license permits 
broadcasting, but the licensee has no constitutional 
right to ... monopolize a radio frequency to the 
exclusion of his fellow citizens." !d., at 389. 
Because I believe this view is as sound today as when 
voiced only four years ago. I can only conclude that 
there is simply no overriding First Amendment i11terest 
of broadcasters that can justify the absolute exclusion 
of virtually all of our citizens from the most effective 
''marketplace of ideas" ever devised. 
This is not to say, of course. that broadcasters have 
no First Amendment interest in exercising JOUrnalistic 
supervtswn over the use of their facilities. On the 
r.ontrary, such a 11 interest does indctYI exist. and it is an 
11 SeE' , e o . 47 l I S, ( · ~ :\21) 
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interest that must be weighed heavily in any legitimate 
effort to balance the competing First Amendment in-
terests involved in this case. In striking such a balance, 
however, it must be emphasized that this case deals 
only with the allocation of advertising_IJ!ne-airtime that 
broadcasters regularly relinquish to others without tlw 
retention of significant editorial control. Thus, we are 
concerned here not with the speech of broadcasters them-
selves'" but, rather, with their "right" to decide which 
other individuals will be given an opportunity to speak 
in a forum that has already been opened to the public. 
Viewed in this context, the absolute ball on editorial 
advertising seems particularly offensive because, although 
broadcasters refuse to sell any airtime whatever to groups 
or individuals wishing to speak out on controversial issues 
of public importance, they make such airtime readily 
available to those "conunercial" advertisers who seek to 
peddle their goods and services to the public. Thus. as 
the system now operates, any person wishing to market 
a particular brand of beer. soap, toothpaste. or deodorant 
has direct, personal, and instantaneous access to the 
electronic media. He cau present his own message, in 
his own words, in any format he selects and at a time of 
his own choosing. Y rt a similar indivicl ual seeking to 
discuss war. peace, pollution. or the suffering of the 
poor is denied this right to speak. Instead. he is com-
pelled to rely on the beneficence of a corporate "trustee" 
appointed by the Government to argue his case for him. 
lt has long been recognized. however. that although 
access to public forums may be ~ubJectrd to rrasonable 
"' Tllll~, a~ t I](' Court of AppPal~ recognJZ<'d ' .. r I In norma) pro-
grammmg t 1mr, rlo,.;el~ · cont rollrd and eel itrd by broadca~t erH, thr 
con~tt'llation of con,.;tttutional ulterr;;t,.; would br ~uh;;tnntially dif-
ferPnt. •· 450 F. 2cl, at (i'M. 
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"time, place, and manner" regulations,"' "[s]elective 
exclusions from a public forum may not be based on 
content alone .... '' Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley, 
supra, at 96 (emphasis added); see, e. g., Shuttlesworth 
v. City of Birmingham, 394 U. S. 147 ( 1960); Edwards 
v. South Carolina, supra; fi'owler v. Rhode Island, 354 
U. S. 67 ( 1953); Siernotko v. Maryland, 340 U. S. 268 
(1951); Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558 (1948). Here, 
of course, thE> differential treatment accorded "commer-
cial" and "controversial" speech clearly violates that 
principle." Moreover, and not without some irony, the 
favored treatment given "commercial" speech under the 
existing scheme clearly reverses traditional First Amend-
ment priorities. For it has generally been understood 
that "commercial" speech enjoys less First Amendment 
protection than speech directed at the discussion of con-
troversial issues of public importance. See, e. g., Breard 
v. City of Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951); Valentine v. 
Chrestensen, 316 U. S. 52 (1952). 
The First Amendment values of individual self-
fulfillment through expression and individual participa-
tion in public debate are central to our concept of libE>rty. 
If these values are to survive in the age of technology, 
it is essential that individuals be permitted at least some 
opportunity to express their views on public issues over 
'"See, e. g., fJolice Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley, supra, at 98; 
Gtayned v. Cit!! of Rorkfo1'd, supra, at 115; Cox v. Louisiana. supra, 
at 554; Poulos v. New Hampshi1'e, :345 U.S. 395, :39~ (195:3); Cox 
v. Nev• 1-fampshirr. liUpra. at 575-57(i; Schneider v. State. supra, at 
HiO. 
17 Contrary to the Court'~ a~~rrtion, the <'xi~tt"nC<' of tbr Fairnes~ 
Doctrine cannot in any ~eiW' ratiOnalize 1111~ d1~crimmat ion. Indeed , 
tht• Fairne~::; Doctnne ~~ wholl~· unrr~pon~ivr to the need for mdivid-
nal accr~H to thr airwavr~ for thr purpoH<' of dfrctivr ~rlf-Pxpre~,;ion . 
Srr abo n. :38, suprn. 
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tlw electronic media. Balancing those interests against 
the limited interest of broadcasters in exercising "jour-
nalistic supervision" over the mere allocation of advertis-
i1lg time that is already made available to some members 
of the public. I simply cannot agree with the Court's 
r.onclusion that the interest of broadcasters must prevail. 
TY 
Finally, the Court raises the spectre of administrative 
apocalypsr as justification for its decision today. Thus, 
the Court suggests that "[aJnything approaching an 
absolute n:ght of access to broadcast time would disrupt 
the mechanism Congress enacted to permit the Commis-
ion to adjust to the changing conditions of a dynamic 
medium.'' Ante, at- (emphasis added). The issue 
ln this case, however, is not whether there is an "absolute 
right of access" to the airwaves but, rather, whether there 
may be an absolute deuial of such access. The dif-
ference is, of course, crucial, and the Court's miscon-
ception of the issue presented seriously distorts its evalua-
tion of the admi11istrative difficulties that an invalidation 
of the absolute ban might conceivably entail. 
Specifically, the Court hypothesizes three potential 
sources of difficulty: ( 1) the availability of editorial ad-
vertising might, in the absence of adjustments in the 
system. tend to favor the wealthy; (2) application of the 
Fairness Doctrine to editorial advertising might ad-
versely affect the operation of that doctrine; and 
( 3) regulation of editorial advertising might lead to an 
enlargement of Government control over the content of 
broadcast discussio11. These are, of course, legitimate ( 
and, indeed, important concerns. But, at the present 
time. they are concerns-not realities. We simply have 
no sure way of knowing whether, and to what extent if 
any, these potential difficulties will actually materialize. 
The Court's bare assumption that these hypothetical 
problems are both in('vitable and inf)urmouptable indi~ 
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cates an utter lack of confidence in the ability of the 
Commission and licensees "to adjust to the changing 
conditions of a dynamic medium.'' This sudden lack of 
confidence is, of course, strikingly inconsistent with the 
general propositions underlying all other aspects of the 
Court's approach to this case. 
Moreover, it is noteworthy that, some 25 years ago, 
the Commission itself declared that 
" .. . the operation of any station under the ex-
treme principles that no time shall be sold for the 
discussion of controversial public issues ... is in-
consistent with the concept of public interest ... , 
The Commission recognizes that good program bal-
ance may not permit the sale or donation of time 
to all who may seek it for such purposes and that 
difficult problems calling for careful judgment on 
the part of station management may be involved 
in deciding among applicants for time when all 
cannot be accommodated. However, competent 
management should be able to meet such problems 
in the public interest and with fairness to all con-
cerned. The fact that it placed an arduous task 
on management should not be made a reason for 
evading the issue by a strict rule against the sale 
of time for any programs of the type mentioned." 
United Broadcasting Co., 10 F. C. C. 515, 518 ( 1945). 
I can see no reason why the Commission and licensees 
should be deemed any less competent today then they 
were in 1945. And even if intervening developments 
have increased the complexities involved in implementing 
a limited right of access, there is certainly no dearth of 
proposed solutions to the potential difficulties. feared by 
the Court. See, e. g., Canby, The First Amendment 
Right to Persuade: Access to Radio and Television. 19 
1'. C. L. A. L. Rev. 723, 754- 757 ( 1972); Malone, Broad-
casting, the Reluctant Dragon: Will the First Amend-
71- 63, ETC.-DISREXT (.\.) 
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ment Right of Access EIHl ~upprcssi11g of Controver-
sial ideas'?. 5 1'. Mich . .J. L. Ref. 103. 252- 2ti0 (Hl72); 
Johnson & \Vpstl'n. A Twentieth-Century Soapbox: The 
Right to Purchase Radio ami Television Time. 57 \~a, 
L. Rev. 574 (1071); ~otc, 8F) Harv. L. Rev. 68U, 693- 609 
(1972). 
With these coitsiderations in mind. the Court of Ap-
peals confined its<'lf to invalidating the flat ban alone. 
leaving broad latitude' " to the ( 'onunissio11 and lice I I SeC's 
to clC'velop in the first instance reasonable n'gulations to 
gowrn the a\·ailability of editorial advertisi11g. In the 
context of this case . this was surely the ,,·is(•st (:ourse to 
follow , for "if C'xperil•ncc ,,·ith the administration of thC'se 
doctrines indicates that they haw the 11et effect of 
reducing rather tha11 enhancing lFirst .\.ntendment 
value's 1. tlwrc will be time enough to r<'COitsider tht' 
constitutional implications." Red Lion Broadca.sting 
Co. v. FCC, supra, at 303. 
For the present. however. and until such time as these 
assertec!ly "overriding" administrative difficulties actually 
materiali;~,e, if ever . I must agree with the conclusion 
oJ the Court of Appeals that although "it may unsettle 
some of us to see an antiwar message or a political party 
mC'ssagc in the accustomed place of a soap or beer com-
lnercial .. . we must not equate what is habitual with 
what is right-or what is constitutional. .\ society 
alrrady so sa turatcd with commercial ism can \\'Cll afford 
another outlet for speech on public issue . All that we 
may lose is some of our apathy." 1" 
h The ( 'ourt of A ppc•al >' did , how<'V('I', ~uggrst <'<'rtain po~Hihll' 
c·ontour . ..: of tmpl<'m<•ntntion For rxampl<', tlw court notrd thnt 
l>roadca~t<' rs "houlcl h<' pc•rrrutt<•d "to plarc• an out~idc· limit on tlw 
total mnount of Pdilorial ath·ertistng thp~· will :-;!'1]," and "n'aHonahl<• 
I'PguJat lOll of thr pi:H'('Ill('llt of :id\'PI'(I:-<<'Ill(' lll~ i~ aJtogPt Jwr jlfO[l!'l'.' " 
~50 F . ~d. at 6():) . 
1 H -J.,'j() F. 1d , at (\(),5- (\()(J. 
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Mr. JusTICE DouGLAs, dissenting. / 
Congress has authorized the creation of the Corpora-
tion for Public Broadcasting, whose Board of Directors 
is appointed by the President by and with the advice of 
the Senate. 47 U. S. C. § 896. A total of 223 television 
and 560 radio stations made up this nationwide public 
broadcasting system as of June 30, 1972. See 1972 Cor-
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poration for Public Broadcasting, Annual Report. It is 
a nonprofit organization and by the terms of § 896 (b) is 
said not to be "an agency or establishment of the United 
States government." Y ct since it is a creature of Con-
gress whose management is in the hands of a Board 
named by the President and approved by the Senate, it 
is difficult to see why it is not a federal agency engaged 
in operating a "press" as that word is used in the First 
Amendment. If these cases involved that Corporation, 
1 
we would have a situation comparable to that in which 
the United States owns and manages a prestigious news-
paper like the New York Times. Washington Post, and 
Sacramento Bee. The government as owner and man-
ager ·would not. as I sec it, be free to pick and choose 
s~ch ~ms as it desired. For by the First Amend-
ment it may not censor or enact or enforce any other 
"law" abridging freedom of the press. Politics. ideo-
logical slants, rightist or leftist tendencies could play no 
part in its design of programs. See Markel, Will It be 
Public or Private TV, World, March 13, 1973 . p. 57. 
More specifically. the programs tendered by the respond-
ents in the present cases could not then be turned down. 
Govern men tal action may be evidenced by various 
forms of supervi1;ion or control of private activities. 
Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U. S. 715. 
I have expressed the vimY that the activities of licensees 
of the government operating in the public domain are 
govcrumental actions, so far as constitutional duties and 
responsibilities are concerned. Sec Garner v. Louisiana, 
368 U. S. 157, 183-185 ( concurri11g); Lombard v. Lou-
isiana, 373 U. S. 267, 281 (dissenting); Moose Lodge v. 
Irvis, 407 U. S. 163, 179 (dissenting). It is somewhat 
the same idea expressed by the first Mr. Justice Harlan in 
his dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 554. But 
that view has not been accepted. It was rejected--m 
M oose odge and IS again rejec eel today. So it is in 
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hat posture of the problem that I make the following 
observatiOns. - -
]L ~ the Court holds, a broadcast license is not_ en-
gaged in gQ_~rnn~n_!~l _aetiOili9r llilrpo.§...es of the First 
Amendment, I fail to see how constitutionally we ca!_l 
t~ and the _£a~ii diff~;JiQy]llim "-;e treaL!_le"·s-
l!JlllQ,l'S. It wonlcl come as a surprise to the public as 
well as to publishers and editors of newspapers to be 
informed that a newly created federal bureau would 
hereafter provide "guidelines" for newspapers or promul-
gate rules that would give a federal agency power to 
ride herd on the publishing business to make sure that 
fair comment on all current issues was made. The 
sturdy people vvho fashioned the First Amendment would 
be shocked at that intrusion of government into a field 
which in this Nation has been reserved for individuals, 
whatever part of the spectrum of opinion they represent. 
Benjamin Franklin, one of the Founders who was in 
the newspaper business, wrote in simple and graphic 
form what I had ah·ays assumed was the basic American 
newspaper tradition that became implicit in the First 
Amendment; 
"In our early history one view was that the pub- 1 
lisher must open his columns 'to any and aU con-
troversialists, especially if paid for it.' " Mott, 
American Journalism, 55 (1962). 
"Franklin disagreDd, declaring that his newspaper 
was not a stagecoach, with seats for everyone; l10· 
offered to print pamphlets for private distribution, 
but refused to fill his paper with private alterca-
tions." 1 Ibid. 
It is said that TV and the radio have become so pow-
erful and exert such an influence on the public mind 
1 Congress provid(•d in 47 U. S. C. § 153 (h) that "a per::;on en-
i'•tgcd iu radio broadcasting shall not, insoh\r as such person i~ so-
engaged, be deemed a common carrier." 
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that they must be controlled by government. Some 
newspapers in our history have exerted a powerful-and 
some have thought-a harmful interest on the public 
mind. But even Thomas Jefferson, who knew how base 
and obnoxious the press could be, never dreamed of in-
terfering. For he thought that govermnent control of 
newspapers would be the greater of two evi1s. 2 
"I deplore ... the putrid state into which our 
newspapers have passed, and the malignity, the 
vulgarity, and mendacious spirit of those ·who write 
them. . . . These ordures are rapidly depraving 
the public taste. 
"It is however an evil for which there is no remedy, 
Our liberty depends on the freedom of the press, 
and that cannot be limited without being lost." 
Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U. S. 36, in a 
carefully written opinion that was built upon predecessor 
cases put the TV and the radio under a different regime. 
I did not participate in that decision and, with all respect, 
would not support it. Much argument could be made 
that a broadcast licensee is a governmental agency or 
instrumentality for First Amendment purposes. If so, 
it is or could become one part of the American press 
that could be moulded so as to suit the partisan de-
mands and needs of the day. Administration after ad-
ministration could toy with it to serve its sordid or its 
benevolent ends. In 1973-as in other years-there is 
clamoring to make the TV and radio emit those soporific 
messages that console certain groups. There are charges 
that these mass media are too slanted, too partisan, too 
hostile in their approach to candidates and the issues. 
The same cry of protest has gone up against the 
newspapers and magazines. When Senator Joseph Mc-
Carthy was at his prime, holding in his hand papers 
2 Democracy by Thoma~ Jcffcr:;on (Padoncr ed. 1939), pp. 150-151. 
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"containing the names of 208 communists in the State 
Department" (Feuerlicht, Joe McCarthy and Mc-
Carthyism ( 1972) c. 7) , there were scarcely a dozen 
papers in this Nation that stood firm for the citizen's 
right to due process and to First Amendment protection. 
That, however, was no reason to put the saddle of the 
federal bureaucracy on the backs of publishers. Under 
our Bill of Rights people are entitled to have extreme 
ideas, silly ideas, partisan ideas. 
The same is true, I believe, of the TV and radio. At 
times they have a nauseating mediocrity. At other times 
they show the dazzling brilliance of a Leonard Bernstein; 
anct they very often bring humanistic influences of far-
away people into every home. 
Both TV and radio news broadcasts frequently tip the 
news one direction or another and even try to turn a 
public figure into a character of disrepute. Yet so do 
the newspapers and the magazines and other segments of 
the press. Yet the standards of TV, radio, newspapers, 
or magazines~hetlier or excellence or mediocrity-are 
beyond the reach of government. Government-act-
ing throug 1 courts- isciplines lawyers. Government 
makes crinimal some acts of doctors and of engineers. 
But the First Amendment puts beyond the reach of 
government federal regulation of ne\vs agencies save 
only business or financial practices which do not in-
volve First Amendment rights. Conspicuous is the 
Associated Press v. United States, 326 U. S. 1, where en-
forcement of the antitrust laws against a news gathering 
agency was held to be not inconsistent with First Amend-
ment rights. 
There has been debate over the meaning of the First 
Amendment as applied to the States by reason of the 
Fourteenth. Some have thought that at the state level 
the First Amendment was somewhat "watered down" 
and did not have the full vigor which it had as applied to. 
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the Federal Government. See Roth v. United States, 
354 U. S. 476, 502-503 (Harlan, J., concurring). So far, 
that has been the minority view. See Malloy v. Hogan, 
378 U. S. 1, 10. But it is quite irrelevant here, for 
the First Amendment, like other parts of the Bill of 
Rights, was at the outset applicable only to the Fed-
eral Government.~ The First J\ mendment is 'vritten 
in terms that are absolute. Its command is that "Con-
gress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of 
speech or of the press .... " 
That guarantee, can, of course. be changed by a con-
stitutional amendment which can make all the press or 
segments of the press organs of government and thus 
control the news and information which people receive. 
Such a restructuring of the First Amendment cannot be· 
done by judicial fiat or by congressional action. The ban 
of "no" law that abridges freedom of the press is in my 
view total and complete.' The Alien and Sedition Acts, 
1 Stat. 566, 570, 1596, passed early in our history were 
plainly unconstitutional, as Jefferson believed. Jeffer-
son, indeed, said that by reason of the First Amendment 
"libels, falsehood, and defamation, equally with 
heresy and false religion, arc "·ithheld from the 
cognizance of federal tribunals. That therefore the 
act of the Congress of the United States. passed on 
the 14th of July, 1798, entitled An Act in Addition 
3 Barron v. JJayor of Baltimore, 7 Pet. 2-18. 
"The prrsR in 1hi.- rountr~·. likr thnt of Britnin. wn~ at one 1ime 
.·ub.icrt to contempt for it~ (•ommrnt~ on prnding; litigation. Toledo 
};cwspaper C'o. v. United States. 2-17 1'. S. 402. But thnt position 
wns rh:mgcu. See Briclucs \'. California, :n.t F. R. 252, 207. Frdrral 
habra.~ corpus, howeYcr, is available to gi\·e a man hi::; freedom and 
the proserntion an opportunity for a new trial where the conuuct 
of the pres~ has resulted in an unfair trial. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 
:384 U. S. 38. And changr of Yenue may be had where the local 
atmosphere has saturated the community with prejudice. See Rideau 
v. Louisiana., 373 U. S. 723. 
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to the Act entitled 'An Act for the Punishment of 
certain Crimes against the United States,' which does 
abridge the freedom of the press, is not law, but is 
altogether void, and of no force." 4 Ellot's Debates 
on the Federal Constitution ( 1876), p. 541. 
And see 15 Writings of Thomas Jefferson (mem. ed. 1904, 
p. 214; 14 id., at 116; 11 id., at 43-44). 
Those Acts hac! but a short life, and 've never returned 
to them. \Ve have, however, witnessed a slow encroach-
ment by government over that segment of the press 
that is represented by TV and radio licensees. Licens-
ing is necessary for engineering reasons; the spectrum 
is limited and 'mvelengths must be assigned to avoid 
stations interferillg" with each other. Red Lion Broad-
casting Co. v. FCC, supra, at 388. The Commission has 
a duty to encourage a multitude of voices by preventing 
monopolistic practices and by promoting technological 
developments that will open up new channels. But cen-
sorship a or editing or the screening by government of 
5 The Scnatr Rrport which arcompanicd tlw bill that brcnmc the 
Radio Act of 1927. 44 Stat. 1162 stated: 
'·If the clumncl,; of rndio tran~mission were unlimited in nutuber th~ 
importance of the regulatory body would be grca1l~· lcssrncd. but 
tlwsc channel:; arc nmited and restricted in number and the deciiiion 
as to who shall be permitted to usc them and on what trnns and for 
what periods of time, together with the other quesTions connec:tcd 
with the situation, requires the exerci~e of a high order of di~cretion 
nnd the most careful application of the prinriplcs of equitnble treat-
ment to all tlH' rlasses and interests affected. For thrse :mel other 
rrasons your committee decided thnt all powrr to regulate radio 
comnmnieation should be centered in one indcpendrnt bod.1·, a radio 
commi:>sion, granting it full and complrte authority oYer the entire 
sub,icct of radio." S. Rep. 772, 69th Cong., 1st Se~:'l., p. :1. 
a Currently, prr~s rrn~orship cover~ mosl- of thr glohe. In Brazil 
t.he present regime of censor~hip is pervasi,·c. As reported in the 
New York Times for Feb. 17, 1973, p. 11: 
"The censors' rules. issued a few months :1go and constantly 
nmended, cover :1 vast field nnd if strictly applied wonld leave th~ 
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what licensees may broadcast goes against the grnin of 
the First Amendment. 
The Court in National Broadcasting Co. v. United 
States, 319 U. S. 190, 226, said, "Unlike other modes of 
expression, radio inherently is not available to all. That 
is its unique characteristic, and that is why, ulllike other 
modes of expression, it 1s subject to governmental 
regulation." 
That uniqueness is due to engineering and technical 
problems. But the press in a realistic sense is likewise 
not available to all. Small or "underground" papers 
appear and disappear; and the weekly is an established 
institution. But the daily papers now established are 
unique in the sense that it would be virtually impossible 
for a competitor to enter the field due to the financial 
exigencies of this era. The result is that in practical 
terms the newspapers and magazines, like the TV and 
radio, are available only to a select few. That fact may 
argue for a redefinition of the responsibilities of the press 
in First Amendment terms. But I do not think it gives 
press little to discuss. In practice, however, much depends on the 
whims and f'11spicions of the local censors. 
"General prohibitions include protests against censort~hip, and 
discussion of '1 successor to President. Emilio Garrastazu Medici, 
whose term is up in 1974, campaigns against the Government's 
special po"'''rs by decree and sensational news that might hurt the 
image of Br~ zil. 
"Others are campaigns to discredit the national housing program, 
the finanri1l m1rket or other matters of vital importance to the 
Government, the playing np of assaults on banks or credit estab-
lishments, t ension between the Roman Catholic Church and the state, 
agitation in union and student circles, publicity for Communist per-
sonalities and nations. Criticism of state governorti and 'exaltation 
of immorality' through news of homosexuality, prostitution and drugs 
arc also barred. 
"The most contronrsial order issued by the l\1inister of Justice bst 
September, bans all news, comment or interviews on a political 
relaxation of the regime, on democracy for Brazil, and on the eco-
nomic and financial situation in general." 
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us carte blanche to design systems of supervision and 
control nor empower Congress to read the mandate in 
the First Amendment that "Congress shall make no· 
law ... abridging the freedom ... of the press" to mean 
that Congress may, acting directly or through any of 
its agencies such as FCC make "some" laws "abridging" 
freedom of the press. 
Powerful arguments, summarized and appraised in 
Emerson, The System of Freedom of Expression ( 1970), 
cc. XVII and XVIII, can be made for revamping or 
reconditioning the system. The present one may be 
largely aligned on the side of the status quo. The prob-
lem implicates our educational efforts which are bland 
and conformist and the pressures on the press, from po-
litical and from financial sources, to foist boilerplate 
points of view on our people rather than to display the 
diversities of ideologies and culture in a world which, as 
Buckminster Fuller said, has been "communized" by the 
radio. 
What kind of First Amendment would best serve our 
needs as we approach the 21st century may be an open 
question. But the old fashioned First Amendment that 
we have is the Court's only guideline; and one hard and 
fast principle which it announces is that government 
shall keep its hands off the press. That principle has 
served us through days of calm and eras of strife and I 
would abide by it until a new First Amendment is 
adopted. That means, as I view it, that TV and radio, 
as well as the more conventional methods for disseminat-
ing news, are all included in the concept of "press" as 
used in the First Amendment and therefore are entitled 
to live under the laissez faire regime which the First 
Amendment sanctions. 
The issues presented in this case are momentous ones .. 
The TV and radio broadcasters have mined millions by 
selling merchandise, not in selling ideas across the broad 
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spectrum of the First Amendment. But some news-
papers have done precisely that, loading their pages with 
advertisements; and for news they publish murders, hor-
ror stories. scandal, and slanclrrous matter touching the 
lives of public servants who have no recourse clue toN ew 
York 'Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U. S. 254. Commissioner 
Johnson of the FCC wrote in the present case a powerful 
dissent. He said: 
"Although the First Amendment " ·oulcl clearly ban 
governmental censorship of speech content, govern-
ment must be concerned about the procedural rules 
that control the public forums for discussions. If 
someone-a moderator, or radio-television licensee-
applies rules that give one speaker, or viewpoint, 
less time [or none at all] to present a position, then 
a censorship exists as invidious as outright thought 
control. There is little doubt in my mind that for 
any given forum of speech the First Amendment 
demands rules permitting as many to speak and be 
heard as possible. And if this Commission does 
not enact them, then the courts must require them."· 
But the prospect of putting government in a position \ 
of control over publishers is to me an appalling one. even 
to the extent that Red Lion went. The struggle for 
liberty has been a struggle against government. The· 
essential scheme of our Constitution and Bill of Rights 
was to take government off the backs of people. Separa-
tion of powers was one device. An independent judiciary 
was another device. The Bill of Rights \vas still another. 
And it is anathema to the First Amendment to allo\\· 
government any role of censorship over newspapers, mag-
azines, books, art, music, TV, radio or any other aspect 
of the press. There is unhappiness in some circles at 
the impotence of government. But if there is to be a 
change, let it come by constitutional amendment. The 
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Commission has an important role to play in curbing 
monopolistic practices, in keeping channels free from in-
terference, in opening up new channels as technology 
develops. But it has no power of censorship. 
It is said, of course, that government can control the 
broadcasters because their channels are in the public 
domain in the sense that they use the airspace that is 
tho common heritage of all the people. But they are a 
vital part of the press; and since the First Amendment 
allows no government control over it, I would leave these 
licensees, as I would leave the press, to their own devices. 
Licenses are, of course, restricted in time and while, in 
my view, they need not be renewed, there is no po,ver to 
deny them for editorial or ideological reasons, because the 
First Amendment gives no preference to one school of 
thought over the others. 
The Court in today's decision sanctions a federal sad-
dle on broadcast licensees that is agreeable to the tradi-
tions of nations that never have known freedom of 
press and that is tolerable in countries that do not have 
a written constitution containing prohibitions as absolute 
a.s those in tho First Amendment. The Court has made 
gren,t inroads on the First Amendment of which obscenity 
is only one of the many examples. So perhaps we are 
inching slmdy toward a controlled press. But the regime ~­
of federal supervision approved today is contrary to our 
constitutional mandate and makes the broadcast licensee 
an easy victim of political pressures and reduces him to 
a timid and submissive segment of the press whose meas-
ure of the public interest will now be echoes of the 
dominant political voice that emerges after every elec-
tion. Tho affair with freedom of which we have been 
proud will now bear only a faint likeness of our former 
robust days. 
I said that it would come as a surprise to the public as 
well as to publishers and editors of newspapers to learn 
1 
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that they were under a. newly created federal bureau .. 
Perhaps I should have said that such an event should 
come as a surprise. In fact it might not in view of the 
retrogressive steps \Ve have witnessed. 
We have allowed ominous inroads to be made on the 
historic freedom of the newspapers. The effort to sup-
press the publication of the Pentagon Papers failed only 
by a narrow margin and actually succeeded for a brief 
spell in imposing prior restraint on our press for the 
first time in our history. SeeN ew York Times v. United 
States, 403 U. S. 713. 
In recent years the admonition of Mr. Justice Black 
that the First Amendment gave the press freedom so 
that it might "serve the governed, not the governors" 
( id., at 717) has been disregarded. 
"The Government's power to censor the press was 
abolished so that the press would remain forever free to 
censure the Government. The press was protected so 
that it could bare the secrets of government and inform 
the people. Only a free and unrestrained press can ef-
fectively expose deception in government. And para-
mount among the responsibilities of a free press is the 
duty to prevent any part of government from deceiving 
the people and sending them off to distant lands to die 
of foreign fevers and foreign shot and shell." Ibid. 
The right of the people to know has been greatly 
undermined by our decisions requiring under pain of 
contempt a reporter to disclose the sources of the infor-
mation he comes across in investigative reporting. Branz-
burg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665. 
The Boston Globe reports: 7 
"In the last two years at least 20 Federal Grand 
Juries have been used to investigate radical or anti-
7 The Peoples need to Know, an Editorial Series, Boston Globe, 
January 21- 27, 1973. 
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war dissent. \Vith the power of subpoena, the pro-
ceedings secret, and not bound by the rules of evi-
dence required in open court, they have a lot more 
leverage than, for example, the old House Un-
American Activities Committee." 
Many reporters have been put in jail, a powerful 
weapon against investigative reporting. As the Boston 
Globe states "in realizing what is being undermined here 
is press freedom itself." s 
In the same direction is the easy use of the stamp 
"secret" or "top secret" which the Court recently ap-
proved in Environmental Protection Agency v. Mink, 40~ 
U. S. -. That decision makes a shambles of the Free-
dom of Information Act. In tune with the other re-
straints on the press are provisions of the new proposed 
Rules of Evidence which the Court recently sent to Con-
gress. Proposed Rule 509 (a)(2)(b) provides: 
"The government has a privilege to refuse to give 
evidence and to prevent any person from giving evi-
dence upon a showing of reasonable likelihood of 
danger that the evidence will disclose a secret of 
state or official information, as defined in this rule." 
Under the statute if Congress does not act, this new 
regime of secrecy is imposed on the Nation and the right 
of people to know is further curtailed. The proposed 
code sedulously protects the Government; it does not pro-
tect newsmen. It indeed pointedly omits any mention 
of the privilege of newsmen to protect their confidential 
sources. 
These growing restraints on newspapers have the same 
ominous message that the overtones of the present opin-
ion has on TV and radio licensees. 
The growing spectre of governmental control and 
surveillance over all activities of people makes ominous 
8 Ibid. 
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the threat to liberty by those who hold the executive 
power. Over and a.gain attempts have been made to 
use the Commission as a political weapon against the 
opposition, whether to the left or to the right. 
Experience has shown that unrestrained power cannot 
be trusted to serve the public weal even though it be in 
governmental hands. The fate of the First Amendment 
should not be so jeopardized. The constitutional man-
date that the government shall make "no law" abridging 
freedom of speech and the press is clear; the orders and 
rulings of the Commission are covered by that ban; and 
it must be carefully confined lest broadcasting-now our 
most powerful media-be used to subdue the minorities 
or help produce a Nation of people who walk submissively 
to the executive's motions of the public good. 
Mills v. Alabama, 384 U. S. 214, involved a prosecution 
of a newspaper editor for publishing, contrary to a state 
statute, an editorial on election day urging the voters to 
vote against the existing city commission and to replace 
it with a mayor-council government. This Court, speak-
ing through Mr. Justice Black, reversed the judgment 
saymg: 
". . . the press serves and was designed to serve as 
a powerful antidote to any abuses of power by gov-
ernmental officials and as a constitutionally chosen 
means for kcC'ping officials elected by the people 
responsible to all the people whom they were se-
lected to serve. Suppression of the right of the 
press to praise or criticize governmental agents and 
to clamor and contend for or against change, which 
is all that this editorial did, muzzles one of the very 
agencies the Framers of our Constitution thought-
fully and deliberately selected to improve our so-
ciety and keep it free. The Alabama Corrupt 
Practices Act by providing criminal penalties for 
publishing editorials such as the one here silences 
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the press at a time when it can be most effective. 
It is difficult to conceive of a more obvious and 
flagrant abridgment of the constitutionally guar-
anteed freedom of the press." Id., at 219. 
I would apply the same test to TY or radio.9 
What \V alter Lippman wrote about Coolidge's criticism 
of the press has present relevancy. President Coolidge, 
he said, had 
"declared for peace, goodwill, understanding, modera-
tion; disapproved of conquest, aggression, exploita-
tion; pleaded for a patriotic press, for a free press; 
denounced a nanow and bigoted nationalism, and 
announced that he stood for law, order, protection 
of life, property, respect for sovereignty and prin-
ciple of international law. Mr. Coolidge's catalog of 
the virtues was complete except for one virtue .... 
9 The monetflr~· and othrr burclrns impos<'cl on the pr<'SS by the 
right, of a criticizrd person to reply, like the traditional damage 
rrmedy for libt'l, lrad of rour~c to self-cen~orship rc.,prrting mat-
trrs of import:mre to the public that i he First Amendment denies 
the G01·crnment the power to impose. The burdens eertainl~· arr ns 
onerous as the indirect rr~trirtions on Fir~t Amendment. rights which 
we haYe strnrk clown: (1) the requirement that a books<'Iler examine 
the contents of his shop; Smith v. Call:fornia, 361 U. S. 147 (1959); 
(2) the requirement that a magazine publisher im·estigat!' hi~ adYrr-
tisers, Manual Enterprises, Inc. v. Day, 370 U. S. 478, 492--4!)3' 
(1962) (opinion of Harlan, J.); (3) tho requirement that names 
and addressc~ of sponsor;; be printed on handbills, Talley v. Cali-
fornia, 362 U.S. 60 (1960); (4) the requirement that organizations 
supply membership lists, Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation 
Committee, 372 U. S. 539 (1963); Louisiana ex rel. Gremillion v. 
NAACP, 366 U. S. 293 (1961); Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 
U. S. 51G (1960); KAACP v. Alabama, 357 U. S. 449 (1958); and 
(5) the requiremrnt that indi,·idunls disrlose organizational mem-
bers, Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U. S. 479 (1960). In c..'tch instance 
we held the restriction unconstitutional on the ground that it dis-
couraged or chilled constitutionally protected rights of speech, press 
or associn tion. 
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"That is the humble realization that God has not 
endowed Calvin Coolidge with an infallible power 
to determine in each concrete case exactly what is. 
right, what is just, what is patriotic. . . . Did he 
recognize this possibility, he would not continue to 
lecture the press in such a way to make it appear 
that when newspapers oppose him they are un-
patriotic, and that when they support him they do· 
so not because they think his case is good but be-
cause they blindly support him. Mr. Coolidge's: 
notion ... would if it were accepted by the Amer-· 
ican press reduce it to utter triviality." Luskin, 
Lippman, Liberty, and the Press, p. - (1972). 
A scholar 10 who knows history has recently said: 
"The ground rules of our democracy, as it has grown, 
require a free press, not necessarily a responsible or 
a temperate one. There aren't any halfway stages. 
As Aristophanes saw, democracy means that power 
is generally conferred on second-raters by third-
raters, whereupon everyone else, from first-raters to 
fourth-raters, moves with great glee to try to dis-
lodge them. It's messy but most politicians under-
stand that it can't very well be otherwise and still 
be a democracy." 
10 Douglas J. Stewart of Brandeis University writing in review of 
Epstein, Newt> from Nowhere: Television and the News (1972) in 
Book World, March 25, 1973, pp. 4-5. 
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MR. J usTICE BLACKMUN, concurring. 
I join the Court's judgment and Parts I, II and IV of 
its opinion. I am of the view that it is not necessary, 
in this case, to reach and decide the issue of the presence 
or absence of governmental action. I therefore would 
defer resolution of that issue to another time and case. 
The Court of Appeals recognized that it "matters little" 
--------
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''"hether its decision be regarded as one based on the First 
Amendment or as one interpreting the Communications 
Act in the light of that Amendment. 450 F. 2d, at 649. 
The Act certainly embraces First Amendment values. 
Assuming then, for purposes of this case, that govern-· 
mental action is present, the Court, in Part IV of its 
opinion, effectively demonstrates for me that the First 
Amendment does not compel the result reached by the 
Court of Appeals. Thus, the governmental action issue-
does not affect the outcome of this case, and I refrain 
from deciding it. 
